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THIRD SERIES. No. III.—JULY, 1869.

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ART. I.—MR. MILL AND HIS CRITICS.

By FRANCIS BOWEN, Professor in Harvard University.

SECOND PAPER.

“MATTER, then,” says Mr. Mill, according to his “Psychological Theory,” “may be defined a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter; *and so do all Berkeleians*. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirm with confidence, that this conception of Matter *includes the whole meaning attached to it by the common world*, apart from philosophical, and sometimes from theological, theories.”

Here is an implied assertion, that his definition of Matter coincides with Berkeley's doctrine of Idealism, and a direct assertion, that it includes the whole meaning attached to the conception of Matter by ordinary people, who are neither philosophers nor theologians. We dispute both positions. Bishop Berkeley affirms the necessity of a Cause, an Efficient Cause, to account for the ideas or sensations in our minds; and as he says “there is nothing of power or agency” in the ideas themselves, as “it is impossible for an idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything,” he has a right to conclude, as he does, “there is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which pro-

duces and changes them." This cause he elsewhere affirms to be a mind or spirit, since he can have "no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can I conceive of volition to be anywhere but in a spirit;" therefore, "I assert as well as you, that since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without in a being distinct from ourselves." The ideas imprinted on my senses, he argues further, "are not creatures of my will; there is, therefore, some other will or spirit that produces them." Berkeleian Idealism, then, affirms the principle of causality, and thereby proves the existence of a Not-Self,—of a Divine mind, and other human minds besides my own; it denies material substance, but affirms spiritual causation and the efficiency of volition. Mr. Mill repudiates Efficient Causation altogether; and by admitting the existence only of Sensations and Possibilities of Sensation, he unpeoples the universe, and leaves his single "thread of consciousness" alone in creation. Berkeley spiritualizes Matter; Mill annihilates it.

The progenitor and sponsor of Mill's system is not Bishop Berkeley, but David Hume, who taught that "nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions," and that "it is impossible for us to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions." Setting aside some metaphysicians, he thinks he "may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." "The mind," he affirms, "is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different [times]; whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. *They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind*; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed."



Just as little can the "Psychological Theory" be sheltered under the common opinion on this subject entertained by the vulgar. Ordinary people certainly attribute their sensations to some Cause operating upon their organs from without; and this Cause they believe to be *something*, they know not what, the unknown seat or substratum of the qualities which affect their senses. The notions of Efficient Cause and Substance, far from being mere "metaphysical entities" excogitated by a few philosophers and theologians, must be classed among the most primitive and familiar impressions and beliefs of the great bulk of mankind. Mr. Mill's doctrine is the metaphysical refinement; that which he impugns is the common belief of all men, except a few philosophers.

Whatever evidence there may be, on the ordinary or Intuitionist theory, "that I have any fellow creatures, or that there are any Selves except mine," says Mr. Mill, "exactly that same evidence is there" of the existence of these other Selves on the Psychological Theory. We deny that his doctrine affords him any such evidence, or even authorizes him to trust his memory, to admit his own personal identity, or to entertain any expectation whatever. If we know nothing but sensations or feelings, occurring singly or in groups, together with their sequences, coexistences and similitudes, and are not at liberty to assume any *cause* for these phenomena, other than their invariable antecedents and concomitants, then we can not *know* even the poor "*thread* of consciousness" to which Mr. Mill has reduced his own individual being. His own Mind may be a string of beads, but it is one which is constantly slipping through his fingers, since he grasps it only by one bead at a time, neither the past nor the future being in any manner *present* to consciousness. We have no better right to infer the actual existence of the Past from a present consciousness which merely *represents* that Past, than we have to infer the existence of the table, as an external reality, from the consciousness of the sensations which we believe the table excites. On this point, Hume is consistent and logical, while Mill is the reverse. If Perception, which is a continuous phenomenon, the sensations abiding till we voluntarily turn

away from the object that produces them,—if Perception, we say, plays us false, what better guaranty have we of the faithfulness of Memory, which is avowedly nothing but a mental picture, a mere representative image, and comparatively a faint one, of what is past and gone? The cardinal feature of Mr. Mill's theory is, that a phenomenon avouches incontestably nothing but its own phenomenal existence and characteristics. We might as well admit our own causative energy, though, according to Mr. Mill, we have direct evidence only of the effects produced by it, as admit the reality of a Past, of which only an adumbration now floats before consciousness. The irresistible character of the belief which accompanies it is no valid evidence before the court where Mr. Mill presides; such testimony, in the case of Perception, he rules out without ceremony.

Besides the permanent group of Possibilities of Sensation, which he calls his own body, Mr. Mill argues that there are other similar groups, representing other human bodies, each exhibiting a set of phenomena such as he knows, in his own case, to be effects of consciousness, "and such as might be looked for if each of the bodies has really in connexion with it a world of consciousness." But, to him, these groups are only forms of the Ego, and can not be resolved into a Non-Ego, except by admitting the doctrine of Efficient Causation, or of immediate perception, or of that irresistible but inexplicable belief which is only another name for *knowledge*, or of an *a priori* law of thought. Through dwelling upon the doctrine that Matter is only a name for an aggregate of possible sensations, he has so far objectified the group in his own conception of it, as to forget the subjective character of all the elements of which it is composed. But it is objectified only in thought; it is a mere subject-object. A Possibility of Sensation is only his *expectation*, (a pure state of his own mind,) that the given Sensation, (another mental state,) will revive under certain circumstances.

Mr. Mill was betrayed into the inconsistency of admitting "memories and expectations" into that thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life, through the

exigencies of the case; for, of course, without remembrance and anticipation, no inductive reasoning would be possible, and there would be no experience beyond that of the present moment. This is the gulf of utter scepticism into which Hume willingly plunged; Mr. Mill struggles bravely to get out of it, but his own consistency must be sacrificed before he can gain foothold on the solid ground above. For what are these "memories and expectations?" "In themselves," he rightly says (p. 241), "they are present feelings, states of present consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished from sensations." But he adds, "They all, moreover, *resemble some given sensations or feelings, of which we have previously had experience*;" and each of them, also, "*involves a belief in more than its own present existence.*"

How does Mr. Mill know that they "resemble" some of our former sensations, since these previous phenomena are not now before us? And what guaranty has he of the validity of that "belief," by which they are accompanied? True, they affirm such resemblance, and assert this belief. But Mr. Mill, in other cases, has refused even to listen to such allegations. The presence of the sensation is an immediate datum of consciousness; but the validity of any knowledge, assertion or belief implied in that sensation, or inseparably associated with it, is not an immediate datum of consciousness, and can not be admitted without building up again that real objective world, both of Matter and Mind, which the "Psychological Theory" has resolved into a mere dream. There is no reason, then, why Mr. Mill should hesitate, at the last moment, to carry out his theory of the Mind or Ego to its farthest consequences. There is no "inexplicable fact" in the case. The presence of alleged "memories and expectations" in the series ought not to have perplexed him, any more than the presence of alleged "perceptions."

We can learn that another mind is acting near us only from sensible evidence of the presence and actions of another body—a tall, featherless biped—now affecting our faculties of sight and touch. Taking for granted the actual existence of this biped, Mr. Mill argues that the similarity of its outward form

and actions to those of my own body, and my consciousness that *my* actions are connected with *my* thoughts and volitions, authorize me to conclude, by legitimate inductive evidence, that the biped's actions are connected with *his* thoughts; that he, also, has a Mind. Furthermore, he affirms, that having supposed the biped possesses thoughts and feelings similar to my own, "I find that my subsequent consciousness presents those very sensations, of speech heard, of movements and other outward demeanor seen, and so forth, which, being the effects or consequents of actual feelings in my own case, I should expect to follow upon those other hypothetical feelings [of the biped], if they really exist; and thus the hypothesis is verified."

But this argument is open to two fatal objections.

1. What right have I to take for granted the real presence before me of one mass of matter—the biped,—when I deny the real presence of another aggregation of matter—the desk,—the evidence for the existence of the two being avowedly the same,—namely, the existence of a group of sensations, and believed possibilities of sensations, in my own mind; or, rather, the existence of them *somewhere*, though in no definite locality; since Mr. Mill is by no means sure of the reality of his own Mind or Self, and does not believe the real externality to us of anything, "except other minds?" It seems a paradoxical distinction, by the by, to assert the externality—that is, the existence in space—of other *minds*, and to deny the externality of all *bodies*, his own included.

2. The correspondence of the relation between the observed actions and supposed feelings of the biped with the relation between my own actions and feelings can be affirmed only on the ground of my *remembrance* of the manner in which I acted and was affected on a previous occasion, when the circumstances were similar. To borrow an illustration adopted by Mr. Mill from one of his critics, if the biped screams when he cuts his finger, I can infer that he feels pain, only because I remember what my own feelings were, some time ago, when I experienced a similar accident. But Memory, we repeat, is a witness that has been turned out of court, and can not bear

witness to the similarity either of the feelings, or of the circumstances that generated the feelings.

Mr. Mill repeatedly charges his critics with inability to think themselves fully into the theory which they deny, or to form that accurate and entire conception of it which is necessary before it can be fairly judged. We fear the accusation may be retorted; for it does not seem that he himself is always fully aware of the narrowness of the basis on which his theory rests, and of the consequent difficulty of enlarging it enough to meet all the exigencies of the case. He does not always remember that, to him, the universe must be contained within the limits of his own consciousness at any one moment. He has before him, not a record of the whole, or any considerable portion, of the history of his consciousness, but only an almost momentary glimpse of its condition and contents at the instant of observation, this picture fading out entirely when succeeded by another of the series. That some of these states of his own mind report themselves, when thus observed, as "memories" and "expectations," is a fact of no more importance than the corresponding one, that others give themselves out, with equal strength of assertion, as "internal" and "external" states of consciousness, or as forms of the Ego or the Non-Ego. He must admit that imagination can simulate the Past at least as perfectly as the Present. The "expectation" can not even be justified by the subsequent event; for when that event comes round, the expectation of it already exists only in memory.

Let us now go back for a moment to Mr. Mill's doctrine of empiricism,—to his attempt to account for the presence of necessary and universal truths in the human mind, not by tracing them, after the manner of Leibnitz and Kant, to *a priori* laws of human thought, but by trying to generate them from experience through the law of Inseparable Association. It is unlucky that he allows himself to be so far heated by opposition as to lose caution in the statement of his extreme opinions, and to express himself in a tone of far more confident dogmatism about those doctrines which he espouses against the authority of nearly all the great metaphysicians of an ear-

lier day, than on those points where the authority both of philosophers and of the world at large is certainly in his favor. In this respect, he often reminds us of Hobbes, who was never more vehement and dogmatic than in defending his solution of the difficulty of squaring the circle. We have had one amusing instance of this peculiarity on the part of Mr. Mill, in his sweeping and almost fierce statement of the conceivability of Infinite Space. The following is intended to be an equally resolute and thorough-going expression of the doctrine of empiricism: "As for the *feeling* of necessity, or what is termed a necessity of thought, it is, (as I have already observed,) of all mental phenomena positively the one, which an inseparable association is the most evidently competent to generate." p. 355. When a disputant has thus gallantly thrown away the scabbard, it seems almost a pity to remind him, that his very statement of the question precludes the possibility of his finding an opponent. Of course, if two ideas are *inseparably* associated, it is a "necessity of thought" to think them together; one might as well declare, with great emphasis, that two and two *do* make four. The real question is, whether mere experience of the simultaneity, or immediate consecutiveness, of two thoughts can be so uniform, and so many times repeated, as to make it impossible to think one without the other; or, in other words, to generate an *inseparable* association between them. Mr. Mill affirms that it can; Leibnitz, Kant, Hamilton, and many others, say that it can not.

The Leibnitzian doctrine is well expressed by Mr. Mansel, "that whatever truths we are compelled to admit as everywhere and at all times necessary, must have their origin, not without, in the laws of the sensible world, but within, in the constitution of the mind itself." All attempts, he adds, to trace such cognitions to experience and the association of ideas are vain, "*because other associations, as frequent and as uniform, are incapable of producing a higher conviction than that of a relative and physical necessity only.*" As Mr. Mill admits the fairness and sufficiency of this test, the question is one which can be, at least in part, decided by an appeal to facts.



A necessary conjunction of two phenomena or ideas is one the separation of which is impossible *even in thought*. A necessity of *thinking*, and not of merely *acting* or *feeling*, in a certain manner, is what we are now concerned with. Hamilton asserts that "the necessity of so thinking can not be derived from a custom of so thinking," and that "the customary never reaches, never even approaches, to the necessary." Mill cites in reply the instance of the paviour, who "can not" use his rammer without crying "ha!" and of the orator, who was unable to speak without twirling a string round his finger, as "examples of a customary which did approach to, and *even reach*, the necessary." We submit that both cases are irrelevant, since the alleged inability was only one of *acting* without the usual trick, while both parties were perfectly able to *imagine* themselves acting either with or without the ordinary accompaniment. Equally irrelevant are the instances cited of irrepressible emotion produced by revisiting the scenes where great fright or great sorrow had been experienced; the very effort the sufferers made to control their feelings proves that they could and did *imagine* this effort to be successful.

1. Two straight lines, which are parallel in any portion of their length, can not meet, *however far extended* in either direction; that is, can not inclose a space. This is an absolute necessity of thought, since its contradictory can not even be imagined. Moreover, it is easily cognized as necessary, even by a youth who has just been so far introduced to the mere elements of geometry as to fully know what parallelism means; who has consequently had comparatively little experience, either through his senses or his imagination, of parallel lines; who has never seen or imagined such lines extended, except to a very short distance; and who, indeed, has been most conversant with apparent exceptions to the truth, as in looking up a long street, bridge or railroad, where perspective *seems* to bring the two lines together. Here, then, is a necessary truth preceded by so little experience that it can not have been generated by association.

2. On the other hand, uniform experience, repeated almost every moment of our lives, assures us that all bodies gravitate,

so that, (in the case of terrestrial bodies,) if left unsupported, they fall or sink to the ground or bottom; and the *apparent* exceptions to this law, as in the case of a balloon rising in the air, and of corks or other light substances, perhaps simulating stones in appearance, continuing to float in water, are few and infrequent, and are so easily and fully explained away, that they are properly classed with those exceptions which confirm the rule. Yet it is perfectly easy to *imagine* the contradictory of this law,—that material substances should not fall, but remain suspended in space; or, if they did move, that they should not fall *downwards*, but sidewise, in any horizontal direction, or upwards. Even Mr. Mill admits, that we can without difficulty “form the imagination of a stone suspended in the air.” In this case, therefore, unbroken and multiplied experience does not create any necessity of thought.

Now observe the inconsistency of Mr. Mill's reasoning upon these two cases, so obviously incompatible with his theory. He says that my inability to conceive of two parallels meeting is not removed by witnessing numerous cases of the seeming convergence of two such lines; because further experience, or a moment's consideration, explains the illusion of the apparent, but unreal, coming together of the lines. Very well; then illusory appearances to the contrary, if easily explained away, do not so break the uniformity of the association as to prevent it from becoming indissoluble. And yet, in the case of the stone falling to the bottom of the water, he affirms that our seeing light substances simulating stones continue to float, though readily accounted for, is enough to vitiate the otherwise uniform testimony of experience, and therefore to prevent the inseparable association from being formed. It is a poor rule that will not work both ways. Why does not the correction of the mistake, and the consequently proved fact that the testimony of well-understood experience is really all on one side, create an impossibility of conceiving the other side in the case of the stone, as well as in that of the parallel lines?

We are now prepared to examine Mr. Mill's mode of explaining the genesis of that necessity of thought which we call the universal Law of Causation. It is an irresistible and

universal belief, that every event, every change, which takes place in the outer world, must have a Cause. "In the outer world," we say, wishing to avoid, for the present, the dispute as to the universal applicability of this law to the phenomena of Mind. But no one disputes, no one *can* dispute, the necessity of believing that, in the case of Matter, no change can take place without a Cause. Mr. Mill attempts to resolve this Law into mere Invariability of Sequence. Uniform and oft-repeated experience, he says, has assured us that, "for every event, there exists some combination of objects or events, some given concurrence of circumstances, positive and negative, the occurrence of which will always be followed by that phenomenon." Such experience, according to his theory, creates an Inseparable Association in the mind between any event whatever, and *some* Invariable Antecedent of that event. No matter whether we have yet discovered the proper Antecedent of this particular phenomenon, or not. The mere association of ideas, created by the frequency and uniformity of experience in similar cases, makes it impossible for us not to believe that *there is* such an Antecedent, such a conjuncture of circumstances, special to this phenomenon, to be found somewhere.

We are not now considering the objective validity of this Law of Causation. No one doubts *that*; the progress of physical science settled that point long ago. We are now inquiring only about the origin of that Necessity of *Thought* which compels us to *believe* that there *must be* such a Cause, or such an Invariable Antecedent, for every phenomenon, whether it has yet been discovered or not;—a Necessity of *Thought* which is just as incumbent upon the thickest skulled rustic as upon the man of science, upon the boy as the man, upon the religious mystic as the hard-headed infidel;—which governed the thoughts, and thereby the actions, of men, just as absolutely and universally before the time of Galileo and Bacon, of Archimedes and Aristotle, as it does at the present day. Tell the dullest clodhopper, or the clodhopper's youngest child, that the chair has fallen down, or the light has been extinguished, or the pitcher has been broken, or the paper has taken fire, "without a cause," and, if he understands the

meaning of your words, he will believe that you are making game of him. Show him any strange phenomenon on the earth, or in the skies, and his first inquiry will be,—“What makes it so? What causes it?”

We maintain that this class of persons, the ignorant and unthinking, can not have had the uniform and frequently-repeated experience, which alone could create in their minds an indissoluble association between any new phenomenon and some one antecedent, or group of antecedents, of which it is the special and invariable consequent. Nature does not reveal the constancy of her operations to unpracticed eyes at the first glance. She rather oppresses the untaught mind with a sense of her infinite variety, her ceaseless vicissitudes, her inexhaustible fertility of forms and diversity of motion and operation. Take the phenomena which lie the nearest, so to speak, to human life and conduct;—the phenomena of the weather, of health and disease, of good and bad fortune, of the character and conduct of individual men, of the infinitely varied forms and aspects of the vegetable and animal creation, and the contingencies to which they are subject. Not without reason were the earliest systems of religion devised by uninstructed intellects always polytheistic, such minds naturally seeking causes as numerous and diversified as the effects attributed to them, finding a prototype of nature's action only in the endless inconstancy and caprice of a semi-human will, and therefore peopling the mountains, forests, rivers, seas, and skies with an innumerable crowd of arbitrary deities. Surely the most extravagant and unreasonable of all systems of philosophy is that which would attribute the universal and irresistible belief in the necessity and uniformity of causation, to men's unenlightened experience and casual observation of the workings of nature. Such a belief, could it be formed at all in the mode here indicated, would be the latest product of a mind deeply imbued with the principles and results of modern physical science. It would be natural to man only in the same sense in which every man is naturally an expert in the differential and integral calculus.

The empirical theory of Causation is a necessary part of

the doctrine of universal scepticism, according to which there is no real being, no universe of actual existence, outside of the individual thinker's own consciousness for the present moment. Efficient or real Causation can take place only in a real universe, where there is something to act, and something to be acted upon or produced; in an imaginary universe, a sphere of mere thought, such causation is a mere dream. If that which is called a real "object" is only a group of actual and possible sensations, the object supposed to be a "cause" being one of these groups, and that called an "effect" another, the relation between cause and effect is only the usual relation between two immediately consecutive thoughts,—a relation of mere customary sequence, by virtue of which one suggests the other, without having the slightest real *power* or causal efficiency over that other.

But it was long ago remarked, that any scheme of universal scepticism is incoherent, self-contradictory, and suicidal. It is either a baseless assumption, or it is grounded upon reasoning which can not proceed a step without taking for granted the very intuitions, or fundamental truths, which the sceptic affects to deny and disprove. *That* in reasoning which connects the premises with the conclusion, or, in other words, that alone which makes us believe the conclusion, is a Law of Thought, or an Absolute Truth Intuitively discerned, which, as a ground of belief, is not one whit stronger—nay, is not so strong—as that other Necessity of Thought, or immediate Intuition,—call it what you please,—which compels us to believe the reality of the Ego, of an Efficient Cause as a Non-Ego operating upon me from without, and the externality, indestructibility and infinity of the Space in which the Ego exists. As all reasoning is based upon Necessities of Thought, it can not be used to disprove them; since the conclusion thus obtained affirms the falsity of the Premise whence it was drawn, and we should thus be involved in a perpetual see-saw, as in the famous sophism of Epimenides.

We now pass to that portion of Mr. Mill's work which is the principle arena for "the Battle of the two Philosophies," to his chapter upon the Freedom of the Will. The remark

made by him at the outset, respecting Hamilton's doctrine upon this subject, may be applied with far more justice to his own system of Necessity, (or of Moral Causation, if he chooses to call it so,) "that it may be regarded as the central idea of his system—the determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions." He first finds fault with Hamilton for putting in "a claim for metaphysics, grounded on the Free-Will doctrine, of being the only medium through which our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of a God." A remark of this sort always bring out all the irritability of Mr. Mill, as he thinks it is an attempt to create a religious prejudice in favor of a metaphysical theory; and he therefore denounces it, as "not only repugnant to all the rules of philosophizing, but a grave offense against the morality of philosophic inquiry."

We deny the justice of the imputation, and question the validity of the canon here laid down to restrict the range of argumentation in philosophy. In the passage referred to, far from attempting to excite religious prejudices, Hamilton's main purpose is to vindicate the importance and dignity of metaphysical science, not only in itself considered, but in the logical connection of its doctrines with the fundamental notions in other sciences, such as morality and religion, of the gravest value and interest to man. Who ever heard that it was blameworthy to commend any science, because the conclusions to which it led the inquirer were favorable to sound morals, and created an additional safeguard for the restraints of conscience? Why, Mr. Mill himself occupies nearly the whole of this long chapter in attempting to prove that his own doctrine of causation, which denies the Freedom of the Will, is perfectly consistent with "the reality, and the knowledge and feeling, of moral distinctions;" since these, he affirms, "are independent of any theory respecting the will." And he afterwards remarks, that "not only the doctrine of Necessity, but Predestination in its coarsest form," is, in his view, "inconsistent with ascribing any moral attributes whatever to the Deity." p. 589. Now, we can not see that the doctrine thus avowed by himself differs one iota from that which he so severely blames Hamilton for teaching; except that the latter



takes for granted, what indeed is obvious to common-sense, that a Deity without "any moral attributes whatever" is no Deity at all. It would be harsh to say, that Mr. Mill here either denies this common-sense view of the Divine nature, or that he believes all those who hold the doctrine of "Predestination in its coarsest form" are Atheists. Yet such a construction of his language would be far more natural and justifiable than the imputation which he throws upon Hamilton, of attempting to defend a foregone conclusion by exciting a religious prejudice. In the passage which he misrepresents, though of course unintentionally, Hamilton does not say that metaphysics, or the free-will doctrine, is "the only medium," etc.; but having previously remarked that *mind* itself is "the noblest object of speculation which the created universe presents to the curiosity of man," he continues the argument by asserting, that "*mind* rises to its highest dignity when viewed as the object through which, and through which alone, our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of a God." We may seem to have spent too many words upon this side issue; but in assailing the opinions, and the fairness in argument, of a philosopher who is no longer here to defend himself, Mr. Mill should at least be cautious in making his citations.

We admit that Mr. Mill is justifiable in stating his conviction, that the doctrine of Necessity is inconsistent with the belief that the Deity has any moral attributes whatever, though he thereby violates his own assertion respecting the morality of philosophic inquiry. It is a perfectly legitimate argument against any opinion, to urge that it is at variance with previously established truths in the same, or another, science. Thus, a psychological theory respecting perception may be confuted by what is believed to be a physiological fact. In like manner, a metaphysical dogma may be shaken by proving that it contradicts what are held to be well-established conclusions in theology. This point is so evident that it is fair to say that it never would have been questioned by Mr. Mill, had he not been so sensitive respecting any allusion to religious belief. It is only another application of the same kind of reasoning to declare, what an invincible law of our

nature compels us to believe, that a doctrine which leads to pernicious consequences can not be sound doctrine. A theory in political science, which, like that of Mandeville, tends to the depravation of society, must be a false theory. So an ethical system, which would make men worse instead of better, must be based on wrong principles, or made out by unsound deduction. There is a *reductio ad absurdum* in morals, as well as in mathematics.

Hamilton's theory of the conflicting doctrines of Necessity and Free Will is one application of his Philosophy of the Conditioned ;—that both doctrines are inconceivable, but as they are contradictories, one of them must be true; and therefore, as the inconceivability, which is common to both, does not disprove either, we must believe in Free Will, which has, what the other has not, the distinct testimony of consciousness in its favor. Mr. Mill opens his own discussion of the question with his usual astuteness, by quoting with strong approbation his opponent's arguments to prove the inconceivability of Free Will, and contemptuously denying or disputing what is urged to establish the other horn of the dilemma, the equal inconceivability of the doctrine of Necessity. This is a fine illustration of the use which a dextrous disputant may make of an adversary's labors; as he thereby gets the advantage of many strong arguments from the Hamiltonian point of view, which a regard for consistency with other portions of his own opinions would not allow him to urge in his own person ; and he also has, all along, the air of proving his point out of his antagonist's own mouth.

The Free-will doctrine is alleged to be inconceivable, "because it supposes volitions to originate without cause," so that they seem to be left indeterminate, since there is nothing to decide why I should have one volition rather than another. We demur to this statement, in which it is implied that no determination is possible except through the action of an Efficient Cause, which, of course, determines *necessarily*. An advocate of Free Will must admit that a volition is determined without a *cause* ; but he does not need to assert that it is determined without *reasons*. Now, motives are reasons,

and we maintain that the relation between a Reason and its Consequent is entirely distinct from that between a Cause and its Effect, the latter being fixed and invariable, while the former is in some degree changeable and contingent. A particular Cause *must* have just this Effect, exactly proportioned to it, and no other; but a Reason only sways or influences the choice, without inevitably leading it to any one Conclusion. What is called the weighing of motives, or estimating the comparative value of Reasons, for different modes of conduct, is a process of the Understanding, distinctly preliminary to the act of the Will or Volition, and usually separated from it by a short but conscious interval of time. In any important call for action, we usually pause to make up our minds as to the proper course to be pursued; and the Freedom of which we are then irresistibly convinced is the direct testimony of consciousness at the moment, both that the final *choice* is in our power, whatever may be the comparative weight of reasons for it, and also that the crowning *act*, or Volition, which is still to come, may or may not follow this choice or resolution, just as we may decide at the last moment.

Recapitulating, we say, Determination, as a phenomenon of *choice*, is a function of the Understanding, and takes place in view of Reasons, (miscalled Motives,) though not, as consciousness attests, under compulsion by them. Volition is force in energy directed to some particular end. Two questions may be asked respecting it:—1. Whence comes this force? 2. How is the force determined to *this* end, rather than to any other? To the first we answer, that the force originates in myself, as a *first* cause consciously exerting effort, or putting forth power self-originated, and not merely transmitted passively, as received from another. The second question is answered by saying, that the direction of the effort either follows the previous determination of the understanding, in which case it is *rational* action, or departs from it at the last moment, in which case it is *caprice*.

This theory is not presented as a complete solution of the difficulties in the case; far from it. It is not easy to understand *how* the Understanding, when pressed by conflicting

Reasons, is still free to choose which Conclusion it will adopt, irrespective of the comparative weight or cogency of those Reasons; but *that* it actually does so, and thus maintains its freedom, is attested by consciousness. We voluntarily look away from, or shut our eyes to, the weight of argument and evidence.

He who's convinced against his will  
Is of the same opinion still.

Whatever the philosophers and the pedants may say about it, man is much less a reasoning, than a wilful, animal. The very worst way of undertaking to turn an obstinate man is to argue with him, and to prove that he is mistaken in his premises or his logic. He has a Reason for his decision, so that it is not altogether arbitrary and capricious; but this is not necessarily the strongest Reason, even in his own estimation. The error of the Necessitarians consists in affirming, that there can be no guidance at all of the choice, unless it is the best possible guidance.

The fact probably is, that Reasons can not be measured by pints, or weighed by ounces, or even by grains. Their influence is not quantitative, but qualitative. The difficulty of seeing how a volition can be determined to one end rather any other, is simply the difficulty of seeing *how* Reasons can thus be equally balanced, or rather, *how* they can not be compared with each other in respect to weight or influence; but we know from consciousness *that* they are thus equally balanced, or incommensurable. The word *motive*, as it signifies *that which moves*, and implies a quantum of generating force, is either an unfair assumption of the whole dogma to be proved, or a misleading metaphor.

But whatever the relation may be between the Reasons and the consequent Volition, there is the clearest evidence that it is not the same as the relation between a Cause and its Effect, and even that there is no proper similitude between them. A Cause in energy must be instantaneously followed by its Effect, if indeed the two are not more properly said to be simultaneous; the former is in operation only so far as the latter is produced. According to the Necessitarian theory, then, the will

can not remain dormant, while desires, as Reasons for action, are present to the mind, any more than a balance can remain in equilibrium after a weight has been put into one of the scales. If the volition *must* follow the strongest desire, then it must so follow *instantly*, since an inherent or uncaused power to delay is equivalent to a power to resist. But, as John Locke remarked long ago, the mind has, "as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires," till it can consider and examine them on all sides; and he rightly adds, "in this lies the liberty a man has." Then the Necessitarian is compelled to assert that an antecedent volition is necessary to determine the will to inaction; or, in other words, that we need to will that the will should remain dormant, in regard to selecting one out of two or more contemplated courses of action; we deny any such need. Will is power, but it is not necessarily, or always, power in action. Like imagination, it is a power or faculty which is called into action only occasionally, sometimes after long intervals. While the understanding is wholly absorbed with some object of cogitation, as in working out a mathematical problem, or considering Reasons for divergent courses of conduct, we are not conscious of willing; and the existence of a volition to suspend volition at such a moment, is a blank hypothesis invented to save a theory. But the Reasons are then present to the mind, which is deeply engaged in considering them; that is, what the Necessitarian calls the Causes are present, and yet the Effect does not follow.

Again, when several desires, leading in different directions, are all present to the mind at once, if the action of desires upon the will were that of Causes producing their Effects, the action ought not to be in the direction of the strongest desire, but in that of the resultant of all the desires combined; which is contrary to the fact. For example: I may have one strong wish to go to Boston, and another, almost equally urgent, to visit Medford. Then, on the Necessitarian theory of the inability of the will to act except as it is acted upon, I ought to go to neither of these places, but to Charlestown, which lies about half-way between them, and whither I have

no motive at all to go,—where, in fact, it might be very inconvenient for me to find myself. Therefore, either the doctrine of the causative power of desire is unfounded, or the whole science of mechanics, which is founded upon the composition and resolution of forces, is false. A cause in action potent enough, if not counteracted, to drag my reluctant will along with it *necessarily*, is immediately paralyzed on being so counteracted, and ceases to be a cause at all. But, according to what physical science now teaches respecting the conservation of force, this result is just as incredible as an absolute creation of force, or a commencement of action without a cause. We gain nothing, then, by the Necessitarian theory; but the problem respecting the determination of the will remains just as insoluble as ever. As in Hamilton's theory, we are involved in a dilemma between two inconceivables.

When it is urged that the fatalist “overlooks the equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability of an *infinite* non-commencement, on the assertion of which non-commencement his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately rest,” Mr. Mill tartly replies, p. 556, “It rests on no such thing, if he believes in a First Cause, *which a Necessitarian may*.” Is he serious in making this extraordinary admission, whereby he abandons the whole preceding argument? An uncaused volition is a First Cause; and if the possibility of *this* is admitted, there is no longer any ground for controversy, and the Free-will doctrine is established.

“What is more,” continues Mr. Mill, “even if he does not believe in a First Cause, he makes no assertion of non-commencement; *he only declines to make an assertion of commencement.*” What a hard-pushed disputant, who is willing to shut his eyes to the logical consequences of his own assertions, may do or “decline” to do, is a point not worth considering. But nothing can be more certain, than that the doctrine of an “absolute commencement,” and that of an “infinite non-commencement,” can be shown, on the Necessitarian's own hypothesis, to be two contradictories; so that, if there is any truth in logic, the disputant is not at liberty to deny one, and “decline to make an assertion” of the other;



for one of them **MUST** be true. According to Mr. Mill's own doctrine of "Moral Causation," every phenomenon is both a Cause of its Invariable Consequent, and an Effect of its Invariable Antecedent; and *this* Antecedent, again, is an Effect of *its* Antecedent, and so on forever. This series of Antecedents must be *infinite*; for if we stop at any one Antecedent, whether near or remote, that one is an absolute commencement, or First Cause, and we are impaled on the other horn of the dilemma. Mr. Mill may take his stand with Hegel, and dispute the validity of the law of Excluded Middle; but, otherwise, he is not logically entitled to deny the one contradictory, and yet "decline to make an assertion" of the other.

We affirm, with Hamilton, that we are held to this alternative, an uncaused commencement or an infinite regress, in all cases of causation whatsoever. But Mr. Mill alleges that, in the case of all other facts except volitions, we accept the supposition of "a regress, not indeed to infinity, but either generally into the region of the Unknowable, or back to a Universal Cause;" and as we are concerned with such a Cause only in relation to its Consequents, and not in relation to its Antecedents, "*we can afford to consider this reference as ultimate.*"

A Kentuckian would certainly call this doctrine a "coming out through a very small hole." The question is not what "we can afford" to do, but what, as philosophers, we are logically bound to do, in order to satisfy all the requisites of the theory which we adopt, according to the most comprehensive view that can be taken of those requisites. It is true that the student of mere physical science, who is concerned only with proximate causes, is entitled to stop when he has reached this nearest goal, not because it is impossible, or even undesirable, to go farther, but because it is not the function of this particular physical science, of which he is an adept, to trace the links of connexion with what lies beyond. Thus, having succeeded in tracing a given phenomenon to the law of gravitation, or to that of chemical affinity, he stops there, because these laws, to the special sciences of mechanics and chemistry, are ultimate. Not so with the metaphysician or

philosopher, who, under penalty of being pronounced incompetent and degraded from office, is bound to follow his theory, up or down, to "first principles," or the remotest conceivable antecedents and consequents; for his is emphatically the science of "first principles." Having begun with the assertion that this round world needs support of one sort or another, and then having shown that it rests on an elephant, and that the elephant stands on a tortoise, he is not entitled, when asked, "But what does the tortoise stand on?" to answer, "We can afford to consider this basis of support as ultimate." In tracing the chain of causation, he who stops at any point short of infinity necessarily admits a First Cause at this point, and therefore might just as well have admitted such a Cause at the outset.

Bringing down the discussion to the range of facts, Mr. Mill denies that I am directly conscious of the Freedom of my will, on the ground that "what I am *able* to do, is not a subject of consciousness," but only what I actually do or feel; "consciousness," he insists, "is not prophetic; we are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be."

But in this argument he assumes the whole ground at issue; blinded by his own theory, that Causes can be known only through or from their Effects, he *assumes* that Ability or Power can only be inferred from the results of its coming into action, and therefore can not become known in itself, previous to the occurrence of these results, and independently of them. We deny his whole theory; we deny that consciousness needs to be "prophetic," in order to assure us of what we *can* do. Power, as well as its opposite, inability or a want of power, is a *present* phenomenon, and thus is within the purview of consciousness. Mr. Mill, as we have seen, twice appeals to the consciousness of voluntary "mental effort;" and what possible definition can be given of *effort*, except as *power in exercise*? Still further;—consciousness would not need to be prophetic, even if it were only from its Effects that we could know the causative power of the Will; for the necessary simultaneity, on which we have just commented, of an Effect with its Cause, enables us to be con-

scious, at one and the same moment, both of the Effort and of its success or failure. "Ability and force are not real entities," argues Mr. Mill. Certainly not; they are faculties of the mind, and we are directly conscious of them when in exercise, just as we are conscious of fixing the attention, or controlling emotion, by a strenuous effort. Even in the case of the muscular strain, the failure of the endeavor is far from negating the consciousness of that endeavor. On the contrary, a strong man is perhaps never so fully aware of the extent of his powers, as when he has attempted to accomplish some remarkable feat, and failed; success comes *before*, but failure only *after*, he has put forth his whole strength. To maintain that we are not conscious of any exertion, and do not even know what exertion is, until the results inform us of its success or failure, is to contradict the plainest testimony of ordinary consciousness, and to utter what must appear a startling paradox even to the vulgar.

Observe, however, that what we thus strongly assert is the ability *to will*, not the ability *to do*, or accomplish the meditated feat; the latter, we admit, so far as it is an external phenomenon, an actual contraction of the muscles, can be known only through its results. But in one sense, and that a very important one, the volition *is* the action or the doing, in its subjective and moral aspect, since it is for this alone that conscience holds us responsible. A mere volition to commit murder *is* murder, before God, though not at man's tribunal; since *we* can know the volitions of our fellow man only by their results, his outward acts.

It is admitted, on all hands, that the internal force of volition is absolutely free from compulsion or restraint by any power whatsoever applied to it *from without*. No external force can constrain the will. Bind me hand and foot with chains, and I am still conscious that my will is just as free as ever. But if consciousness is thus competent to declare, and thereby to prove, the freedom of the will as against external compulsion, against bolts and chains, it is equally competent to affirm the like freedom as against internal compulsion, against pressing inducements and urgent desires. No one can can-

dibly deny that its testimony is just as clearly and positively given in the latter case as in the former. Whatever inducements may be present to my mind, I am still conscious that I *can* resist them all, *can will* the very act from which they seem to be doing their best to restrain me. A very considerable, even a painful, effort may be necessary to this end; still we are conscious that it is a possible effort.

"Whence is it," asks Dugald Stewart, "that we consider the pain of the rack as an alleviation of the falsehoods extorted by it from the criminal? Plainly because the motives presented to him are supposed to be such as no *ordinary* degree of self-command is able to resist. And if we were only satisfied that these motives were *perfectly irresistible*, we would not ascribe to him any guilt at all." But we are not so satisfied; we know that, even on the rack, he *can* persevere in willing to tell the truth. According to Mr. Mill's theory, the motives are "*irresistible*;" yet we do him the justice to believe that, in spite of his theory, he would still censure the man for uttering the falsehood. Again, we ask, why accept the testimony of consciousness that these considerations, of extreme present pain and a strong desire to be released from it, do press and solicit with an urgency which it is difficult to withstand, and yet deny the equally positive evidence of the same faculty, that we *can* withstand them? If we can weigh motives against each other, pronouncing this strong and that weak, we are surely competent to pronounce that any one, or any number, of them is weak or powerless against a fixed determination of the will.

Again, we all know that many states of mind are involuntary, as they come and go in spite of ourselves. This is the case generally with most states of the understanding, with our perceptive faculties, and especially our aversions and desires. We can not avoid hearing sounds and smelling odors, if the air be full of noises and fragrance. We can not help coveting relief from pain and freedom from anxiety; novel and terrible objects affect us with fear, against which our most courageous feelings vainly strive. Consciousness testifies to this impotence—this absence of freedom. How, then, can we consist-

ently refuse to accept its testimony to the converse fact, the presence of freedom and the existence of power? Two opposites explain and limit each other. I could not know necessity to be necessity, except by knowing freedom, and conceiving necessity as its opposite; just as I can not know pleasure, except by recognizing it as the opposite of pain. Therefore, those who deny us any knowledge of freedom, really preclude us from any recognition of necessity.

We must think, then, that Mr. Mill has shown more courage than discretion by undertaking to deny the direct Consciousness of Freedom, and to "dispute altogether that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion." But for the inveterate preconceived opinion, which is the shibboleth of his sect, that we can not know causation in itself, but can only learn from experience a uniformity of succession between antecedents and consequents, we believe he never would have hazarded such denial. When pressed by one of the ablest of his critics, Mr. Alexander, to say distinctly, in the case of an insignificant action performed by himself, "Is he not conscious of being able to touch at will either the right side of his nose or the left?" and having touched the left, is he not conscious that he *could* have willed to touch the right? he certainly appears to evade the challenge.

Hitherto, we have argued against the old form of the doctrine of Fatalism—viz., that the strongest motive is a Cause, and, as such, *compels* the volition, as an Effect, to follow it. But the modern Necessitarians, as represented by Mr. Mill, since they ignore, or deny altogether, the notion of Efficient Causation, reject also the idea of *compulsion*. They argue from experience only. Certain inducements and desires being present to a mind of a given character and disposition, we find from experience, they say, that a volition corresponding to the relative strength of these inducements and the prevailing bent of the disposition invariably follows. "A volition is a moral effect, which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes." He acknowledges himself to be entirely ig-

norant whether it *must* so follow; "all I know is, that it *always does*." By virtue of this distinction, which rejects coercion, but denies ability, he hopes to wipe off the most repulsive aspect, and to escape the most appalling consequences, of pure Fatalism.

We must avow our strong belief that it is a distinction without any essential difference. What possible difference does it make to the prisoner, whether bolts and fetters *compel* him to stay in his cell, or he is so disabled that he *can not get out* of it? Our quarrel with Mr. Mill is not for what he asserts, but for what he denies. He does not affirm Compulsion, but he denies Freedom. If my Volition "*always does*" follow the strongest motive, it is not at liberty to go in any other direction; and there is small comfort in being reminded that the lack of liberty does not arise from the application of any force whatever.

On the old theory, the will is like an unfortunate man tied hand and foot, and dragged after the heels of a mad bull by a rope attached to the animal's horns. This is the doctrine of Fatalism; wherever the bull gallops, the man *must* follow—by *compulsion*. But this is not Mr. Mill's theory. He asks us to believe that the rope has disappeared, and that there is no compulsion in the case, whether visible or real; and yet that we learn from actual observation, that the man "*always does*" follow his grim antecedent at the same distance as before, each bound of the one being copied by a corresponding leap of the other. This, he says, is not Fatalism, is not even Necessity, since there is no *must* in the case. But it is what he calls, at one time, the "Determinism" of the Will, and at another, "Moral Causation," or the doctrine of invariable sequence.

Evidently this latter statement of the theory is more unwarrantable than the former. We can understand the Necessity which has a cause, the lack of freedom which proceeds from restraint, or that one should be a slave when he has a master. But without a cause, without restraint, without a master, it is not merely incredible, but inconceivable, that the will should not be free.

We come, then, to the question of fact, and are met by Mr. Mill's vehement affirmation of the point, "as a truth of experience, that volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity, and (when we have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same certainty, as physical events follow their physical causes."

Observe the parenthetical qualification; for since we surely do *not* "have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances" under which any of our fellow men act, to be able to predict, with any certainty, what his actions will be in one case out of a thousand, it is obviously not "a truth of experience," but one of very doubtful inference, in the vast majority of instances, that those actions are rigidly uniform and subject to law. *Varium et mutabile semper femina* is a most unjust aspersions of one sex, so far as it implies that they are one whit *more* whimsical and capricious than the other. To any student of human nature, to any keen observer of life and manners, this comparison of the conduct of men on ordinary occasions, with the invariable sequence of mechanical and chemical phenomena in the outward universe, will appear amusing on account of its very extravagance. On such a subject, the appeal lies, not to philosophers and men of science, but to poets and dramatists, to biographers, essayists, moralists, men of the world, and men of affairs. We confidently invoke all literature, excepting only treatises on physical science and the speculations of system-mongers on abstract subjects, for proof of the assertion, that no two men ever act alike under the same circumstances, and that no one man ever adopts precisely the same course of conduct on two similar occasions. We would almost define man to be an animal that never repeats himself. We may even challenge Mr. Mill himself to say whether, out of the thousand little actions which fill up one of the ordinary days of his busy life, any three ever resemble each other as closely as three beats of the pendulum of his clock. One who has gone through the process of learning to play on the piano can tell whether it was an easy task to reduce the movements of his fingers to mechanical uniformity in striking the right notes at the right moment. Evidently,



what has to be educated in this case is the will, not the muscles; for, at the outset, the fingers may already be deft enough in executing other little tasks, equally minute, with all needed precision.

Whatever may be made out, then, by inference, analogy, and theory, we stoutly deny that the uniformity and certainty of volitions is "a truth of experience," meaning thereby a fact patent to observation. Mr. Mill could not have chosen a weaker position for his doctrine, as nearly all the facts point directly the other way. He will say, of course, that when the volitions vary, the antecedents are different. Be it so, for the nonce; but if the antecedents are hardly ever the same, the uniformity of the volitions is certainly not a truth of experience. And since these "moral antecedents are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions" in another man's mind, how can any one not gifted with omniscience declare, that they are always different when the volition is not the same, and always alike when a volition is exactly repeated? We vehemently suspect, that Mr. Mill's "experience" must be resolved into an inveterate preconceived opinion, that even the actions of the human will can not escape the universality of law;—an honest belief on his part, but one which here takes for granted the whole matter in dispute.

We are far from denying a certain measure and kind of uniformity in human conduct. The doctrine of Free Will recognizes this fact, and accounts for it by the essential unity of human nature. It is certain we often act uniformly, because we are *rational* beings; and we often act inconsistently and not according to rule, because we are *free* beings. Men are similarly, though not equally, endowed with the great springs and impulses of activity,—with corresponding appetites, affections, and desires, which determine the principal Ends of action, and with intellectual powers that are homogeneous, though not equiponderant, so that often similar Means are adopted for effecting our purposes. Whole sciences, such as ethics, politics, political economy, and the philosophy of history, are built upon this general accordance of human beings with each other, though the surface of life is constantly broken

and fretted with the idiosyncracies of intellect and character. A prevailing unity of aim and purpose is created by the wants and necessities even of our physical being; and some uniformity of conduct is the obvious result of the similar circumstances by which we are surrounded. But above and around this accordance of general features, there is room for infinite variety of details, and a boundless field for the freedom of particular volitions.

Mr. Mill and his school utterly mistake the lesson which is taught by "the statistical results of the observation of human beings, acting in numbers sufficient to eliminate the influences which operate only on a few, and which, on a large scale, neutralize one another." What these show is that similarity of leading purposes, and correspondence of general ends and aims, which result from the endowment of all men with the same passions, and from the unity in kind, though not in degree, of our cognitive faculties. They afford little or no evidence of the agreement of men with each other in single acts and special volitions; that is, they give hardly any testimony which is relevant to the present discussion. Thus, all men desire society, approbation, power, wealth. Experience teaches them by what general lines of conduct these ends may most probably be attained; and along these lines men move with a good degree of uniformity, though by no means with the same speed or eagerness. To the attainment of these broad and common ends a vast number of particular aims and efforts,—the special undertakings of professional, commercial, mechanical, and social enterprise,—are subservient; and here, unity of action is much less obvious, and often can not be traced at all. Then, each of these less general ends can be pursued only by an almost countless multitude of special volitions, which escape the dominion of law altogether, and manifest only infinite variety and caprice. Here is the proper realm of the freedom of the will; the uniformity which was found before, in the general purposes of life,—which is proved by statistics, and is the object of discussion in the moral sciences,—is traceable not so much to the will, as to the unity of our intellectual and emotional endowments. It characterizes

those acts of the understanding which lead to *choice* or *preference*, and which, as we have seen, not only precede, but are usually separated by a conscious interval of time, from the action of the Will.

Analyze such statistical evidence as has been collected by Quetelet and other observers, and the correctness of these observations will be apparent. The events which are thus proved to recur, year after year, in nearly the same degree of frequency, maintaining almost an equal proportion to the whole number of people, will be found complex in nature, alike only in outward aspect, springing from different motives, and carried out by very dissimilar means. Thus, the number of homicides, suicides, robberies, petty thefts, cases of intemperance, and the like, that occur annually in a given population, are cited as proving the reign of law where it would be least expected. But how unlike is one case of homicide or suicide to another—unlike in the passions which produced them, the circumstances which excited these passions, the quickness with which the determination was carried out, and the means by which the crowning act was perpetrated! The lawyers, after a very imperfect analysis, distinguish at least half a dozen kinds of killing. One jumps overboard because crossed in love; a clerk or trustee hangs himself because detected in embezzlement; a gambler throws away life after fortune; a sentenced criminal escapes the shame of a public execution; the prosperous man destroys himself in a fit of insanity. Statistics which lump together so dissimilar acts as these prove nothing as to the uniform sequence between volitions and their moral antecedents. To hunt through the history of the world for one human act perfectly resembling another, not only in itself, but in the motives which produced it, would be as bootless an undertaking as to take up the challenge of Leibnitz, and seek on an oak tree for two leaves which should be exact counterparts of each other. And yet Mr. Mill claims uniformity of sequence between motives and volitions as “a truth of experience!”

Mr. Mill denies “that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or aversion.”

But in proof that we are so conscious, one of his critics cites the fact, that we are as sensibly *exhausted* by a long continued effort to resist temptation, as after any physical exertion; whereas, if the will passively followed the strongest desire, there would be no occasion for *any* effort, but the volition would be determined readily, and at once, just as the balance turns under a preponderant weight in either scale. Mr. Mill replies, "The fact is not quite thus, even in inanimate nature; the hurricane does not level the house or blow down the tree without resistance; even the balance trembles and the scales oscillate for a short time, when the difference of the weights is not considerable." We accept the parallel. The house or tree does not yield to the wind "without resistance," because it has innate strength in itself to withstand such force operating upon it from without. Grant as much of the will, and the case is decided in favor of its freedom. An innate power to "resist" the strongest present desire must be, by the nature of the case, a power *self-determined* to activity, since all other desires then present to the mind are, by hypothesis, weaker than the one resisted. Such self-determination is further indicated by the fact that resistance to the strongest desire is offered at one time, even to exhaustion, but entirely withheld at another. Not so with the tree or house, the impediment here being mere stiffness or *passive* resistance, and therefore always manifested to the same extent.

We have no space left for following Mr. Mill through the weakest, though the most elaborately argued, portion of his book, in which he seeks to reconcile a denial of the Freedom of the Will with the consciousness of moral responsibility, and with the acknowledgment of the justice of punishment for wrong-doing. Here we must leave him to his other critics, whose publications are named at the head of this article (in April No.), and to the common sense of mankind, to which we may boldly appeal for the instantaneous rejection of a doctrine so repugnant to our most deeply rooted feelings and convictions, that sophistry is only wasted in its defense. Such sophistry is abundantly confuted by the two brief and simple questions put by Mr. Alexander in his late work: "If Phys-

ical Causation incapacitates the Will, (and therefore makes the man unpunishable)" and Mr. Mill acknowledges that it does, "must not moral Causation incapacitate it? And if not, what is the rational ground of the distinction?" Being under physical constraint, the man could not have *acted* otherwise; following his moral antecedents, he could not even have *willed* to act otherwise. Will you dismiss him as innocent in the former case, and punish him as guilty in the latter? He who can answer this question in the affirmative, is prepared to adopt Mr. Mill's theory of Ethics.

We have made little allusion to the other published criticisms on Mr. Mill's extraordinary book, for, with one exception, they are already well known and highly esteemed; and the little space at our command could be more profitably given to independent observations and reasoning, than to comments on what had already been well said by others. We rejoice to learn that Mr. Hazard's letter, as yet only privately printed, is soon to be published in a much enlarged form; it shows all the delicacy of psychological analysis, and vigor of argumentation, which distinguished his remarkable work on the "Freedom of Mind in Willing." Dr. McCosh's "Examination" is fully worthy of his very high reputation as a scholar and a philosopher, and furnishes additional cause for the pleasure and pride with which his appointment to a most important academical position in our own country has been received by all Americans. A considerable portion of it is devoted to Logic, in which his exposure of the errors and defects of Mr. Mill's system is so able and complete, that we have gladly left this branch of the discussion entirely in his hands. "The Battle of the Two Philosophies," by an anonymous "Inquirer," justifies the strong commendation which it has received from Dr. Mansel. Though very concise, it is so lucid, thorough, and convincing, that we hope it may be republished here, as the shortest, but one of the ablest, refutations that have yet appeared of materialistic, empirical, and necessitarian doctrines in philosophy.

## ART. II.—THE WANT OF MORAL FORCE IN CHRISTENDOM.

By RAY PALMER, D. D., New York.

IT is the distinctly declared purpose of God, that this world shall be thoroughly subdued to Christ. The redemption which he wrought out by his mission and sacrificial death, is a redemption whose benefits are equally available for all. The moral forces of his kingdom are adequate to the attainment of an ultimate triumph over all opposition. Though the Prince of Darkness has so long had the ascendancy, and the whole creation under his sway has groaned and travailed in pain together until now, it is as sure as the eternal veracity and power of Almighty God can make it, that the dominion of righteousness and truth shall be established in the earth, and that every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.

We further understand that this result is not to be brought about by miracle. Those who have themselves believed, the marshalled host of Christian disciples, are charged with the responsibility of pressing the contest between good and evil to an issue, in the power of divine truth and of the Spirit who attends it. None of us liveth to himself. Ye are the salt of the earth. Ye are the light of the world. Go ye and disciple all nations. It is by the agency of his faithful followers that Christ will set up that kingdom whose essence is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. All this we accept as very familiar truth.

Yet we can not but acknowledge that the work of subjecting the world to the transforming power of the Christian religion has advanced but slowly. It is advancing but slowly now, in comparison with what is possible. It does not advance according to the benevolent wishes of the Saviour, and of those who cordially sympathize with him. It is certainly to be admitted, it is a matter of gratitude and of rejoicing, that in these last days there has appeared somewhat extensively a more vigorous Christian life, and a greater energy of Christian action, than has been seen in previous centuries.



Yet, after all, when we compare what has been done with the numbers and resources of the avowed friends of Christ, we are obliged to own that it seems comparatively little. The forces of the God of this world are also more thoroughly alive and more effectively at work than ever. The reign of sin, it is plain, is not to be surrendered without a desperate resistance at all points. It is impossible to shut one's eyes against the truth, that modern Christendom does greatly need for the work now on its hands a vast increase of moral power. It is on this need that we now propose to dwell.

If the apostle Paul were to-day upon the earth, we can not but conceive that he would pour out all the ardor of his burning soul in asking, for all who are professedly the followers of Christ, that which he asked so fervently for the saints and faithful at Colossi—that they might be filled with the knowledge of Christ's will in all wisdom and spiritual understanding; and might walk worthy of the Lord unto all pleasing, being fruitful in every good work and increasing in the knowledge of God; and might be strengthened with all might according to his glorious power, unto all patience and long-suffering with joyfulness. We can not but conceive, in other words, that he would lift up his voice to summon the evangelical church catholic to awake to the grandeur and solemnity of her position, and to rise to an intelligent, practical, progressive and exulting Christian energy.

But in order that we may more definitely understand by what sort of effort, and in what particular manner, this great and most necessary attainment may be made, it may be useful to specify some particular things which it must needs involve.

First of all there is plainly demanded, as an element of augmented power in Christendom—I use the word to denote the collective followers of Christ—a return to apostolic faith. With so much of wealth and learning and popular favor, with so many of the young and gifted and vigorous in the service of the Christian church, or at least embraced in her communion, and with such facilities of all sorts as are now at her command, why is it that the Christian host—the entire bro-



therhood of Christ's disciples—is working no more efficiently, and with no larger measure of success? If this question should be put to several intelligent Christians who had bestowed no special attention on the subject, one very probably would answer: For want of Christian unity. Another: For want of higher views of Christian obligation. A third: For want of a better knowledge of the necessities of the world. A fourth: Because of the reign of worldliness in the hearts of Christians. A fifth: Because of the inconsistencies that mar the beauty of Christian example in the church, and neutralize her influence.

But is it not quite evident that these and similar answers by no means go to the bottom of the matter? There is something back of all these things; something that underlies them all. Such specific evils which exist among the professed disciples of Jesus have all one common ground in a far deeper and more generic evil—the evil, we mean, of an unbelieving spirit. In this, undoubtedly, we have the primary cause of moral feebleness. We do not speak, of course, of a positive disbelief, for we are referring now to those who do practically receive Christianity—to truly renewed men. We intend, by an unbelieving spirit, a distrustful, dubious, half-believing temper, to which the vast and solemn realities which Christianity unveils seem more like dreams and shadows than like substantial things; a habit of mind, in regard to the invisible and supernatural, so hesitating, so wanting in strength of apprehension and positiveness of assurance, that it prevents the true impression of divine revelation, and neutralizes, in a measure, the peculiar spiritual influences connected with it. If one will see and feel the sun, there must be no dark clouds to intercept his rays; and the light and the power of the gospel of God's grace lose half their vitalizing efficacy if they must reach the soul through the murky vapors of distrust.

That an almost Sadducean spirit is, outside the church, a special distemper of our time, will be readily admitted. It has existed, indeed, in all times; for it is a characteristic of the natural heart. But there is an instructive history of unbelief in connection with the progress of Christianity; a his-

tory which clearly demonstrates the necessity of a certain definite adjustment of faith and reason to each other, in order to the development of a healthful and energetic piety. When faith has disowned reason, and dissevered herself from sound religious knowledge, as in the darkest centuries, she has become transformed into dreamy superstition. When reason has disowned faith, and has refused to recognize the moral instincts and intuitions of the soul, she has ended, as has been seen in our own day, in cutting off humanity from all contact with the supernatural and divine.

The unbelieving spirit, which, within the last half century, has expressed itself in the two forms of a critical and naturalistic rationalism, and a practically atheistic speculative philosophy, is the most unnatural result of a powerful reaction of the commonsense of mankind against the absurdities and falsehoods of the previous superstition; a reign that literally

"bred

Perverse, all monstrous, all prodigious things,  
Gorgons, and Hydras, and chimeras dire!"

Superstition had penetrated the entire mass of mankind; and had infused its spirit, to a greater or less degree, into even those who were most enlightened.

So in its turn the spirit of unbelief has reached, and very sensibly affected, those who profess, and that, too, very sincerely, to receive divine revelation, along with those who question or deny its claims. Compared with the true ideal of what enlightened Christian faith should be; with what that of Paul and John of the primitive Christian martyrs, or even of Huss and Luther actually was, the faith of Christendom to-day is undeniably faltering and weak. It is deficient both in insight and in tenacity of hold. The evil were comparatively slight, were it confined to those who, in part or in whole, are rejectors of Christianity. But is it not, unhappily, too plain, that even the church and the ministry do feel, to a very injurious extent, the influence of the enervating and enfeebling moral atmosphere with which a profoundly unbelieving age surrounds them? This influence, quite likely, in the case of many, is unnoticed. It is too subtle to attract attention to itself.

It steals over the soul as imperceptibly as the electric fluid enters into the body, when all things about it are in a highly electric state. Yet it does, effectually, its work of mischief. It tends to produce—it has produced, it is believed—in the greater number of Christian men and women, a habit of mind of which it is the natural result, that while few or none of the cardinal truths of the New Testament are positively doubted or denied—few or none, on the other hand, are vigorously grasped, and unflinchingly believed. Is God a personal being, and does he exercise an all-embracing and supernatural control over the world and over man? Are the Scriptures really given by inspiration of God, and do they contain a positive, objective, reliable revelation; and are their teachings, fairly interpreted, to be accepted as infallible? Is the whole human race ruined by sin, and destined inevitably to a lost eternity unless delivered by a divine interposition and in the present life? Has God himself become incarnate to redeem, and is the blood of Calvary, the atoning sacrifice of Jesus, the sole basis of pardon and peace with God? To these and kindred questions, professing Christians, as a body, of course, will answer—yes! But is the answer firm. Is it not rather in the heart at last but a faint and faltering assent? as though the thought were secretly allowed that after all there may be some uncertainty about these things? As though the great realities of the invisible world, so grand, so solemn, so fitted to rouse the soul to intensest consciousness, and to the highest possible activities, might peradventure in the end turn out to be mere phantoms? What else but moral weakness can come of this half-believing? Just so far as it exists, it prevents the great principles of Christian action being rightly understood, and leaves the soul destitute of the best and highest inspirations of Christian love. Of course we do not mean to question that there are many individual examples of lofty and steadfast faith, among the disciples of our time. There have been men and women, there are many such now living, both in the churches at home and on the fields of foreign labor, who, in the spirit of self-sacrifice and of high devotion to the work of the world's redemption, have hardly

been surpassed in any period since the ascension of our Lord. We speak of the great body of avowed disciples when we affirm that the Christian host is weak through unbelief.

If, then, it be true that the unbelieving spirit of the time—a spirit nurtured by false science, false criticism, and false philosophy—does materially affect the Christian church; if it does very greatly diminish the impression of the soul-stirring truths of the Christian religion on her members, then it is clear that an increase of the moral power of Christendom demands, as its first condition, the advancement of the entire corps of the friends of Christ, including both Christian preachers and the great brotherhood of believers, to a far higher and more spiritual faith. There must be formed in the heart of the church a state of enlightened and yet childlike trustfulness—a habit of believing—a preparation and predisposition to accept and vividly to apprehend the momentous things made known by revelation, and to allow them their full power upon the soul.

When an observer goes out on a starry night, and looks up into the ebon firmament with the unassisted eye, he sees only a few hundred stars scattered over the vast expanse, and most of these are seen as mere luminous points. But let the same eye, turned to the same heaven, be adjusted to the telescope, and at once out of the before-impenetrable depths emerge an infinite multitude of glowing orbs, while those which previously appeared so faint, put on an imposing splendor; and the enchanted soul is overpowered with admiration of the magnificence and beauty of the universe. It is even so when a spiritual faith assists the natural understanding. The realities of the invisible world come brightening out of the deep and awful shadows of eternity, and blaze on the vision of the soul in solemn grandeur. They begin to be felt in some proportion to their magnitude and interest, and in somewhat of their just practical impression.

With such a faith—a faith not blind but illuminated and directed by the Scriptures—a faith not abjuring the light of reason, but giving scope to the highest instincts of man's spiritual nature—with such a faith would return the days of

Christian heroism. The attainment of it is a practicable thing, since the foundations of faith are sure. In earnestness of communion with God and with this truth, it is possible to climb to a region above the mists of sense, where the atmosphere is evermore serene, and perception clear and certain. That is the region of moral health and power. Till there shall be a wide revival of such faith, the work of bringing back the world to Christ *must* linger, whatever outward agencies may be employed.

Very nearly related to this demand of a higher faith, is another which is equally essential to the desired increase of moral power. It is required that by a more careful attention to the spirit of the Scriptures, the great body of believers should enter more thoroughly into the true idea of Christ's kingdom on the earth. There is reason to think that the defect of faith to which we have referred as a cause of spiritual weakness, is itself in no small measure to be attributed to views more or less sensuous and gross as to what that kingdom is essentially; and, of course, as to the means and manner of its advancement. Certainly it is in just and Scriptural apprehensions of this matter, that a really elevated and Scriptural faith must find its ground. Besides, the nature of our efforts, and the strength of our desires for the coming of Christ's kingdom, will of course be very much determined by our notion of what that kingdom is. In proportion as we conceive it wrongly our action will probably be misdirected.

What an earthly kingdom is, we know. It is a thing of sense. It supposes a visible organization. There is a crown and throne and sceptre. There are cabinets and councils—administrative departments, tribunals of justice and codes of laws; all sorts of executive agencies and forces—in short, there is a vast system of institutions and arrangements, which, in their organic unity, are fitted to impress the senses just in proportion to the grandeur of the kingdom. We most naturally think of a kingdom, therefore, as of something visible and imposing—something whose instruments and activities are manifest to sense; and although when we speak of the kingdom of Christ among men we know and say that it is not such

a kingdom, yet it is difficult to disconnect, from our conception of it, all notions of the outward and the sensible, and to reach the true spiritual idea. This difficulty, too, is rendered still greater by the fact that in the prophecies relating to the coming of Messiah's reign among mankind, the most impressive outward changes are, in the boldest imagery, represented as occurring in connection with its progress; and that through the agencies of vast material instrumentalities. The King of kings is pictured as going forth to subdue the world with his sword girded on his thigh, with his vesture dipped in blood. He smites the nations, and dashes his enemies in pieces as a potter's vessel, and treadeth the wine press of the fierceness of the wrath of Almighty God. He overturns, and overturns, and overturns; and on the ruins of old oppressions establishes his throne in righteousness. Then he extends peace to Jerusalem as a river, and makes the glory of the Gentiles as an overflowing stream! He creates, as it were, new heavens and a new earth.

The fact has, therefore, been that, like those who lived before Christ's coming, we modern disciples have rested too much in the views of sense. There has been a tendency to connect the kingdom of Christ in our thoughts by far too much with outward instruments and means, as though it depended primarily upon these; to look chiefly at the obstacles to its progress, as measured on the scale of human things; and to judge of its advance by the course of outward events and the extent of visible ameliorations. The effect of all this is to render our views comparatively material and low, and our spirit secular and worldly. We are led to estimate our resources and to calculate results in a merely human way, instead of fixing our eyes on Christ and trusting mainly to his power.

We have, then, to set it distinctly and anew before us, that the kingdom of Christ is essentially invisible and supernatural. It is to be conceived of as a kingdom of purely spiritual forces. It has a King; but he is unseen by mortal eyes. He goes forth to subdue the world; but it is as embodied in the truths of historical Christianity, as borne to the souls of



men in the breath of the Holy Ghost, and as moving through the world with the silent and untraceable footsteps of Divinity. He is attended by mighty armies: not armies of flesh and blood; but as John saw in the Revelation, the armies of heaven follow him; invisible ministering spirits; the innumerable company of angels. It is no fond fancy of the great Epic Poet, but a sober fact of Revelation, that

"Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth  
Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep."

As, at his birth, they made the midnight air vocal with music that seemed to charm the silent stars—as in the temptation of the wilderness and the sorrow of Gethsemane, and when he awoke in the tomb from the cold slumber of death, they were about him with their loving ministries—so are they ever with him now in a joyous coöperation for the subjecting of the world to his reign of life and love. He has power, against which the resistance of the princes of this world, the hostilities of evil men, and the inherent difficulties of the great work of remodelling the social habits and the civil and religious institutions, which ages of moral degeneracy have established, and of purifying the fountains of human thought and affection, are all as nothing; for as Head 'over all things, for the church and on behalf of holiness, the infinite resources of omnipotence in heaven and on earth are his to be wielded at his will. It is this sublime view of Christ living, in the world in the power of his supreme divinity, inter-penetrating and pervading it with spiritual forces, with invisible and supernatural agencies and actors;—as steadily and surely, though with an unseen hand, directing all the great currents of the world's activity and thought for the helping on of the grand consummation of the ages—the universal reign of righteousness and peace; it is this view, we say, to which the apprehensions of all Christian people must be raised. As it is only in the exercise of some measure of faith that we can enter into these high and spiritual, yet altogether real, conceptions of Christ's kingdom; so it will be found that in them faith will find its firmest ground of confidence—its best sustenance and strength—its loftiest and most tranquil elevation, and, of



course, its utmost active power. Let the ministry, let private Christians, let the church at large, but make these conceptions familiar to their minds, so that they shall habitually mingle with all their thoughts, and nothing will seem too great to be attempted, nothing too hard to be accomplished, nothing connected with the progress of the Gospel too wonderful and glorious to be anticipated and believed. So long as we look chiefly on the human side of the work of the world's regeneration, no wonder we lack courage. The old gigantic evils inwrought through ages into the very texture of society, appear like gnarled oaks in a thick forest, that, growing through centuries together, have not only struck deep their mighty roots into the soil, but have interlaced and knotted them so firmly that to remove them seems impossible. But if we will turn from the human side to fix our thoughts on the divine; to set Christ habitually before our minds as now invisibly coming in the glory of the Father, and of the holy angels, with the might of Godhead to take possession of his own, in fulfillment of an eternal purpose, we can not but feel the powerful stimulus of unfailing encouragement and hope. In such a view of things, our efforts are not the chief instrumentality for the moral transformation of the world. They are altogether subordinate and secondary. Far, far above and beyond our sphere of action, Christ as principal is wielding a thousand unseen forces, and working out the issue so desirable to him, with his own eternal wisdom.

But we must not stop with having gained more spiritual and just conceptions of the kingdom of Jesus Christ. It is a still further condition of augmented moral power that the heart of the Christian host becomes to a far greater degree inspired by a sentiment of high devotion to his person. The impulses of personal attachment, especially where the object is eminently excellent, are among the most powerful springs of human action. The heart is sure to gravitate with all the wealth of its emotion toward what it really adores. If the object be actually worthy to be entirely revered and loved, or be conceived worthy, it takes possession of the soul. It is idealized to the imagination and becomes to the heart a per-

petual presence, and the source of an unquenchable enthusiasm. Secular history abounds with instances of high and chivalrous devotion on the part of individual subjects toward their sovereigns, of soldiers for their commanders, and of friend for friend in private life. History and Poetry have loved to celebrate these instances, and to embellish them with every grace of illustration and of language; and the strong hold which legends, songs and ballads, recounting them, have always had on the hearts of men, is proof that such devotion is recognized by the natural instincts of mankind as one of the noblest and most powerful of human sentiments. It has often excited even ordinary men to acts of extraordinary virtue, and thrown a heroic interest about their characters and names. When Charles Edward, the Pretender, was endeavoring, after the fatal defeat at Culloden, to make his escape from Scotland, and immense sums had been offered for his arrest, he was yet faithfully concealed and served by men and women at the hazard of their lives, from the sole impulse of a chivalrous affection for his person. With seven outlaws, in a cave, he lived in safety for some time. "Stay with us," said they, "the mountains of gold which the government have set on your head may induce some gentleman to betray you; but were we to injure a hair of your head, the very mountains would fall down to crush us to death." A generous personal devotion transformed a band of robbers into examples of disinterested fidelity and friendship. Yet this was the devotion of mere loyalty.

Conceive, then, a sentiment of devotion to the person of Jesus Christ, that should surpass in elevation, purity and strength, the highest historical examples, as greatly as He himself surpasses all merely human characters, to pervade the whole of Christendom. What mighty moral force there would be in it! To what a style of Christian action, to what a tone of thought and feeling, would it certainly give rise! What instances of self-sacrificing toil, of noble generosity, of unreserved self-consecration, of lofty courage, of patient suffering, of high endeavor and achievement, would be exhibited every day and in every place! What new resources would Christi-

anity at once develop for the prosecution of her mission among men! What an abundance of gifts, unasked, but prompted by the heart, would be laid on her thousand altars! gifts, not merely of gold and silver and precious stones, but, far richer, of genius and learning, of youthful earnestness and strength, of manly wisdom and experience! With much of alloy, doubtless, it must still be admitted that there was yet somewhat of the true spirit of personal devotion to the great author of Christianity in the heroic attempts of Christendom, in the middle ages, to regain the holy sepulchre and city; and it stirs one to think of the enthusiasm it awakened and kept alive so long. Rivers of the best blood of the Christian kingdoms were poured out on the plains of Asia and the hills of Palestine; and princes and nobles, and even ladies, born to all the refinements of illustrious rank, and the indulgences of wealth, endured cheerfully the hardships and perils of wars in distant lands, and consecrated money and jewels, and even entire estates, to the sacred cause. To die in the holy enterprise was accounted no misfortune. Let, then, this same spirit, unmingled with worldly ambitions and selfish hopes and aims, generated by pure love to the Saviour, and directed by sound knowledge, possess and fill the heart of the Christian world in this our time; and might it not, would it not certainly, result that a most divine enthusiasm, a genuine Christian chivalry, would speedily fill the world with deeds, the record of which would be incomparably brighter and more admirable than any which has been delivered to us from the past.

Why should it not be so? Because, is it said, the person of Christ is not visible to sense? Remember the words of Peter—so full of simple beauty: "Whom having not seen ye love." It is an advantage as regards a high devotion to him, and not a hindrance, that we may not see him with these eyes. By the portrait drawn for us in the Scriptures, he may be ever present to our thought. The divine ideal of his person may feast perpetually the sanctified imagination. In the sweetness of spiritual communion, likewise, he is with us, even as he promised. He is thus a real being in our conception; a being whose image as it lies ever enshrined in the heart that

loves him, may be all the more rich in holy beauty, all the more spiritual and divine, because it is not connected with any material and sensible impressions. Not less than if he actually walked among us, therefore, is it practical to have one's soul inspired with warm personal devotion to our Lord. The Church happily is not wholly without experience of the power of this impulse now. It is only necessary that it rise to an enthusiasm more worthy of his excellence, to a more pure, intense, and self-consecrating love.

It would be difficult to form an adequate idea of the practical effect of infusing such a personal devotion to Christ into the entire corps of his disciples. The whole would by this be made compact in Christian unity. As an army of conquest it would then be able to advance with resistless energy. It would pour ungrudgingly its richest treasures at the feet of its august and venerated Leader, for the exigencies of his cause. Wherever he himself should lead the way, it would follow with unfaltering firmness, though it should be into the very strongholds of the enemy, and unto the fiercest and most terrible collision with the Prince of the Powers of Darkness. The greatest military leader of modern times, on a certain occasion, found it necessary to force the passage of a narrow bridge held by the enemy in strength, and swept by formidable artillery. Again and again the attempt to pass was made, and again and again the advancing columns recoiled from the murderous fire, obstructing the way still more with heaps of the dead and dying. At once the leader seized the banner and himself advanced it to the middle of the bridge. Then came his followers in one overwhelming rush: the pass was carried and the victory won.

When the great Captain of Salvation shall be followed with such intensity and steadfastness of personal devotion, and in the far higher and holier temper that befits his blessed service, dangers and difficulties will come to be held of small account indeed, and the day will be at hand when the Man of Sorrows shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied with his high reward. Not that he needs our aid; but that, out of his love to us, he has designed for us the salutary dis-

cipline, the elevation of character, the solid happiness and enduring glory, of sharing with him in the conflict, even as he has promised that we shall share in the joy of the final triumph. "He does not Christianize the world," says Robert Hall, "by magic. We are not to expect religion to descend from heaven, or to rise upon the earth, like a beautiful vision. It will, indeed, descend from heaven, and arise upon the earth; but this will be by regular, appointed and adapted means; means such as require our continued assistance."

There is not only room, therefore, for us to undertake those sacrifices and labors which may fitly testify to Christ our affectionate personal attachment; there is a necessity that we should do it in order that the diadem of full dominion on the earth may be set, at last, on his immortal brow! It is a grand feature of Christianity, that it is adapted to enlist not only the understanding and the judgment in the service of its author, but also the tenderest and sweetest sympathies, the most refined and generous sentiments; in a word, the best and warmest affections of the heart. There is nothing so touching, so beautiful, so worthy to be celebrated and admired, in the devotion of man to man, that it may not be not only equaled, but surpassed in the devotion of each faithful believer to his Lord.

But the highest requisite of all for the increase of our moral power is yet to be suggested. The Christian church will never fully develop its moral force until it shall be generally pervaded by a profounder practical understanding of the vitalizing energy of the Holy Spirit of God. When we say a practical understanding, we mean an understanding such as experience only gives. It is not new theories that are needed as to the Spirit's work, either in the regeneration or the sanctification of the soul. The fewer of such theories the better. Ingenious speculations here, however much they may please their authors, or gratify the curious, do, after all, but bewilder and perplex the simple and sincere. The thing really demanded is, that the fundamental fact announced by Christ and held by the evangelical church throughout all ages, that the Divine Spirit is in the world as a supernatural vital force, to

beget, sustain and perfect the life of God in the souls of sinful men, needs to be wrought into the heart and the consciousness of the whole Christian fellowship far more effectually than it ever has been since the first days of Christianity. Mere dogmatic soundness as regards the mission of the Spirit, may be nearly or quite inoperative. An inward personal experience of his work, on the contrary, is sure to be productive of spiritual activity and power. "Tarry ye at Jerusalem," said Christ to the first disciples, "till ye be endowed with power from on high;" and it was only when they had felt the Holy Ghost in the fullness of his vital influences within their souls, that they became consciously strong and thoroughly courageous, for the work that was before them. Then it was that the heroic age of primitive Christianity began.

Undoubtedly the disciples of Christ do now intellectually believe in the person and work of the divine Spirit as set forth so clearly in the New Testament. There is among them, without question, a certain degree of experimental knowledge of his power in the soul; and here and there are instances of a high degree of his holy unction personally enjoyed. It is to some measure of this divine anointing that we ascribe whatever of spiritual vigor the church actually exhibits. Without it she were dead. But where are the men who, according to the favorite phraseology of apostolic times, are "full of the Holy Ghost?" Are they not really like great characters in history, few and widely scattered, and surrounded by vast multitudes of very inferior lustre? Why is it that such persons are the acknowledged exceptions, and not the ordinary examples of Christian experience, but that the greater portion of believers have as yet felt only a little, in comparison with what is possible, of the inward work of the spirit of grace? Because the vitalizing power of the Spirit is comprehended only so far as realized in the consciousness of the soul, each individual believer is in danger of limiting that power in his thoughts by his own particular experiences; and we fear that it is even true that the few who do feel it to such a degree as to raise them to a preëminence of holy life and strength, are sometimes regarded with suspicion by those who are below



them; as though the reality of their spiritual elevation might after all be doubtful. If a man were only able, through some defect of his own organs, to see but two or three of the series of colors that complete the magnificence of the rainbow, he would be very likely to imagine that the splendor, far beyond his own perceptions, of which he heard others speak so glowingly, was only an illusion.

But why should the higher experiences of the work of the Spirit in the souls of intelligent and sober Christians be suspected? Do they not harmonize with the representations of the Scriptures? Let any thoughtful person read with care the Epistle to the Ephesians—an Epistle that, in the spirit of a noble experimental lyric, mounts far above the ordinary range of Christian emotion; like a majestic anthem, performed in a vast cathedral, that, swelling up into the lofty arches and, as it were, flooding the whole place with harmonies, expresses what only a few are able thoroughly to appreciate. Let such a reader carefully observe to what sublime attainments of spiritual illumination, life and joy, of union with Christ, and of holy inward power, Paul deemed it possible to rise; and notice how they are all connected with the work of the divine Spirit in the proper fulfillment of his mission to believers; and he will find the conviction forced upon him, that instead of regarding high spiritual experiences with distrust, the whole Christian Church should be earnestly yearning after, and praying for, and expecting to attain them. Since it is a first truth of the Christian system that the Holy Spirit is the Author and the Sustainer of the divine life in the soul, it can not but be true that in proportion as his quickening power is felt, will that life be vigorous and progressive. Nor can the Christian church be conceived to develop its highest energy, and to accomplish its noblest deeds of love and self-devotion, until penetrated and vitalized to a very high degree, by the mighty inworking of that power.

Nor is this all. Not only will a profound experience of the life-imparting power of the divine Spirit give the requisite vital force. It will give, also—what is equally an element of moral strength—the *courage* which the work of Christ de-



mands. It is not surprising that when the present condition of the world, and of even nominal Christendom itself, is thoughtfully considered, the resources and efforts of the Church seem utterly inadequate to the moral elevation of mankind. They are inadequate, considered in themselves. The attempt to scatter the world's darkness, to dry its tears, to put an end to the groans of ages, to change its grating discords into a universal harmony, to exterminate its hideous vices, and make all forms of public and private virtue to bud and blossom in their stead; to wrest, in a word, the dominion from the Devil and give it unto Christ—by mere human instrumentalities, is not less hopeless than the project of lighting up "chaos and old night" with tapers. With only a low spiritual experience it is plain that Christians are, and must be, unable to conceive how even the influences of the divine Spirit can do what the dying millions of mankind require, in order to raise them up from the abyss of sin, to mould them unto goodness, and set them in unison with God. They are liable, therefore, to be depressed with discouragement, and even tempted to despair. A few have thus been led to regard Christianity as a failure, for the world's deliverance, and to look for more material and sensuous exhibitions of the lordship and sovereignty of Christ.

But when, by what he has felt within himself, one really comes to comprehend how mighty the inworking of the Holy Spirit is, he then is well assured that this celestial energy can reach the utmost necessities of mankind. In what he has done for me—he will say within himself—I clearly see that there are no shades of death that he can not penetrate, no depths of guilt from which he can not raise the sinful, no indifference and obduracy that he is not able to overcome, no cravings of wretched hearts that he has not the power to satisfy, no bondage unto Satan whose chains he can not break! He, that in my cold, barren heart hath produced the glow of holy love, and the graces that constitute true goodness—what can be needed for any of my race that he can not accomplish? It is only for him to enter into the heart of fallen humanity, in the plenitude of his efficiency, and the race shall rise again,

and stand restored and beautiful, and the world put on the aspect of happiness and glory which the prophets ascribe to the time of Messiah's reign.

Augustine, recounting the steps of the process by which divine grace had brought him up out of the depths of sensuality, breaks out in the following language: "Who and what am I? What evil am I not? Was it my will or words or deeds that have recovered me? No, but thou, Lord, good and merciful, didst deliver me from the depths of misery! How sweet was it in a moment to be free from those infatuating vanities, to lose which had been my dread, to part with which was now my joy. Thou didst cast them out, O my true and consummate delight, and thou enteredst in their room, O sweeter than all pleasure, clearer than all light, higher than all honor! Too late did I love thee, thou primeval beauty! Thou calledst aloud and overcame my deafness; thou didst shine and dispel my darkness. Thou was fragrant and I panted after thee. I tasted and hungered and thirsted after thee. Thou teachdest me, and I was inflamed into thy peace."

When any soul has had such experience in himself of the restoring energy of the Spirit of grace, what can he not believe and anticipate as regards even the most debased of his fellow men. When the larger proportion of the professed disciples of Christ shall have had such experience—shall have been brought up from the region of mere natural life into the higher walks of the life of God; when they shall have entered into the fulness of Christ, and into the freedom and the peace of a conscious union with him; then they will look on the vast masses of mankind, yet held in the bondage of corruption, without the least misgiving. They will rest in the assurance that the vital breath of the Holy Ghost can awake them also to new life, and clothe them with the beautiful garments of salvation. They will look, therefore, not at human weakness, but at divine power. As of old, when the Spirit of God brooded on the dark and desolate waste, prolific life was born, and countless forms of beauty started forth, and the face of the world soon came to reflect back the smile of the Creator; even so the expectant church will look to see earth covered all over

with moral vitality and loveliness, man standing up in the symmetry of a new creation, and the tabernacle of God indeed established among men, by the quickening energy of the same almighty agent. She will possess the augmented strength which courage and assurance give; not the courage and assurance of a self-reliant spirit, but of intelligent, devout and firm dependence on God the Holy Ghost.

Such are some of the things that seem to be demanded as conditions, or elements, of a decided increase of moral power in the Christian body.

Except on these conditions, it is difficult to see how any great advance in the spiritual force of the collective Christian host can be attained. The impulses of mere natural feeling, however strong, are in their nature transient. They give no permanent and steady power. Resolves and purposes, however firm, that come only from the human will, and stand only in human constancy, are not to be counted on as steadfast. At the best, we ought to expect that the grand struggle for the spiritual dominion of the world will yet be long and hard.

Quite probably days are yet to come in which the fires of martyrdom will be as hot as ever, and brave and faithful souls will fill up what is behind of the sufferings of Christ. Christianity must needs be revolutionary, wherever it goes in an evil and disorderly world. Christ came to send a sword: Peace only after a fierce and decisive contest. The agitation of nations now, the heavings of society, as if volcanic fires were struggling underneath, mighty conflicts, such as those which have lately shaken our own land and drenched her soil in blood, are, it is plain, only the unavoidable results of the collision of Christian truth and principles with the falsehoods and the wrongs which must be swept away. The friends of Christ and of Christianity must, therefore, be divinely fitted for their work. They must be living men, by living sympathy with God—strong in the inflowings and overflowings of infinite and everlasting strength!

Is it asked what must be done in order that the necessary conditions of a greatly augmented moral power in Christendom may be fulfilled? First of all, let each minister and

each Christian disciple, as an individual, see to it that they are fulfilled in his own person. Then, let each do his utmost to urge others up to that higher type of Christian living, that better style of thought and experience which is essential to spiritual power. It is for all who would see Christendom attain to this advanced position to hold the matter ever in their thoughts; to talk of it at their firesides and to each other by the way; to impress the truth in relation to it in the places of social worship and in the pulpit; and, especially, to ask of Christ, who left to his own the promise of the Comforter, that the mission of the Holy Ghost may be speedily developed in the fulness of a power such as has not as yet been witnessed in the world. The day of triumph for Christianity waits, we believe, for such a manifestation of the sons of God as this.

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#### ART. III.—CONSCIOUSNESS: WHAT IS IT?

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IF THERE is any one characteristic of mental facts, in distinction from all other facts, it is consciousness. Concerning this feature of the mind, so peculiar and prominent, there still remains considerable diversity of sentiment; a proof, perhaps, that the true view has not yet been presented. Having briefly stated some of the opinions held as to the nature of consciousness, we wish to present a new theory in regard to it.

According to Hamilton, Descartes is the first philosopher of the West who uses this term to designate the mind's knowledge of its own action. Previous to him, this form of expression, and obscure in thought. Locke blends consciousness and reflection, and seems to have regarded consciousness as a distinct power. In the last particular he was followed by Reid and Stewart. Professor Porter, in his new work, defines consciousness as "the power by which the soul knows its own acts and states." More singularly, he divides consciousness into two forms or species, natural consciousness and reflective consciousness.

This view, then, that consciousness involves a distinct act, is one that arose early, and has remained historically strong; nevertheless, it seems to us to be easily confuted. In the first place, every act of mind, that it may be an act of mind,—at least a known act of mind—must be accompanied by this farther act of consciousness. Each thought, each feeling, each volition, must have this inseparable attendant; and what, pray, is it without this? A thought that is not known is no thought; a feeling that is not felt is no feeling; and a volition that is not consciously made is not made at all. Hence the very marrow and pith of each mental act, is this common act of consciousness; and to talk of acts whose substance and centre have thus been analyzed out of them and assigned a distinct, additive office, is to mistake the effigy of a man for the man himself, the form of thought for the act and power of thought. Consciousness is the pervasive characteristic, the peculiar quality and feature, the common ground and condition of every mental act and state; and not, therefore, something which can be separated from any and all of them, and leave an intelligible remainder of action, to be called, respectively, thinking, feeling, willing.

Moreover, this act of consciousness, as an act of mind, must itself be known, and is, therefore, to be known directly, or by a second act of consciousness, of which it is made the object. If it, as an act, can be known directly, why may not every other act of mind? and why are we compelled to accept a complex, double-headed movement in the case of thought, while left at liberty to conceive the act of consciousness itself as a single, translucent effort, known to the mind in the first instance? If an act of consciousness, as an act, can be comprehended as directly intelligible to the mind, equally well can one of thought, or of feeling. Or, if an act of thought is not immediately cognizable, and requires the intervention of a second act, to wit, one of consciousness; then should this act require a third act to reveal it, and this a fourth, till the power of the mind to know at all is lost in the absurd pursuit of a power to know that power wherewith it knows. If the first act is not an act of knowing, no second act can make it

one. If we can see and not see, feel and not feel, will and not will, then it will be in vain that we create another "inner sense" to overlook the mind itself, and report the mind to the mind, and tell the mind what, moment by moment, the mind is about. If the mind can not know, it can not inform itself what is knowledge. Knowledge can not be made up of two acts. In the last analysis it is simple, and failing once it fails forever.

Another class of philosophers, less definite in their language, have contented themselves with a figurative designation of the office of consciousness, and have not told us in set phrase what it is. Thus Cousin speaks of it as a witness, and Dr. Hickok as an inner light. These images may aid us in conceiving what portion of our knowledge we owe to consciousness; but can do nothing by way of philosophical explanation of it.

The view of Sir William Hamilton seems to us peculiarly wavering and indistinct. He explicitly rejects the idea, that consciousness is a faculty. He occasionally defines it in language that approaches closely what we regard as the true idea; yet, more frequently, he speaks of it in a way that seems peculiarly to identify it with knowing, and to give it the breadth which belongs to the cognitive faculties. Thus he very correctly speaks of consciousness as the "one necessary condition" of all mental phenomena; yet at once proceeds to mar the statement by saying, this "condition is consciousness, or the knowledge that I—that the Ego—exists, in some determinate state." Herein he makes consciousness something more than a general condition of all mental acts, and attributes to it a knowledge of that which is not phenomenal, to wit, the ego. In giving the special conditions of consciousness, this enlargement, and at the same time limitation, of the word more manifestly appear. First, he says, "consciousness is an actual, and not a potential, knowledge." "The second limitation is that consciousness is an immediate, not a mediate, knowledge." To us a certain truth seems to belong to these statements, while the form of them is objectionable. The obscurity of the form of the language here employed per-

tains, we believe, to the thinking of Hamilton, and of many other philosophers. The truth of the statements is, that consciousness is involved in, is the condition of, all actual, immediate knowledge; as, indeed, it is of all knowledge, and all feeling, and all volition. The error of the statements lies in the affirmation, that consciousness *is* such knowledge, in contradistinction to any other knowledge; or in any other sense than that it is its essential form or condition. This error appears more plainly when Hamilton proceeds to give as a third, fourth, and fifth condition of consciousness, contrast, judgment, and memory. Here, then, certain forms of thought are made the conditions of consciousness; whereas consciousness is the absolutely universal condition of every mental state or act. If contrast is a condition of consciousness, and consciousness a condition of feeling, contrast is also a condition of feeling, and there can be no feeling without contrast, judgment, memory. A simple, passing sensation would thus be impossible; and also a first sensation, since such a sensation could not arouse memory. What a sensation may give rise to, and what are its antecedent conditions, are very different inquiries.

Hamilton further urges, that consciousness is "the genus under which our several faculties of knowledge are contained as species;" that "consciousness constitutes, or is coextensive with, all our faculties of knowledge,—these faculties being only special modifications under which consciousness is manifested." Now, a genus is nothing aside from the species which it includes, and consciousness must not only *be* each and every known power, it must *equally be* each and every susceptibility and volition; since these stand in exactly the same relation to it, are in the same degree dependent on it, as are thoughts. Hence consciousness, ceasing to be a single power, has become all the powers, or the mind itself. Thus it is virtually lost as an element, being made to include all elements; lost as a condition, being itself the thing, the entire activity conditioned.

To these varying and confused views, we wish to oppose another. Consciousness is inseparable from all mental action. It is its peculiar condition. It is not itself a single



form of activity; it is not the entire activity of the mind taken collectively, it is the antecedent ulterior condition of that activity. Each act of the mind implies an independent power; but, that it *may be an act of mind*, it must be characterized by consciousness, assume this form, come under this condition. We know, we feel, we will. In each case we know that we know, we know that we feel, we know that we will. We do not, however, by this double form of expression, intimate that each of these acts is double, that there underlies the first knowing a second knowing; that there may be found under the feeling and the willing, respectively, a cognition. Each act is simple, primary, original, and involves the same condition, that of consciousness. Consciousness, then, is a regulative, an intuitive, an *a priori* idea, under which we explain all mental phenomena. It stands in the same relation to these that space does to physical existences. There is no material event or being which is not referable to some place or space in which it has occurred, or where it exists; there is no mental phenomenon that has not arisen in some consciousness, that has not, in the very fact and act of being, met with this indispensable condition of its being. Knowledge, feeling, volition, that are not known to him whose they are, that have not assumed this generic form, consciousness, are utterly unintelligible. What is an intuitive idea? It is one necessary and universal for the phenomena to which it pertains; and one which itself has no phenomenal existence, but is antecedently requisite for the apprehension of the facts that come under it. Thus time is not this or that series of events, is not found as a quality in any succession, but is the condition involved in the unfolding of every train of facts. Time can not be arrived at as a sensation; since it is not phenomenal, but is brought by the mind to phenomena for their apprehension. Thus it is with space, and thus it is also with consciousness. Consciousness is not, as we have seen, a single power, neither is it all the powers of the mind; it is a necessary and universal condition of all states and acts of mind, something without which no act or state is one of mind. Neither is consciousness the direct object itself of any form

of knowing, of any inner sense, since such a knowing must itself possess it. It is arrived at directly by the mind, as the necessary form or condition of its own action. Herein, then, consciousness meets the criteria of a regulative idea; it is the essential, antecedent condition of a class of phenomena; it is supplied by the mind as necessarily involved in them, not as phenominally a part of them. The effort to regard it in this last light has been the source of all the difficulties of the explanations commented on above.

There is here no impugning of the reality of consciousness. Space is as real as the events that transpire in it. In calling it a regulative idea, we do not mean to invalidate its actual being, and relations, but simply to deny of it material, phenominal existence. Consciousness is as real as the facts which it explains; it is not merely a portion of those facts, a power among those powers; nor yet all those powers in their completeness: but that which conditions them, one and all, to be what they are, to wit, facts, powers of mind.

According to this view, space and consciousness, figuratively spoken of as fields, divide between them all phenomena, at least all known phenomena, those of matter and those of mind. An event that transpires in space secures a physical existence; one that occurs in consciousness becomes a fact of mind, though often in a very rudimentary form. The connection between these two arenas of the world's events is, in its form and method, unintelligible to us; but everything that transpires must show itself in one or the other of them, and, so appearing, is as apprehensible as the familiarity of experience can make anything.

An obvious consequence of this view is, that we shall find no place for any "sub-conscious region;" a region that is not a region, and yet one that plays so prominent a part in the works of some philosophers, especially those of Hamilton. If consciousness and space divide the phenominal world between them, there is no intermediate ground, or ground on one side, which may answer to this sub-conscious realm. We object to it, in the first place, as an utterly inapprehensible, unintelligible, unlocated field or province, as to the existence and char-

acter of whose events the mind can say nothing. Admittedly it is below consciousness; neither does it show itself anywhere in the region of physical facts. Sub-conscious acts or states, therefore, must be perfectly unknown to us, indeed, unknowable by us in their form and conditions. The easy admission of the existence of such facts shows an unphilosophical, an uncritical attitude of mind. It is very different from the concession of an unknown essence, an essential centre or source of the forces of mind or of matter; there is here granted a series of sub-conscious phenomena, without the slightest idea on the part of many of those who concede them, of the place, circumstances or conditions of their being. Indeed, these admissably are beyond all the forms and bounds of knowledge.

We object, again, to such phenomena, that not only are they without proof, they bring no real explanation to the mental facts that are the occasion of their theoretical acceptance. The connections of association are offered as one of the grounds of this theory. Certain facts or ideas, A, B, C, D, have been present to the mind in a given order. Afterward, the presence of A restores D, but by the intervention of B and C. Later, A and D are found united directly in consciousness. The fact is explained by an alleged unconscious movement of the mind through B and C, and thus a sub-conscious region is evoked, in which this imaginary transit can take place. The facts, with the explanation thus offered, are not one particle plainer than they are without it; yet, to secure it, utterly unintelligible and unknown phenomena have been foisted upon our philosophy. It is as apprehensible that the mind should take short cuts, that D should unite itself at length directly to A, as it is that, in walking, we cut off superfluous circuits. When a shorter route has been taken between two points, we do not suppose that the sagacious traveler has passed over the omitted space under ground. No more is it necessary to fancy that the mind has burrowed in a sub-conscious field, and struck up again at the right point. Nor, granting the alleged facts of the explanation, is it an explanation. The connection, in the dip, of the last conscious,

with the first unconscious, act; and, in the crop of the last unconscious with the first conscious act, are entirely unintelligible. The machinery is more, and the confusion is greater, than they were in the simple fact before it suffered the concealment of a solution. The same we believe to be true of all the phenomena of which this theory is offered as an elucidation.

Again, we object to it as always and necessarily playing into materialism. The only sub-conscious region that ever will be, and alone can be, found, is located in the nervous system, and to attribute to the supposed physical changes, that may there take place, the direct effect and force of thought, is materialism. The connection between the brain and the mind is as yet inscrutable. The action of the one is conditional on that of the other; in some sense runs parallel with it. Yet the two forms of action are utterly unlike, known in wholly different ways, and are in no sense equivalents. This doctrine of sub-conscious phenomena is a step toward confounding the two. Thus, G. H. Lewes, in his *Physiology of Common Life*, tries to prove, by reasoning which is wholly physical, "that all nervous centres, in action, give rise to *Sensation*, and thus furnish elements to the general *Consciousness*." According to this view, every involuntary movement, in respiration, in the circulation of the blood, in the passage of the food, are connected with sensations, thus with consciousness, and thus with the mind. We can not pause to show the entire truth of our assertion, that the proof offered by him proceeds on materialistic reasonings. We simply illustrate the statement by the following example: "We fall asleep during a sermon (such cases have occurred), or while a book has been read aloud. The sound of the speaker's voice is heard, but the words gradually cease to be perceived. Page after page is read aloud, exciting no perception at all in our minds; but has there been no sensation excited? We have not *heard*, but have we not been *affected* by the sounds? To prove that we have is easy. Let the reader suddenly cease, and, if our sleep be not too profound, we at once awake. Now, unless the sound of his voice affected us, it is clear

that the cessation of that sound could not have affected us." It is here implied that the mind must be cognizant of every condition of its organs, or it can not be cognizant of a *change* of condition. This is a perfectly just inference as regards the physical state of the sensorium. That which in continuance produced no change, could, in discontinuance, be the ground of no modification. Not thus, however, is it with the mind. This is not, in ever present and perfect watchfulness, cognizant of the momentary state of each and all its senses. It is not on such hard conditions that it makes them avenues of knowledge. A marked change of state in an organ impresses the mind, without this constant inspection. If not, the empty organ, the organ without a content, must be watched as closely as one with a content; otherwise the introduction of a content might pass unheeded. It is no more marvelous that the cessation of a sound, as a change of state, should startle the mind, than that a shout should awaken it. Each fact affords a new and effective transition.

I lay my hand on a stone and press it forward; it remains stationary. I increase the force, at once it begins to move. I may well reason, that the first effort must have changed the conditions of inertia in the stone, otherwise the subsequent stress would not have moved it; yet that movement came as an isolated, final result. The effects on the physical organs of the mind are accumulative. Not thus the actual movement or recognition of the mind. This is complete and instantaneous, conditioned on *sufficient* force.

The argument of Hamilton grounded on the *minimum visibile* is not less materialistic in its tendency. "We look at a distant forest, we perceive a certain expanse of green." "Now, the expanse of which we are conscious is evidently made up of parts of which we are not conscious." "We must, therefore, admit the reality of modifications beyond the sphere of consciousness." These sentences, changed in their relations not in their import, express concisely the view of the author. The argument is sufficient to prove a change in the organs, in the physical conditions of sight, but is not sufficient to establish any sub-conscious, mental effects. Such phenomena have

nothing wherein they can inhere, no field in which they can show themselves, no possible method of exhibiting or establishing their being.

It is said by some of the authors who maintain the above view, that the difference between a state to which consciousness clearly testifies, and those states alleged by them to be present, though unrecognized by us, is found in the fact that the first is an object of attention, and the others are not. This calls us to define attention. We suppose it to be simply a deepened, strengthened activity of mind, arising from its own effort. More time and prominence, therefore, will be given to states which are the products of attention; but every act of mind involves exactly the same condition, and the difference between these acts is one of degree, not of kind. A state that occupies no portion of consciousness, that is not observed definitely or indefinitely, thoroughly or rapidly, is not a state of mind. There are many objects that hang, as it were, on the verge of observation, that effect one or other of the organs of the mind, and are yet not partakers in its attention less or more. Every state of mind is, in a broad sense, one of attention; what is ordinarily designated as attention, being only an intensified form of the activity involved in a careless, inattentive state. Let me watch the posts that scud by me as I look from the window of the cars. As the train increases its speed, the limits of distinct, individual attention are soon passed, and I can not count them. Yet, for a while, they make a divisible impression, discerned by the mind, though their number is beyond its enumeration. This limit, however, by great speed may be overpassed, and the last moment of time sufficient for distinct recognition be submerged; each object being lost in a confused, general impression. A definite, finite amount of time is requisite for a mental act or state. The objects beyond the posts, or in their neighborhood, have altered the condition of the senses; but have not in the least affected the mind, bending its entire powers to the consideration of these fugitive sentinels of distance.

The use of language, in connection with the view now pre-

sented, requires some attention. It is not easy to make it perfectly accurate, yet we may very readily cause it to subserve the purposes of expression, without being misled by it. We may say, consciousness testifies to this feeling, or that thought; and yet exclude the inference that consciousness is either a witness or a power. Knowing, feeling, willing, by virtue of their own simple, direct constitution, have a double aspect: the knowledge or experience which belongs to them as a particular perception, emotion, purpose; and the condition common to them all, that they are known to the mind whose states or acts they are. The convenience of language leads us to speak of this inseparable condition as if it were a distinct, complete form of knowing. This we can do with safety only on condition that we constantly remember the partial application of the words we employ. A feeling is not at once a feeling and a knowing, though we express the clearness of our conviction of the fact of emotion by saying, I know that I feel. Feeling, *as feeling*, involves a condition which allies it to knowledge; yet not more to knowledge than to volition, to every act of mind.

Philosophers constantly appeal to consciousness in proof of this or that feature of their several theories; how far does such an appeal hold? Consciousness, in the qualified use of language now spoken of, may be said to testify to all the phenomena of the mind, as phenomena; but not to their correctness or fitness. That it thinks and what it thinks, that it perceives and what it perceives, that it feels and what it feels, the mind necessarily knows. The fact is impossible without the knowledge of it, since the knowledge of it is what is meant by the fact. The justness of the thought, however, the accuracy of the alleged perception, its reliability as a phase of mental action, are totally distinct questions, not directly referable to consciousness for their solution. The clear, decided way in which they transpire in the mind, as acts, prepares us to believe in that which they declare; but the final, philosophical basis of this belief is found in a careful analysis of our several faculties of knowing, in a determination of what they reveal, and in a direct faith reposed on them as powers



of knowledge. There is no opportunity for any scepticism as regards consciousness. That we think and feel and will, all philosophy presupposes. The act of philosophizing involves it, and no man ever distrusts the mere fact of his own mental states. Such an unbelief is intrinsically absurd; it doubts itself. If the mind be represented by a mirror, the fact that an image is in the mirror is one thing, and the analytical character of the image, and its relation to an actual knowledge of the outer world, are very different things. Consciousness declares the first, the powers of knowing as means of knowledge declare the second. More exactly, a perception, a judgment or a recollection, as a knowing process, issues backward toward the mind in revealing itself, issues forward toward the object in disclosing it. For the first fact, to wit, the mind's own action, we rely on consciousness; for the second, to wit, the thing known, we trust to the given faculty of knowledge. In the night, I mistake a stump for a shrouded ghost. It is an error of the eye, not of consciousness.

We can not rightly, in a discussion concerning perception, say that we are conscious of an external object, unless that object be really and veritably a portion of the phenomena of the mind. Consciousness underlies these and these alone, is commensurate with these and these alone. An act of memory, and the event remembered; an act of judgment and the conclusion involved therein; an act of perception, and the thing perceived, are very different. Consciousness pertains to the first, and memory, judgment, and perception to the second. To take any other view is to dispense with the necessity of the specific power, and to attribute to the general condition of knowledge the results which belong to the separate acts of knowing. If we are conscious of the external world, why perceive it? If we are conscious of liberty, why reason about it? Nothing can be more immediate and undeniable than consciousness. Indeed, to doubt it, where it is truly involved, is, as we have said, absurd.

Let us see how the view, now briefly presented, leaves on the one hand the Scylla of materialism, and on the other the Charybdis of idealism. Materialism is the imminent danger

of our times. Its chief, its insuperable barrier is the irresolvable nature of consciousness, the utter disconnection of its phenomena from those of matter; their radically diverse character and method of acquisition from the most subtle facts dependent on the play of nerve-forces. If consciousness is to be regarded as a regulative idea, one more of these stubborn, irreducible notions is placed in the path of materialism. The mind's conception of the necessary nature of its own activity, like its conception of the necessary conditions of physical events, is found to run before, and expound phenomena, incomprehensible without it. Farther, consciousness is thus made to stand over against space, as dividing the conditions of being with it, and giving a wholly new, diverse, independent form of existence. Thus the physical and the mental are cut squarely and cleanly apart, and the identification of the two classes of facts made more than ever impossible. All middle ground is swept away, and while the dependence and parallelism of certain physical changes are recognized, their essentially, diverse, and alien nature is made equally plain. To call the state or condition of a nerve-centre a thought, a feeling, is thus to confound things so utterly unlike that they do not belong to the same general, generic category of being. The one arises under the regulative idea of space, the other under that of consciousness. There is thrown between them the broadest possible distinction, a distinction like that which exists between time and number, or space and causation. The inter-action between these two realms of matter and mind we do not pretend to explain; nor need we be disturbed because we can not, since it is of a final, *non-phenomenal* character. The last phenomena in brain-tissue may be observed, the first in consciousness attended to; but the connection between the two, like the connection between successive, physical events, springing the one from the other, is unsearchable.

Idealism, on the other hand, is embarrassed by this view, since the dual action of the mind of which it makes so much is lost. Each action, each state, in final analysis, is simple and complete, existing under one common condition. The mind can no longer be figured as situated centrewise, and

watching the phenomena transpiring within its own subjective circle; as classifying them, and projecting certain of them outward, as a material world. Each act is simple, and the mind is moving *through* it not *upon* it; is accomplishing something else, viewing something else, by means of it, not watching it and playing tricks with it, as the juggler with his deceptive images. Thus the proof derivable from the character and integrity of our knowing faculties, and applicable for the confirmation of a belief in the external world, has its full force. Perception and the judgment of causation are single, separate, outward-going activities of the mind, which have no verity whatever, unless it be that of affirming correctly what they seem to affirm. They are not secondary, subjective phenomena, transpiring under the primary inspection of the mind, but they are direct, original activities of the intellect, bent on this very errand of knowing, and utterly false and futile if they fail to yield knowledge. So, also, the sensations are of a simple, primitive character, and betray the independent nature of the causes which excite them. The mind finds itself reached in them by outside forces, and this becomes its inevitable conviction.

We are not so sanguine as to suppose that the above view will be readily accepted; but we believe that increasing consideration will give it increasing force, and reveal its adaptation to the elucidation and defense of that common, general body of belief concerning mind and matter, which holds possession of the public faith in spite of the shifting and erratic forms of philosophy.

## ART. IV.—THE RELATION OF THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT TO CHRISTIAN DUTY.\*

By REV. ROBERT AIKMAN, Madison, New Jersey.

WE HAVE directed attention to the works indicated in the foot-note, not because we design in this article anything which can fairly be called a review of them. But they indicate the lines of thought taken by candid and fervent Christian men, whose zeal for the truest and most hallowed observance of the Lord's day does not yield in the least to that of any of those who take the different and more common view. The two Sermons by the late Incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton—that rare and glowing intellect whose posthumous light broke so suddenly upon us—have been some years before the public, and must be admitted to have made a wide impression. The little work by Mr. Bacon is of recent issue. While in full sympathy with the views of Robertson, and coming to the same general conclusions, it is a reverent and manly discussion of a great subject, in a spirit equally courteous and independent. It is by discussions such as these from the pulpits of the Brighton and the Valley Church, and by calm consideration and reply, that we shall at last come (it may be) to a common theory and a uniform Christian practice.

The heading of this article indicates the general drift we propose: "The Relation of the Fourth Commandment to Christian Duty." Has *Christian* duty anything to do with the fourth commandment? Are there any obligations imposed in it which are binding on us? In it have we a divine command which is, in any proper sense, a divine command under the new dispensation? Or, upon the other hand, is the observance of a Sabbath or Rest-day a matter without command upon us? something which is left for the enlightened conscience of every man to decide, upon principles of high Christian expediency? Christian expediency which, when

\* The Shadow and the Substance of the Sabbath. The Religious Non-observance of the Sabbath. By F. W. Robertson, Brighton, England.

The Sabbath Question. Sermons Preached to the Valley Church, Orange, by George B. Bacon, N. J.

clearly perceived, does indeed become duty, because it brings us under the law of love, but which is yet quite a different thing from the guidance of a divine precept.

It is manifest that there is a wide difference between these grounds, both of which good men occupy. If we answer affirmatively to the former questions, we come to the result of a universal obligation to observe the Sabbath. If we answer affirmatively to the latter, then, to observe the Sabbath is a duty only to those who think it to be duty. In the former case, God's revealed wisdom is our guide; in the latter our human, however conscientiously formed, conclusions. The former includes the latter, because a divine command always implies the expediency of the human duty; but the latter may not include the former, inasmuch as human judgment often makes that appear expedient which is very far from right. The consequences, therefore, legal, social and moral, which flow from these two grounds of obligation, may be very different, and the difference of the highest importance.

As Mr. Bacon remarks, a man is not likely to say much that is new upon this subject; in which respect, however, it only partakes with many other great topics which, from time to time, come up to be discussed anew, and to be decided, if not by new arguments, yet in view of the needs of another age and a different state of society.

A question which lies near the root of the present discussion is: When was the Sabbath instituted? Was it of strictly Jewish origin? Or was it of primitive origin, given to the world when the world was made? If we say it was strictly a Jewish institution, then the way may lie open to declare that it was abolished when the new economy came in. If it is primitive in its origin, given to the world when the world was made, then it would seem as if the Sabbath must be both world-wide and perpetual in its obligations; as such, both Jewish and Christian, because meant for the race. The relation of Christian duty to the Sabbath Commandment has, therefore, much to do with the discussion of this preliminary question.

Robertson says: "The history of the Sabbath day is this:

It was given by Moses to the Israelites, partly as a sign between God and them, marking them off from all other nations by its observance; partly as commemorative of their deliverance from Egypt. And the reason why the seventh day was fixed on, rather than the sixth or eighth, was that on that day God rested from his labor. The soul of man was to form itself on the model of the Spirit of God. It is not said that God at the creation gave the Sabbath to man, but that God rested at the close of the six days of creation; whereupon he blessed and sanctified the seventh day to the Israelites. Nor is there in the Old Testament a single trace of the observance of the Sabbath before the time of Moses. The observance of one day in seven is purely Jewish. The Jewish obligation to observe it rested on the enactment given by Moses." In this view Mr. Bacon coincides, though in better guarded language. The fact that God rested after his creative work "was, probably enough, the religious truth which Abraham had handed down along the generations to the lawgiver Moses. But it is not probable that this fact was commemorated by what I have called a monumental day, until the exodus from Egypt. Probably Abraham knew that God had created, and that God had rested; but probably Abraham did not celebrate God's rest by a weekly Sabbath. There is only a very slender and unsatisfactory sum of evidence, only the very thinnest film of proof, to show that any weekly Sabbath was observed before the time of Moses." This opinion, as is well known, has been held by others, of whom Paley may be mentioned as perhaps the most distinguished name, and also because the main argument upon which they all rely is stated in his usual clear language, thus: "If the Sabbath had been instituted at the time of the creation, as the words in Genesis may seem at first sight to import, and if it had been observed all along from that time to the departure of the Jews out of Egypt, a period of about 2,500 years; it appears unaccountable that no mention of it, no occasion of even the obscurest allusion to it, should occur either in the general history of the world before the call of Abraham, or, what is more to be wondered at, in that of the lives of the first three Jewish patriarchs."



Now, it may be observed in passing, that Paley has put two things together here which may not necessarily have been conjoined. The Sabbath may have been instituted at the time of the creation, while yet it may not have been observed all along until the exodus. It doubtless fell out from the knowledge of nearly the whole antediluvian world; but so, also, did the knowledge of the one living and true God. It is quite probable that amidst the cruel rigors of Egyptian service its observance was almost obliterated from the Hebrew practice, but this, as we shall presently see, may itself have served to give special form to the precept when embodied in the future national code.

The first thing which occurs to us in regard to this negative argument is to question its value, on the ground that it is simply negative; it is not pretended to be supported by even a probable affirmative. Early Scripture is silent about the Sabbath; therefore there was no early Sabbath. If this assertion were strictly correct in regard to writings so succinct and brief, where the first 2,000 years of the world's history are presented to us in a mere genealogical record, it would be very far from proving, or even of necessity making it probable, that the Sabbath had no existence. This is especially a case where a negative proves nothing. Let us bring the value of it to an easy and decisive test. Circumcision was an undoubted early rite, yet there is no mention of the observance of the rite from the famous occasion when the children of Israel were about to enter Canaan, to the day when the rite was performed upon the infant John the Baptist. Even the word fails to occur until the times of Jeremiah, a period of 800 years. Now, suppose we say: "There is not a single trace of the observance of the rite of circumcision from the time of Joshua to the days of John the Baptist," have we proved anything by our negative? Suppose we add: "There is no single mention of the Passover from the days of Joshua to the days of Hezekiah, 700 years;" must this be considered "unaccountable," and be held to prove a serious conclusion? Let us observe in this connection the history of the Sabbath itself. There is mention made of it by Moses in Numbers, 28th chapter; and from that time



Scripture is silent about it until the days of David ; for the space of 400 years. In Paley's language, "there is no occasion of even the obscurest allusion to it." Paley says that this silence is especially to be wondered at on the account "of the lives of the first three Jewish patriarchs, which in many parts of the account is sufficiently circumstantial and domestic." We must needs then say, that this silence during a later period of equal length, in accounts, many of them quite as domestic and circumstantial, in which are details of laws, customs, rites and ceremonies, with much of national and individual life, and occupying a much greater portion of the sacred volume, ought surely to be matter of even greater wonder. These illustrations are sufficient to show the value of this negative argument, and whether it is entitled to any weight whatever in the discussion. Yet, be it remembered, it is the main ground which so acute a mind as Paley discovered for the basis of a denial of the primitive origin of the Sabbath, in the face of the apparently clear account of its institution when the world was made.

Let us now look at the question from a positive point of view. We may dwell a moment on the bearings of the admitted primitive division of time, into weeks of seven days, as shown in the history of Noah and the flood, and later in the history of Jacob, when subtle Laban said to him: "Fulfil her week." No one, we presume, questions that this division into weeks was from the beginning of time. We suppose it is also admitted that time was thus divided from the creation of the world, because God had worked during six days and rested on the seventh. The question which now occurs is: What can be more natural that that the weekly division of time being given to man at the beginning, it should have been given on the divine model of six laboring days, and the seventh a rest day, a primeval Sabbath? Have we not a right to believe this? In the absence of something positive to the contrary, is not the balance of probability thrown in this direction? To one who had not, even unconsciously, a theory preoccupying the mind, would not this inference be so easy as to be almost inevitable?

It is, indeed, difficult to understand how Robertson avoided this conclusion. These are his words: "The reason why the seventh day was fixed on rather than the sixth or eighth, was that on that day God rested from his labor. The soul of man was to form itself on the model of the Spirit of God." Great and sweet truth, well expressed by one who lovingly and painfully strove thus to fashion his own soul. But what is this model for the human life? The preacher himself tells us, it was God's six days' work, his seventh day's rest. How surprising, then, to read these following words: "It is not said that God at the creation gave the Sabbath to man, but that God rested at the close of the six days of creation; whereupon he blessed and sanctified the seventh day to the Israelites." Indeed! Had Adam, then, so soon to wander outside the gates of sinless Eden, no need of a divine model? To Enoch, Noah, Abraham, in hard conflict with a world which had forgotten God and his primeval work, was there no need to form their souls on this model of God's Spirit, by six days of labor and then a Sabbath day of holy rest?<sup>2</sup> How came the preacher to lay so true a foundation for the Sabbath in the inmost and universal needs of the soul of man, and at once to build upon it so discordant a superstructure?

Let us revert to the simple and lucid language of the inspired account: "And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made, and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made." What is the impression made upon the mind when we read this language? Surely it is that the institution of the Sabbath forms one of a series of consecutive events. God rested from making a world, and thence and then gave a rest-day to the world. Were this account to come, for the first time, under the eye of an intelligent Hindoo or Chinese, would he have any doubt

\* "To conceive that the patriarchs, who were men of like passions, men exposed to like temptations, toils and sufferings with others, could maintain for centuries a holy and happy life, without the stimulus and refreshment of the Sabbath, is to suppose a case which, if true, would prove the uselessness of the institution in any circumstances."—Gilfillan.

that he was reading from the Christian's Bible, the belief of the Christian world with regard to the origin of the day of sanctified rest? This is the argument from the common sense of common men. We say nothing of great names here; nothing of the prevalence of our view of this passage in Genesis almost undisturbed throughout nearly all the ages of the church. But we say that the common-sense interpretation of plain language by common men has great weight; no man ever advances so far in his attainments as safely to ignore it.

When, therefore, we are told that "the history of the creation was written by the Israelites, and naturally and appropriately introduces the reason and the sanction of their day of rest," the Sabbath itself not being instituted until 2,500 years later, we can not but regard it as a pure assumption. We call for the proof that what plainly seems to be the record is not the record.

We believe, indeed, that the account of the creation was written by an Israelite. What part tradition or early documents had to do with it, if any, we know not, but Moses was divinely inspired to write the wonderful narrative. If early tradition, or old truthful documents, were made use of by the inspired man of God, then if the view we are controverting is correct, Moses must have interpolated the reason for the seventh-day command into the ancient account. Let any man show this if he can.

To infer, however, that because the account of the creation was written by an Israelite it was therefore written for the Israelites, would be erroneous. That account was written for mankind; not more for Israel than for us. With regard to those earliest records of our world's history, in which the Jew was not one whit more immediately concerned than will be the latest generation of the race, the words of Paul to Roman believers are eminently apt, that, "Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning." It does not, therefore, seem reasonable to believe that the Holy Spirit, when revealing through Moses an account of the creation of the world, which was to be read in all ages, by all nations, in all tongues, would have inserted in the midst of this account

the reason for an institution which was not to exist until 2,500 years had elapsed, and which was to be local and circumscribed in its observance; "instituted in the wilderness," "purely Jewish," "resting on the enactment of Moses." No! Rather did Moses, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, write for the world an account of the creation of the world; and in language which would not, in a matter of such high and permanent concernment, be calculated to mislead the world.

Let us look at the subject from another point of view, in close connection with what we have just said. Robertson, in the former of his two sermons, says: "If the Sabbath rests on the needs of human nature, and we accept Christ's decision that the Sabbath was made for *man*, then you have an eternal ground to rest on, from which you can not be shaken. A son of man may be lord of the Sabbath day, but he is not lord of his own nature. You may abrogate the formal rule, but you can not abrogate the needs of your own soul. Eternal as the constitution of the soul of man, is the necessity for the existence of a day of rest. Further still, on this ground alone can you find an impregnable defense of the *proportion*, one day in seven. A change from this proportion has been tried and, by the necessities of human nature, the change has been found pernicious. Even in the contrivance of one day in seven it was arranged by infinite wisdom. Just because the Sabbath was made for man, and not because man was ordained to keep the Sabbath day, you can not tamper with the iota, one day in seven." In one of his letters he says again: "You can not base the Sabbath on a law, but you can show that the law was based on an eternal fitness." With a single qualification, we agree fully and earnestly in all this. If we can prove a divine Sabbath law, that law is authoritative whether or not we can prove an eternal fitness as its basis. We do not suppose, however, that Robertson would hold that the authority of a divine law was contingent on the skill of finite scrutiny as to its foundations. The ground thus laid down by the gifted preacher is common to us with him. Much of the argument of all modern advocates for the Sabbath is based upon it. The reason for the Sabbath is not local or tempo-

rary. The command is not of the nature of the prohibition to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, specific and transient. The reason for it lies back of itself; and in this it partakes of the nature of all the other commands of the Decalogue, and of all moral commands, which always have a foundation lying beneath the precept, and other than the mere good pleasure of the lawgiver.

This being true, then, that the necessity for a day of rest, and the proportion of one day in seven, is built into the fabric of our world, is "eternal as the constitution of the soul of man," we ask these questions: Is it reasonable to believe that this institution was first enacted to a very small nation, a few millions of men, who were expected, and even commanded, to keep themselves secluded from all the great world surrounding them? If the necessity is human, and therefore universal, is it credible that the wise and benevolent God, when creating a world, and giving to it institutions and means of grace, would have left his world without an institution, of which the incarnate Creator himself says: "The Sabbath was made for man." "The Sabbath rests upon the needs of human nature." Had human nature no such needs during nearly half the period of the existence of the race; or, if it had, did God omit to make provision for needs so imperative and absolute?

Before closing these observations on the primitive origin of the Sabbath, we wish to say a word about Mr. Bacon's first sermon, "The Sabbath of God." It is a most suggestive and interesting discourse, some of the main positions of which we have no desire to question. We have no doubt of the pre-existent earth long ages before the day of Adam. It is not necessary to deny that the six creative days were slow rolling eras of vast incalculable changes. This interpretation\* dawned dimly yet sublimely on the mind of "the great father Augustine, long before geology was born. These strange sunless days—*dies transacti sine luminaribus*. The devout scripture-loving, scripture-revering Augustine saw such intimations in

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\*See Prof. Tayler Lewis, in *Lange's Commentary on Genesis*. Part II, page 131.

abundance, saw them on the very face of the account. There was no doubt-raising science then, nor anything in philosophy, that drove this most profound, yet humble and truth-seeking, mind to such conclusions. He could not read the first of Genesis and think of ordinary days."

And yet, it must be said, that few things are more dangerous than building a theologic or biblical dogma upon a geologic theory. Men of middle age have seen the indubitably proud theory of to-day displaced by the equally well-established theory of to-morrow, itself soon to be as thoroughly abandoned as its predecessors; and each of these mutually destructive views held in turn by the great teachers of geology; so that the disposition to interpret Scripture by geology has become too plainly perilous to be as popular as it once was. The view which holds the six creative days to have been six formative ages, we indeed accept, but it seems safe and proper not to dogmatize upon it as a foundation. It is also certainly true that the "rest upon which God entered began at the close of his six days' work, and continues yet." When the apostle says: "He that is entered into his rest, he also hath ceased from his own works, as God did from his," he means to convey to us the idea of a continuous Sabbath day to God; the Creator resting "the seventh day from all his works." However much is mysterious in this high and holy truth, with regard to Him who may be endlessly creating and annihilating worlds, we accept it. We do not know that any one feels called on to disprove or question it. Nor do we deny that in this rest into which God has entered there may be a yet unrevealed and sublime analogy to the whole history of our world, and the future of millenium or of heavenly glory. We feel indebted here to Mr. Bacon for thoughts which are finely suggestive. But we submit that these admissions do not affect the important question upon which we are now at issue. We are not asking: Did God's rest begin at the close of its six days' work to continue through the lapse of earthly ages? Our Question is: Did God, when human life began with Adam, divide up human time into weeks, and ordain that one-seventh of it should be Sabbath time? Did the benignant



Creator ordain that even our little individual earthly lives, so inconceivably important although so brief, should be cast into the sublime analogy of his own working and his own resting? Whatever greater things are yet to be unfolded, this is to us of primal importance, and, we claim, is to be decided on other grounds than those to which we have referred.

The question is asked by Mr. Bacon: "Need we insist—nay, even can we suppose, that the seventh day, which God blessed and sanctified, was really a day of twenty-four hours' duration, according to the measure of a man's comprehension?" We reply: If the question refers to the day which God blessed and sanctified *to man*, as a Sabbath day—and, to have any practical bearing, this must be its meaning—then we must needs insist on just that; we can not suppose otherwise than that it means "a day of twenty-four hours' duration, according to the measure of a man's comprehension." Indeed, this is not a matter of mere human assertion at all. Whatever else may be in doubt, this is not; it lies imbedded in the fourth commandment: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; *wherefore* the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and hallowed it." Let God's book of nature have thrown light on God's revealing word, let the six creative days have been slow moving ages, it is not the less true that the Sabbath day which God blessed and hallowed to his own people as their day of rest, was a day of twenty-four hours' duration; and that the reason why he so blessed it was because of his own rest, after his own work, however long his working day, however long his resting day.

The only point upon which there can be room for discussion is, as to *the time when* God set apart a day of twenty-four hours as a Sabbath day. Those with whom we differ say that the institution did not begin with man, and was not made for the race, but was enacted when the race was more than 2,000 years old. We hold that it was primeval, and given to the world. But that God did bless and sanctify an ordinary solar day, "a day of twenty-four hours' duration according to the measure of a man." In that we can not but be agreed; and



also agreed that the divine reason given is God's working through six days and resting through one.

A word upon another point in this connection. Robertson says : " The first account of the Sabbath occurs after the Israelites had left Egypt; and the fourth commandment consolidates it into a law, and explains the principles and sanctions of the institution." Mr. Bacon coincides in this opinion, and in accordance with it explains the 16th chapter of Exodus, where its first observance is mentioned in connection with the giving of the manna. This view of the transactions narrated in that chapter greatly impresses us with the propriety of the somewhat boundless toleration which should exist between equally sincere men who fail to see alike. It does seem to us, it always so seemed, that the narrative alluded to plainly implies the previous enactment of the Sabbath day. We think that any one without a theory to support could hardly read it and receive a different impression. We frankly admit, therefore, that having always read Genesis ii, 2, 3, and received from it the common impression which it has made on common minds in all ages, we may have been prepared for our view of this 16th chapter of Exodus; our own theory may have led to our view. But even then we have a right to claim that if the calm reading, by the unbiased minds of men, of both these parts of God's word has led almost universally to the same belief, there is great weight to be given to the fact.

But let us look at the circumstances of the case. The children of Israel had just come up out of Egypt. They had been the victims of more than a century of unmatched oppressions. History may be searched in vain to find a parallel to its unreasoning rigor and outrageous exactions, culminating in an attempt to utterly obliterate the nation. Their religion and their God were alike despised by their oppressors. During the lives of successive generations, they had been driven by hard taskmasters to daily toils, regardless no doubt of holy days, or holy national customs of any kind. Taking it for granted that the Sabbath went with Israel into Egypt, how must it have fallen into disuse during these years full freighted with woe; when the sons of warlike Simeon and Levi, and

princely Joseph, sunk into that last condition of the abject, when the slave prefers to be a slave rather than to encounter suffering and peril to be free. What else could happen than that the Sabbath had been disregarded and, to some extent, lost, so that it needed to be recalled when the nation went up out of Egypt and began its new life. In the light of this high probability let us read the 16th chapter of Exodus. The freedom of Israel was but thirty days old. These thirty days had been crowded with bewildering experiences; and they have now come to a resting place "in the wilderness of sin, which is between Elim and Sinai" at a safe distance from Egypt. Here occurs the commencement of that miracle of forty years' duration, which was so arranged as at once to recall, and permanently to compel, the observance of the Sabbath. The Lord says to Moses: "I will rain bread from heaven for you;" and then follow the words: "And it shall come to pass, that on the sixth day, they shall prepare that which they bring in, and it shall be twice as much as they gather daily." Does not this look as if the people were expected, without any special instruction, to know and to supply the reason for a direction otherwise so unaccountable? For, as yet, Moses seems not to have said a word directly about the Sabbath. He appears to have expected them to understand the matter at once, and to act upon it without explanation. And the people did, with such few exceptions as were to have been expected. "On the sixth day they gathered twice as much bread, and all the rulers of the congregation came and told Moses. And he said unto them: This is that which the Lord hath said, to-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord." Upon the theory of a primeval Sabbath, much disused, partly forgotten in Egypt, all this transaction appears natural; but we can not but regard it as wholly unlike the setting up of an institution, new in the world, and so remarkable and unprecedented in its kind. We should certainly in that case expect the first mention of it to be in the way of a distinct and formal command announcing it as something unusual and new.

Indeed, the Fourth Commandment itself, by its very form

and phraseology, seems to refute the view that the Sabbath was instituted in the wilderness at the giving of the manna, and for the Hebrew people. It is one of the three commandments which have annexed their own specific reasons and sanctions; and these are given particularly and at length. But there is no allusion to the manna, although the feeding of three millions human beings, during forty years, by bread rained from heaven, is perhaps the most stupendous miracle recorded in the Bible, and was eminently worthy of remembrance in the Sabbath law, if the law and the miracle were simultaneous, and the latter the occasion of the former; if, as Mr. Bacon says, "The Sabbath had for its occasion a conspicuous incident in the history of a nation." That the Sabbath had a special import to the Hebrew is not to be denied; it was to be expected that when reenacted, this rest day should remind them of their deliverance from the grievous bondage in Egypt. When, therefore, Moses, just before his death, rehearses the law and gives his final charge to Israel, he gives their deliverance, "through a mighty hand," as a reason why the Lord commanded them to keep the Sabbath day. But in the original transaction, forty years before, the words of the commandment pass over everything that is either national or Jewish, and go back to the commencement of time, to the creation of the world, and the period when God placed on the earth the progenitor alike of Jew and Gentile.

Without attempting to exhaust the argument for the primeval origin of the Sabbath, we rest it here. The importance of whatever decision we arrive at with regard to it can hardly be overestimated. Paley, with his usually clear perception of the relation of things, says: "If the divine command was actually delivered at the creation, it was addressed no doubt to the whole human species alike, and continues, unless repealed by some subsequent revelation, binding upon all who come to the knowledge of it. This opinion precludes all debate about the extent of the obligation."

We have no serious fear that the Christian world will ever give up this ground upon which to base the universal obligation of the Sabbath. As the Bible makes its way into all the

regions of the earth, and is listened to as the authoritative voice of God, speaking in all tongues, men will read, in quiet Sabbath hours, the wonderful, yet simple, account of the creation of the world, and come to the closing words: "Thus the heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them. And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made." And, reading these words, with calm and natural thinking, with no theories at hand, and none to maintain, they will trace their Sabbath back to the old sweet days of sinless Eden; hold it fast as almost the lone relic of its brief hours of perfect worship; and thank God that when he made the world he bestowed upon it this benignant gift, full of suggestions of his own high and holy rest, and the emblem, to the wearied soul of man, of his coming heavenly and eternal rest. And such thoughts as these will make the words seem more profound and true of Him, the Creator, now incarnate, who, recalling his own primeval gift, said, with a meaning only fully fathomed by himself: The Sabbath was made for man.

We come now to another aspect of the Sabbath question which has decisive bearings upon the subject of our discussion. It may be variously stated, thus: "Has the Sabbath been abrogated? Has the fourth commandment been repealed or suspended by the Christian dispensation? Are Christians under obligations of obedience to God to observe a Sabbath day? These questions would all be answered by an indubitable settlement of the point we have already discussed. We make no claim to such a settlement; and, besides, this aspect of the question will repay an independent examination, and has an outlook into other fields of thought. We will here make few references to the language of any of those who take views different from our own. We should be sorry even to seem to misstate them, and we are not sure that we could give them with the qualifications which their authors would deem essential to their fair statement. It is always perilous in contro-

versial matters. Especially if they be theological, to state your opponent's position; he will be apt to say, "Why did you not state my doctrine as I put it?" And you, to answer, "Why did you not put your doctrine as you meant it?" And no umpire to decide. We will, therefore, only endeavor to give what seems to us the true view of this most important aspect of the Sabbath question.

The first thing which strikes us here is the place where we find this precept; its inseparable surroundings. It is embedded in the midst of nine others, all of a very remarkable nature—unique and comprehensive. So comprehensive, indeed, are these commandments, as to have always been regarded by the Hebrew and the Christian church, as including all the duties which we owe to God and man. The duties they enjoin, and the sins they forbid, are to be considered as the heads of extensive classes, under which all others are to be arranged. To this great code it pleased God to give signal and stupendous attestation, making the distinction between it and all other parts of the Sinaitic laws, and its incomparable superiority, to appear exceedingly manifest. This only was spoken by the mouth of God himself to the people, "out of the midst of the fire." This only was written by the finger of God; twice written by Jehovah himself, even Moses not being permitted to copy them from the broken tables on which God had graved them. Of these ten commandments Moses said: "These words the Lord spake unto all your assembly in the mount, out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, and of the thick darkness, with a great voice; and he added no more; and he wrote them in two tables of stone, and delivered them unto me." In another place Moses speaks of "two tables of testimony, tables of stone, written with the finger of God." These are "the words of the Covenant." "It is by virtue of their presence in it that the ark becomes the Ark of the Covenant, and the sacred tent the Tabernacle of Testimony." Evidently the Decalogue is central and essential in the Sinaitic institutions, whatever else is accessory and ceremonial. Of the precepts written on these tables, nine are believed and admitted to be of absolute, un-

changing, and universal obligation. The Decalogue did not originate the duties which it enjoins; it did not reveal them; these were from the beginning, springing necessarily out of the mutual relations of God and man, and of men to one another. The Decalogue is a divine and supremely authoritative assertion and a special enactment of these immutable principles. No one, at least, doubts that this is true of nine of the commandments.

From this premise two conclusions would seem surely to follow: First, If the Sabbath be founded upon the needs of human nature, the necessity for it built into the present system of things; if Robertson speaks advisedly—and we believe he does—when, in one of his letters, he says, “I certainly do feel by experience the eternal obligation because of the eternal necessity of the Sabbath; the soul withers without it;” if it be true that without it religion would probably die out of the world—and here our expressions are no stronger than those of many wise and good men whose other views we are unable to adopt—then, *a priori*, might we not look for a Sabbath commandment *just where we find it*; in the midst of nine other comprehensive precepts, which, like it, are held to be of primal, universal, and permanent necessity? Is not the Decalogue, that divinely simple and divinely wonderful summary of moral duties, the proper place in which to embody a statute based on a human need which also is divinely constituted? Surely it ought to be found there, set forth to the world of human beings in company with those other grand laws which are the foundation of our world’s moral life. In the commandment itself, in its reasons and sanctions, in the place where it is found, and the precepts which have kept company with it through the ages, and will forever, in all this we perceive a harmony which we reverently believe to be not less than divine.

The other result from the premise referred to we hold to be this: If the Sabbath law is abrogated or superseded, then all the other nine must go with it. We do not see but that, logically, the ten must share a common fate. The Sabbath rests on the needs of man, on the “fitness of things;” there is “eternal obligation to it because of the eternal necessity for



it"—and the fourth commandment is the divine enactment, and not the origin of the obligation: no more can be said of all the others. Who then shall say that one is abrogated while nine stand? One obsolete, all the rest permanent; one faded to a shadow; the others living entities to the world's end! Have we not a right to demand of him who avers this that he show us a plain "Thus saith the Lord?" That he be able to tell the time when the fingers that wrote the fourth commandment on its table of stone, and wrote beneath it and above it nine others to endure forever, erased the letters and left bare the place where this had been? And here we must depart a moment from the rule laid down for ourselves and quote the language of Mr. Bacon, though we should prefer to have our readers themselves refer to his 4th sermon: "The Lord's day a privilege." He says: "The commandments were graven on stone, because men are bound by the Spirit to observe them. I must not steal. Why must I not steal? Because it is so written in the Jewish law? No. But it is so written in the Jewish law, and in every other law, because I must not steal. It is wrong to kill. Why is it wrong to kill? Because the sixth commandment forbids killing? No. But the sixth commandment forbids killing because it is wrong to kill." With the qualification which we made upon Robertson's language, we say: Well and tersely put. We have already said the same, though not so well. But why does Mr. Bacon embrace in his theory of moral obligation the sixth and the eighth commandments and leave the fourth coldly outside. Finding them on the same "Tables of Testimony," written by the same divine hand, and held to have a permanent ground in the religious needs of a race, whose religion *is its all*, by what right shall he forbid us to add to his own clear words these of ours: Is it wrong to profane the Sabbath day? Yes. Why is it wrong? Because the fourth commandment says, Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy? No. But the fourth commandment says this, because it is right to do it. The right in each case based on a principle and a necessity inherent in the system; the commandment in each case being a divine consolidation of the principal and the



necessity into a law. If any one say that the sixth and the eighth commandments are more clearly moral precepts, we admit it; but to say that a rest-day, a day for holy thought, for higher aspirations, for special communion with God, is not as real a need to our restless, earth-prone, God-forgetful race, is not only to take for granted the question at issue, but is to assert what no man knows enough to prove. May not the fact that the Sabbath command is not to us so evidently a moral precept, while yet the Sabbath necessity is real and absolute, be the very reason why the divine Lawgiver imbedded it amidst nine other commandments, the moral nature of which no man can doubt, and the universal need of which no man can question.

These thoughts only lead us to a further question: What is the relation of the whole Decalogue to the Christian system. For, if what we have said be true, then the relation of Christian duty to the Fourth Commandment involves this wider one. Mr. Bacon, in that sermon just alluded to, uses this language: "It can not be said that the law of the Sabbath, being a part of what is known as the ten commandments, distinguished by a peculiar dignity from the rest of the law, and graven expressly upon stone tables, remains permanent and binding upon all men, though the ceremonial law is passed away. Where do we find any exception of these ten commandments from the acknowledged fulfilment or supersedure of the law by Christianity? It is the law as a whole that is superseded. Are we, then, to be told that this, by far the most important part of it, is still in force?"

Upon what appear to us the manifest and radical differences between the merely ceremonial law and the Ten Commandments, we will not dwell. We think the difference to be somewhat like that which exists between the scaffolding and the house. The Hebrew was to dwell in God by living in obedience to God; and the Ten Commandments were to him the divine summary of virtue. The ceremonial observances were needful helps to a rude people in a ruder age, by means of which the idea of worship was unfolded, through which they drew near to God, and learned to know the nature and beauty

of his holiness; that holiness of which the Decalogue was the verbal expression. The ceremonial law had uses other than this, but it had this; and to say that the Ten Commandments ought to pass away because that did, really seems like saying, that when you take the scaffolding down from around your house, you ought to pull down your house along with it.

As to the relations of the Decalogue to the Christian system, we are by no means sure that we differ as widely from Mr. Bacon as his words, which we have quoted, would seem to indicate. His qualifications we think greatly modify his words: "The law as a whole is superseded." Our own position is succinctly this: The relation of Christians to the ten commandments *is not essentially different* from the relation of the Hebrews to the ten commandments.

The field of thought opened here is a broad one, but the proofs of this proposition lie near at hand. The central, vital principle in the gospel dispensation is Faith. "He that believeth shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned." So Christ commanded to preach, so apostles preached. Good works are needful and will be rewarded, but salvation is conditioned upon faith. No obedience that any sinner of our race will ever render can be ground of justification before God: "by the deeds of the law there shall be no flesh justified in his sight;" but "a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law." But was faith less vital and essential under the old dispensation than under the new. No. It was absolutely as vital and essential. "Abraham believed God, and it [his faith] was counted to him for righteousness." This is the very truth which Paul declares and defends in the 4th chapter to the Romans, and the 3d chapter to the Galatians, in an argument so lucid, though so brief. Was obedience to the law (ceremonial or moral) ever the condition of salvation? No. The promise was 430 years before the law, and the inheritance was by promise, and through grace. "If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law." The apostle utters the great central truth of the new dispensation in the words, "Now the just shall live by faith;" but the voice of Paul is

but the echo of the voice of old Habakkuk, who cried thus in the ear of the Jew 600 years before.

Whatever may be man's view of the moral system of this world, the simple, solemn truth is, that the Bible regards this world as a revolted and last world from the time that Adam fell. It declares that there have been just two trial questions propounded to our race. One was in Eden, where it was said, obey and live. This was a strictly legal system; and there has never been another such under God's government of our race since Adam sinned. That which at once succeeded it, and has prevailed ever since, had for its sole test question and command these words: Believe and live.

The coming Saviour was at once promised and foreshadowed from that hour, with more and more clearness, till he came; but the race was under the rule of grace, and faith was its condition of salvation. The distinction between the Mosaic and the Gospel dispensations is not at all in their great central vitalizing principle. Around that principle God wisely and kindly built up a grand structure of temple service of cost and toil, full of blood and full of import. By and by his hand swept away the whole solemn fabric, but only to bring to clearer sight FAITH, the one living thing whose life was indestructible, and which alone gave value to it all. Faith, which in the new dispensation, when the Christ promised had become the Christ crucified and exalted, was evermore to stand in the full sight of man as well as God.

If these principles are true—and we suppose them to be acknowledged and familiar—it is easy to see what place the Decalogue occupies in the gospel day. Obedience to the ten commandments is not the law of life to us. Neither was it to the Hebrew. Not to him any more truly than to us. To a race under a redemptive system, such a condition is impossible in the nature of the case. What, then, is the use and value of the Decalogue? It is the divine summary of perfect human duty toward God and man. No less, no more; and as such its value to the world is just inconceivable. This it was to the Hebrew, and this it is to us. As such it has a purpose and a work to do for our sinful and redeemed world, which the

Apostle makes greatly, even essentially, important; it makes known the nature and desert of sin; "through the law is the knowledge of sin;" and through that knowledge it brings us to Christ. "The law is our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ; that we might be justified by faith." And this was its office to the Jew of old as truly, and to the more spiritually minded, as sensibly as to us; "through the law" he became "dead to the law;" that he "might live unto God." So the Jewish worshipper brought his lamb, unblemished, to the altar, saw it slain, was sprinkled with its blood, and felt some of the fullness of the assurance that "The just shall live by his faith."

What then shall we do with this wonderful Decalogue? These heads of series of all duties and all sins. Shall we say: It went with the rent veil and the moulded curtains of the tabernacle; with the ark, whose fate no one knows; with the lumber of the perished temple? What is meant when it is said the law is superseded? Not that the engraved tables have perished. Not that as moral truths the Ten Commandments have passed away; for these were written in the heart of man before Sinai was seen by Moses, and will remain written there were the memories of Sinai to become as silent as its thunders. Is it meant that they declare no more the conditions of salvation? They never did. Is it meant that now they are the handmaids to faith? They always were. The Decalogue was given to a sinful and erring world; to a world fallen from its first estate, and much in the dark as to all high and holy principles. It was not needed in Eden. There will be no Decalogue in heaven. But in our imperfect system there never will come a time when it will not be needed. So long as this remains a sinful world there will ever be danger, lest man have other gods than Jehovah, lest he take the name of the Lord in vain, dishonor father and mother, and kill and steal and lie. Therefore, during this imperfect period, specific prohibitions of their sins will always be needed, and will exist. It is a mistake to suppose that because, under the gospel, man is under the dominion of the law of love, therefore specific commands are superseded. When was ever man under any

other law? Jesus summed up the law in the words: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind;" and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But, let it be remembered, he only repeated the identical words which, as the Logos in Sinai, he had spoken to Moses and given to the Hebrew in the old dispensation. (Lev. xix, 18; and Deut. vi, 5.) His divine summary of love no more superseded the Decalogue in the later age than in the earlier. Jesus himself laid down many specific commands. Paul says, "Love is the fulfilling of the law," but he yet deemed it quite proper, and not superfluous, to add, "Lie not one to another;" and, "Let him that stole, steal no more." A great American statesman said on a certain occasion, "I do not think it necessary to reenact the law of God;" but, for all that, we know that every good law which men make is nothing else than a reenactment of the law of God. We conclude, therefore, that the law as laid down in the Decalogue has not been superseded, can not be, and will not be, until the perfect supersede the fallible and sinful, until the heavenly supersede the earthly.

If these positions be firm, it can not but follow that the relation of Christian duty to the Fourth Commandment is *essentially* the same as that of the Hebrew. We say *essentially*. Modified as to the mode of observance by the less sensible and more spiritual nature, and the holier freedom of the Christian system. It is just here that the life and words of the Lord Jesus come clearly to our aid. Let us examine his mode of treating this matter of Sabbath observance, and see what light it throws upon the question. If we mistake not, it will be seen that the Saviour treats the fourth commandment just as he treats the other nine. The relation of the law to the new system forms a very important part of the Sermon on the Mount. We have there some authoritative statements upon this great subject; and these statements involve the true and full solution of our question. Jesus first asserts the immutability of the law. That it was something which he came not to destroy but to fulfil. And *to fulfil* seems to us properly quite a different thing from *superseding*. The law was

to endure, every jot and tittle of it, "till heaven and earth pass;" and its least sanctions were enforced with the greatest solemnity. Then, as if to show that by the "law," he definitely refers to the ten commandments, Jesus selects three from the ten; possibly as more liable to abuse than some others, or for some other reason which he does not divulge. From the first table, the command which enjoins reverence to the name of God; from the second table, the commands which guard human life and the marriage institution. The commandment of old is, "Thou shalt not kill." "Think not that I am come to destroy it; but rather to fulfil it—[*πληρῶσαι* as opposed to *καταλύσαι*; not to loosen or unbind, but to *fill out* the command.] I will show you its reach, its depth and height; and I say beware of causeless anger, for that is to kill; beware of an unforgiving spirit, for an unrelenting heart vitiates and makes abominable an altar gift. This is the sixth commandment. And the seventh is like unto it. The precept of old is, Thou shalt not commit adultery. I came not to loosen its strength but to fill out its scope; to show more meaning in it than David felt, or ancient seers declared. Therefore be careful of the glances of the eye; and consider that it is better for thee to pluck out thine eye than under the curse of the law to be cast into hell." In like manner Jesus treated the third commandment.

Thus, in brief, did Christ show forth the import of the Decalogue, and its relations to Christian duty; using these few as illustrations of the whole. He did not abrogate the letter; he did expressly the contrary, as we understand his words; but he opens up the deep and wide-reaching spiritual things enfolded in the command, expressed, and only faintly expressed, by the letter.

Can any one show a different mode of treatment on the part of Jesus of the fourth commandment? We believe not. On the contrary we think it clear that he deals with it in the same way. We have a right to hold in view as fundamental Christ's assertion, that he came not to destroy the law but to fulfil; not to unbind or loosen, but to fill out and make perfect. This is the basis which he lays down of his own



treatment of the law, lest men should conclude, because he dwells so much upon the spiritual import of the precept, that he had put aside the outward form. And we have a further right to believe, in the absence of any exception made by the Saviour himself, that not nine, but ten commandments, were in his mind when he spake of the immutability of the law, and drew his illustrations from both tables of the Decalogue.

With this in mind, let us see how Jesus actually dealt with the fourth commandment. The famous passage in the 12th chapter of Matthew will guide us. Jesus and his disciples were passing on the Sabbath through a corn-field, and his disciples being hungry plucked and ate. The Pharisees, offended, appealed to him against this desecration of holy time. At once Jesus began to open to them the spirit underneath the letter. He rebuked them for the mere external view they took, and proceeded to show them—What? That there was no more a Sabbath? That he had come to abrogate the command? That the letter had departed? The form was to be no more, or of no consequence? Nothing of the kind. But that there was an essence in it truer to man's nature and needs than they knew. That the Sabbath was given to man because of his human wants, being made for man, and not man for it. He did even more than this. He forthwith chose an illustration which would be of exceeding force, perhaps an exceeding surprise to these doctors of the old economy. To them nothing was so holy as the temple, with its altar, its shew-bread and other symbols. No unpriestly hand might innocently touch those sacred things. But Jesus shows them, by the influential name of David, that underneath the letter had lain a great fullness of spiritual import; that David well understood it, and the good priest Abiathar; and that, too, in the days when no man doubted that the outward form was of divine authority. The same spiritual liberty was then, as now, within the letter; and the soul divinely illuminated would, through the letter, catch the spirit of the ever permanent precept. The precept and the day being made for man, the race of man; not man for it. The incident which immediately follows is to exactly the same result. The withered hand was



healed in the synagogue on the Sabbath day, and the deed of mercy placed on the same ground of true recognition of, and real obedience to, the fourth commandment.

In these, and similar transactions, we have clearly made known the Saviour's view of the relations of the fourth commandment to duty under the new dispensation. He dealt with this commandment precisely as he dealt with the third, the sixth and the seventh. With regard to them he declared, first, the permanence and immutability of the precept. In solemn language he sets forth their greatness, and allots to men their position in the kingdom of heaven in accordance with their teachings and their practice of these commandments. And then he unfolds their spiritual fullness. In all his subsequent dealings with the Jews, when the observance of the Sabbath is in question, we fail to find any departure from the principles thus early laid down on this whole great subject. When the multitudes listened to the Sermon on the Mount, we venture to assert that no one of them understood Jesus to have abrogated or changed the sixth commandment by his words, "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, but I say unto you, Thou shalt not be angry with thy brother, Thou shalt not say, Thou fool." So, with equal certainty, no spiritually minded Hebrew ever imagined that Jesus meant to supersede the fourth commandment, or to change his true relations to it, when he said, "It is lawful to do good on the Sabbath day;" and, "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath."

We confine ourselves to a single word in reply to a point made more than once in these sermons, that if we hold to the permanent obligation of the fourth commandment we are logically tied down to the observance of the seventh day and to each particular of the whole outward precept. We confess to some surprise at this. Robertson's life was a continual struggle to get at the reality of things; beneath the shell to find the kernel; within the letter to discern the spirit. We doubt not that Mr. Bacon is of the same mind. Why should it be denied us to do likewise? To say that we are thus logically compelled is to aver that the fullness of spiritual obedience to

a command is not a whit more binding than the mere keeping of its letter: the error of the Pharisees, rebuked by Jesus, and avoided by even David and Abiathar in the old ceremonial day. We hold the essence of the fourth commandment to be, that one-seventh of human time shall be spent as a rest-day unto God; and that this is one of the precepts of the unrepealed Decalogue. The change to the first day of the week is a simple modification of the form of the commandment, and we reverently believe that no being in the universe has so little care for what is simply and only formal as the Creator of the universe. A sailor circumnavigating the earth gains a day, and at the end of his voyage celebrates his Sabbath on Monday. Is it any less the acceptable Lord's day to the Lord of the Sabbath? Nothing can be more in accordance with the attributes and ways of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, than such a change of the particular day, while preserving the unchanging fact of a seventh day of holy rest. To keep the world in mind of him, its Creator, God ordained that it should rest on the day which he had blessed and sanctified, when his creative work was done. In the fullness of time there comes another epoch in the eternal ages of God—than which, who shall say that even the Most High shall ordain a greater—when the incarnate God completes his work of humiliation and suffering for his lost world, and enters upon his mediatorial glory. Shall He not ordain for this ransomed world a memorial day for this? Did it need even a command that the rest day of the creation should merge itself into the Lord's day of the redemption? just as the Passover, without distinct abrogation, quietly glided away and the Communion of the Lord's Supper took its place.

We have aimed in this article only to discuss some general principles; to cover only what seemed necessary to a proper answer to the question, What is the relation of the Fourth Commandment to Christian duty? The applications of the broad principle we have endeavored to defend must be left, where the Saviour left them, to the enlightened conscience and wisdom of the individual believer, and the church of God. In regard to these, as they vary according to times and circum-

stances, nothing can uplift from us the ever-present need of scriptural insight and divine assistance. We should be grieved, indeed, to even appear to dissent from the many wise and noble utterances of Robertson and Bacon on this Sabbath question; particularly those made in behalf of the less privileged portion of our world—the poor, whom we always have with us—and unto whom it is one of the most imperative duties of the church of Christ to make the Sabbath a delight, holy of the Lord and honorable.

Mr. Bacon calls our attention to the significant fact that “devout scholars on the continent of Europe, recognizing the superior excellence of the Lord’s day as observed in America, are urging the introduction of our practice, while they continue to condemn our theory.” The fact is hopeful for the continent; we trust not ominous to us. Perhaps the true theory of the Sabbath is one of the many good gifts which the new world is bestowing on the old. It may be that these scholars will yet be pondering the question, whether a nation’s practice does not, sooner or later, *follow its theory*; and whether both Europe and America have not each been giving some centuries of illustrations of this law. We have no doubt that the continental practice is the legitimately-born child of the continental theory. We believe that if the Pilgrim Fathers had imported to this land the continental theory, these devout scholars would not now be enjoying a Sabbath observance here superior to their own; and we are profoundly convinced that if ever there shall be among the Christians of these United States a general adoption of the Sabbath theory as held in Europe, the prevalence of the European observance of the Sabbath will be close at hand.

## ART. V.—PRESIDENT WHELOCK AND THE GREAT REVIVAL.

By Rev. E. H. GILLET, D. D., New York.

THE progress of the "Great Revival" in different parts of New England created a demand for that kind of preaching which few were better qualified to supply than Bellamy, Pomeroy and Wheelock. In some respects Edwards and Tennent were perhaps their superiors, but Edwards found enough to employ him at Northampton and its vicinity, and Tennent was too distant to repeat his New England tour without great inconvenience. It is not strange, therefore, that the labors of Wheelock should have been in request from different quarters. His correspondence shows that the applications made to him, from places near and far, to visit and preach to them were numerous.

In May or June (1741) he had gone North to Windsor, Northampton, and, among other places, to Stafford, where the people were "left as sheep without a shepherd," and besought his aid. In September, the pastor of Windsor, Jonathan Marsh, "at the motion made by the deacons of the church, who speak the minds of the better part of the society," entreats of him a "farther visit," "in hope of the revival of the work among us anew by your means." "The eyes and hearts of the better part of our people," he adds, "are much set on you (with your brother Pomeroy). They won't be content without another visit from you."

But still more urgent invitations called Wheelock in yet another direction. In the latter part of October he set out on a preaching tour with the purpose of visiting Boston. His journal, for the next three weeks,\* indicates the energy and zeal with which he prosecuted his work. He visited—preaching at each place—Plainfield, Voluntown, Scituate, Providence, Rehoboth, Norton, Raynham, Taunton, Braintree, etc., and at Boston received an enthusiastic welcome. He preached for Messrs. Webb and Prince, and Dr. Coleman, to crowded

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\* Printed in full for the first time in the *Historical Magazine*, 1869.

assemblies, and was urged to preach at Cambridge. His farewell sermon attracted throngs who were unable to get into the large church edifice, and some of his most intelligent hearers told him afterward, "they believed that Mather Byles was never so lashed in his life." A copy of his sermon for Dr. Coleman was requested for the press.

With the invitation from Cambridge he was unable to comply. His time was limited, and he was forced to refuse applications which followed him from places that he had previously visited. One of the most urgent of these was from Providence, whence the pastor, Rev. Mr. Cotton, hastened to Boston to persuade him to return thither. He bore with him a letter from Benjamin Cary, dated Nov. 8, 1741, enforcing the application, and saying, "This night we had above twenty young people, and six or seven a crying out in great distress. Likewise last Sabbath night four, Mr. Cotton will inform you of. These are therefore to beg you to return with our dear pastor to help us once more."

But a Council was to meet at Windham on the 16th of the month, and Wheelock, who had been absent nearly four weeks, was in haste to return. Perhaps the state of ecclesiastical affairs in Connecticut had not a little to do with it. On the 30th of October, while he was on his way to Boston, Solomon Williams, of Lebanon, wrote to him that Rector Clap, "at the desire of the Governor and Council," had transmitted to him, as last Moderator of the Convention of the Association, a copy of an Act of Assembly importing, that in view of the unhappy divisions subsisting in the colony, and in the hope "that a general Consociation of the churches, consisting of three ministers and three messengers from each particular Consociation, might issue in the accommodation of divisions, and promoting the true interests of vital piety," the expense of the entertainment of such Convention (to meet at Guilford, Nov. 24, 1741) should be borne by the government, and that the consociated churches of Windham County would meet at Windham on the 16th to elect delegates.

The party opposed to Whitefield, and jealous of the course pursued by the itinerating preachers generally, had so far

succeeded in their plans as to secure the calling of this meeting of the General Consociation, by which some remedy for the ecclesiastical confusion was to be provided. Men like Rector Clap, Stiles of North Haven, and Whittlesey of Wallingford, were ready to invoke the aid of the civil authority for their own protection from itinerating fervor; and it was doubtless quite generally understood that their conclusions would be embodied—as they afterward were—into a law of the colony. On the very day that the Council met at Windham, Bellamy wrote to Wheelock, “You know, doubtless, that the Consociation is to be held at Guilford next week. Dear Sir, fail not of being there, together with Mr. Mechem and Pomeroy, and all that are true friends of the suffering interests of our dear Lord. I trust you will meet there all your brethren from this way.”

The results of the doings of the Consociation are well known. They prepared the way for the Act of 1742, which was designed to put a stop to the itineracy of such men as Bellamy, Pomeroy and Wheelock, as well as of Tennent and Finley, from without the bounds of the colony. Upon the character of that Act, denounced by Trumbull in his history, as well as by Prince and Edwards in this country, and leading dissenters in England, it is not necessary to dwell. Under heavy penalties it forbade the preaching of any minister within the bounds of another parish than his own, except by the invitation of the pastor, or the vote of the major part of the Society. Whoever transgressed the law was debarred from legal maintenance, and was left dependent for his salary on the voluntary contributions of his people.

The suggestion of such an enactment by the Consociation indicates the strong feeling of opposition which was arrayed against the friends of the Revival. In some cases it rose to extreme bitterness. Among several others, Wheelock must have been regarded as not the least obnoxious. We can not doubt that his views of the measures of the Consociation were in full accord with those of Bellamy. He does not appear, however, to have been present at the meeting at Guilford. He had been so long absent from home, perhaps, that he

chose not to devote more time to an object from which he could anticipate no good result, or possibly others in preference to himself were elected by the Windham Association as delegates.

But Wheelock did not relax his efforts or lay aside his itineracy. His heart was cheered by reports of revivals in different places, and his zeal was kindled by new applications for preaching. Jonathan Barber wrote him from Whitefield's Orphan House: "I trust the Lord has made Bethesda a house of mercy indeed to save poor souls since I have been here. We have had one or two seasons when our children were awakened, and made earnestly to cry after the Lord Jesus to have mercy upon them." Josiah Cotton writes from Plainfield, Dec. 17, 1741:

"Having one minute before lecture to write, can but just say that I have been to York, where I rejoiced in a great and glorious work going on; upon my return find my dear people in most teachable frames; have not been able to set in my house scarce a day, having my hands so full among them. My wife and 5 more have been propounded to communion. Good sir, hasten to our Macedonia, to our help. We impatiently long to see your desirable face. I could not see Mr. D. Rogers, either at Boston or Ipswich, but sent express to him by his brother, N. Rogers, so that I desire you would not retard your journey to us, whether you hear from him or not. P. S. The Rev. Dorrance being present, presents regards, and desires you would stop a day or two at his town, as you come to us."

Timothy Allen, just ready to part with his own people at West Haven, and already under reproach for his enthusiastic utterances, in which he approached to Davenport's standard, writes to Wheelock (Dec. 28, 1741) in behalf of the Fourth Society of Guilford, where some were "under strong convictions that they have rested all their days on a false hope," and where, he trusted, Wheelock's labors might be crowned "with saving good to a great many souls." He adds: "Opposition grows. O for another shower of Almighty grace! But praise to the dear Lord that metes refreshings to his dear children in divers places."

Early in January (1742) Wheelock designed and probably accomplished his promised visit to Providence, involving an absence from his people of three or four weeks. It is evident from his correspondence that the earnest friends of the Revi-



val designed a meeting to counteract the mischief of the conclusions of the Consociation at Guilford. Wheelock's necessary absence from home led him to propose that it should be deferred till April or May.

It is very possible that the excesses of the more zealous revivalists, and their lack of prudence, as well as the incipient uprising of the Separatists, contributed not a little to weaken the hands of the class represented by Wheelock. Davenport and Allen, not to mention others of less note, were the best allies of Clap, Whittlesey, and the party they represented, in creating a conservative reaction.

It is true that "the work" still went forward in many quarters. Wheelock writes to Stephen Williams (Feb. 3, 1742), it "makes very great advances indeed in these parts. This part of the country seems just falling before it. Opposition grows much less, and opposers out of credit. It would be too long to give you a particular account of it. It is now spread in almost every place. Dear Messrs. Williams, of Lebanon, and Mosely, of Kanada (now Hampton) have much of God with them. I this day received a letter from Mr. Daniel Rogers, late of Cambridge, wrote from Ipswich, wherein he informs me of glorious things he has lately seen in those parts, especially at Cape Ann. A man with me this evening, last week from Newbury, says the work is of late gloriously begun in that town, especially in Mr. Tapping's parish, who, he says, is very bitter against it."

At a later date, the Daniel Rogers above referred to writes to Wheelock (April 21) from Boston, "I am now at dear Mr. Bromfield's with brother Buel, who has much of the presence of our Lord assisting and succeeding him. He is writing you what the Lord has done by him. . . . The work meets with great opposition at Boston."

The judicious friends of the revival were jealous of whatever served to prejudice its progress or involve it in reproach. Already the spirit of Davenport had proved contagious. Silas Brett, a student of Yale College, writes (March 28, 1742): "I found myself conscience bound to renounce college, under the present situation of affairs, tho' somewhat alien to the ad-

vice of some, knowing that I must stand or fall for myself." Henry Willis, of a society in Norwich, (now Franklin) writes (March 16): "My people are much divided. I know not how it is with yours. I should be glad to come and strengthen, but not to weaken, your hands in the work of the ministry, and I hope so of you concerning me. I believe you have heard some things of me, and I of you, which are not true, which I shall communicate to you when I have an opportunity, in hopes 'twill make way for your preaching for me, and I may with all freedom preach for you."

But the course of Andrew Croswell, of Groton, seemed to Wheelock to demand faithful reproof. His views of faith and assurance are reflected in his controversies with Solomon Williams and Jonathan Dickinson, and they harmonized with that imperious tone of censure in which he spoke of unconverted ministers. He was undoubtedly one of that class of ministers whom Edwards had in his eye, in his discourse on "Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God." This discourse had been published a few months previous, in the fall of 1741, and must be regarded, in the light of passing events, as a remarkably able and discriminating production. It vindicated the genuine features and proper effects of the revival, testing it by the rules of Scripture, while it reproved the excesses that had been committed in connection with it. It condemned "impulses," "impressions" and "revelations." It declared against the restoration of "miraculous gifts." It asserted, "They who leave the sure word of Prophecy—which God has given us as a light shining in a dark place—to follow such impressions and impulses, leave the guidance of the polar star, to follow a *Jack with a lantern*." It rebuked the practice of censuring professed believers as hypocrites or unconverted. The great divine of Northampton said: "I am less uncharitable than once I was. I find more things in wicked men that may counterfeit, and make a fair show of piety; and more ways that the remaining corruption of the godly may make them appear like carnal men, formalists and dead hypocrites, than once I knew of."

The sermon had scarcely left the Boston press, with its

commendatory preface by William Cooper, before it came into the hands of Stephen Williams. He wrote to Wheelock, expressing his high esteem of it. Wheelock replied (Feb. 3, 174 $\frac{1}{2}$ ) "I heartily agree with you in your thoughts of dear Mr. Edwards' sermon. My study has been for *many months* past to *calm the boystrous spirits* of opposers, that they may be in a way to get good."

One of his efforts was expended on Andrew Croswell. Something of its character may be inferred from the reply of the latter, dated Groton, May 3, 1742:

"Having perused the letter you sent me, I could not help saying within myself, *what meaneth the heat of all this anger?* You seem to *labor*, and that not without a *bitter zeal*, to prove that I have been very faulty in my conversation. Ever since I have been at Groton, till last Spring, I have given way too much to a spirit of *jesting* and *disputing*, though I can truly say it, that if ever I happened to find a man that could talk experimentally about Jesus Christ, my heart *always burned within me*, and my spirits were solemnized for some time after. . . . For this twelve months past, more especially some few months, my thoughts have (through mercy) been strongly turned another way. . . . Your saying that *Mr. Dorrance was formerly* more like a *converted man* than I; and that Mr. Owen reported of you the other day, (which I suppose is now gone abroad) that *you had seven times as much reason to think Mr. Dorrance converted, as you had to think me converted*, have done me much good, and I bless God heartily that I have had the opportunity to *hear* and *read* what thought you had of me. . . . As for Mr. Dorrance, for several reasons which you know nothing of, I can't look upon him as a converted man, (though I never declared him to be unconverted,) and if deacon Snow speaks true, and if Godly men in Voluntown speak true, you yourself are much at a *loss* about him, to say the least; now, how you could carry one with you to preach Christ, that you was so much at a loss about, whether he was Christ's friend or enemy, I can't comprehend. . . . Some other ministers also there are, whom you have approved of and called your brethren, that I can by no means acknowledge as such. . . . When God gives me a sense of the worth of souls, then I see the danger of unconverted ministers, and should sin against my own soul if I did not bear testimony against them; and if all men, even my dear brethren Pomeroy and Davenport, should forsake me, I dare not be dumb and muzzle my mouth in this glorious cause. As to what you say about my backwardness to speak comfort to private Christians, I endeavor to act conscience in this matter. 'Tis very probable that I should not think half of your *converts converted*. It may be that Mr. Davenport would reject more than I should. Who, then, must be the standard? . . . Mr. Edwards is a gentleman I have no personal knowledge of, but yet I love him dearly, and never can think of him (scarcely) without blessing God for him; however, I make no doubt at the same time but that he is too timorous, or *cowardly* in the cause of Christ, and that 'twas owing to this infirmity, and a culpable desire of pleasing both sides, that led him into a gross

and important self-contradiction in the latter end of his late treatise, which Mr. Cooper, of Boston, told me he observed, before I mentioned it to him. As to his spiritual life, 'twas natural to make some estimation of it by his writings; and, besides, Mr. Buel lately gave me such an account of it as perfectly agreed with the idea of it I had of it before. The Lord increase it to him, and make him to exceed Mr. Davenport himself. In the meantime I am fully persuaded that though he and such others as connive at unconverted ministers may have more spiritual life than some of us, who bear testimony against them, they have much less than they would have had if they would have come out more fairly in the cause of Christ.

"To draw to a close of my long letter, I am afraid, my dear brother, the Devil oftentimes makes fools of us both, by making our hearts swell, and putting us upon setting up for *great men*, for when we try to make ourselves *great men*, we always make ourselves *little Christians*. . . May each of us be a *worm* and no man in our own eyes. May we be perfectly joined together in one mind, and speak the same things; or, however, *lovingly* and tenderly differ from one another."

Two days after the above letter was written, (May 5, 1742) the Separate church was gathered at New Haven. The pastor of the First church, Rev. Mr. Noyes, was pronounced by Mr. Davenport, and was so regarded by many, an enemy to the revival. But already the work was powerfully advancing in the town, as well as in the college, where it had prevailed since February. Brainerd's expulsion had provoked the indignation of men like Bellamy, Graham, Cooke and Mills, and doubtless hastened the resolve to organize the Separate church. On the Monday next following the organization, Brainerd passed through New Haven, on his way to Hartford, to spread his complaint of the treatment received from the college authorities before a council of ministers, who were there convened. This he did on the 14th, and, on the 16th of the month, we find him at Lebanon, whither he doubtless bore the urgent invitation to Wheelock—if he did not accompany him from Hartford—to visit, as a supply, the newly formed church at New Haven. Unwilling to act hastily, Wheelock consulted his friend, Solomon Williams, of the adjoining parish. The latter replied (June 2, 1742): "I know not what to say. . . As things appear to me at present, it is a step that I believe I could not have advised to, and as to what appears to you more than I am acquainted with, you know I can be no judge of . . . If you go, may the Lord go with you, to supply you with all wisdom and spiritual understanding, and give you

that great and excellent endowment which he bids his apostles have, when he sent them forth with that command and blessing, *Be wise as serpents and harmless as doves.*"

Wheelock, however, did not hesitate, although he must ere this have been aware of the recent enactment, by the Colonial Assembly, of a law against itinerants, sharpened, undoubtedly, by the provocation offered by the organization of the Separate church at New Haven, to which he was going to minister. On the 7th of June he left his home, in compliance with their invitation, and the record of his course for the next three weeks is found in his journal, hitherto unpublished.

At Weathersfield he found it inexpedient to preach, as the pastor, Rev. Mr. Lockwood, had not received the notice of his coming which Wheelock had sent him, and, moreover, was afraid that he could not preach with *the vote of the church*, rendered necessary by the late law of the colony. At Newington he preached after one of the deacons had taken a vote of the church in favor of it. With Rev. Mr. Hall, of Meriden, he rode to that parish, and, by the way, "told him his fears concerning his state." On the 9th of June he reached New Haven, and thus remarks in his journal:

"Understood that the authority had been consulting how to take me, and that Col. Whiting had given out great words, and had said that I should not preach but once in the town. Preached at 4 p. m., Mark viii, 34.

"(June) 10. Went morning to prayers at college. Afterwards was invited to breakfast by the rector (Clap). I went over. He seemed to be much set against the Separate meetings; charged them with great disorders; insisted upon it that we ought to proceed against those we think not converted, according to the rule, Matt. xviii, first go and tell him his fault, and take two or three more, &c. I told him I could not believe that that rule was ever intended to be improved so, for a man's being unconverted was no trespass against me, &c. Again, it is no scandal, and if it is, then all mankind are born scandalous. I asked him to tell me the steps of procedure with such. He said, Go tell him his fault; then take two or three more; then go to the Association. I supposed that they would be generally in the same case, and not suitable judges. He said, then I might deal with them altogether as with one, and take some one with me to help me. I asked him what I must do if this did not convert them. He said, then I must go to the General Association. I supposed them all to be in the same case. He said I must deal with them as before. I asked him what I should do (other) than hitherto; I have been condemned and they justified. He said he thought it would be very proper to print upon it. I asked him what I should do for the people of the country, who were going by thousands

to hell. He said I should deal with them after the same manner. He seemed to have a remarkable faculty to darken everything. Preached at 6, Ps. xxxiv, 8, with freedom. Understood that Col. Whiting had been over to the Governor to consult him about me, and that the authority met in the evening upon it.

"12. Sabbath day. Preached three sermons. . . . A young woman from North Haven said she would go to the New Light meeting, and see how they acted. She did not question but she should hear some of them cry out. This she spoke with scorn, deriding them. She came, and was the first that cried out in great distress. There were also many others in great distress. The children of God refreshed. The people in general so prejudiced that they wot come to hear me. If there can be no way found to break down this partition wall, it is to be feared the work will stop in this town for the present. Many very bitter against it."

On the next day Wheelock remained "at home," to receive such as wished to consult him. Many came, and he "heard some full accounts of Mr. N(oye)s' conduct with them when under their concern." On the 14th he preached again. On the 15th he set out on a preaching tour, visiting Ripton and Derby, where "the great power of God was seen, 3 or 4 converted, many wounded, many raging." On the 17th he returned to New Haven, and preached. On the 18th he visited Col. Whiting, and was courteously received, that dignitary promising to make him a visit. On the 19th he preached twice, "with freedom." On the 20th he stayed "at home," to receive those who wished to consult him. On the 21st, which was fast-day, he preached in the morning, and was followed in the afternoon by Humphrey and Robbins. On the 22nd he went to Branford and preached twice; on the 23d to Guilford,\* and preached three times. On the next day he returned to Branford, and preached. On the 25th he returned to New Haven, where he accompanied the zealous Timothy Allen to the ship in which he embarked for New London, where he was to set up his *Shepherd's Tent*. On the 26th he preached at New Haven; on the following days he visited Stratfield, Amity, where he preached "in a private house against Mr. Miner's will," Stratford, where he preached "in an orchard without the people's consent," and Derby, where "the power of God was seen." Another Sabbath's services

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\* Timothy Allen had strongly urged him to visit Guilford, 4th Society.



at New Haven closed the labors of his tour, and he returned to Lebanon, after an absence of a little more than three weeks. Not a little boldness was required to face the threats, the odium, and the various difficulties which attended his enterprise.

The history of the Separate church at New Haven during the summer of 1742, was a history of troubles. It was supplied by revival ministers—when supplied at all—and these men, like Sproat, Finley, Brainerd, Bellamy and Wheelock, ran the risk of fine and imprisonment. Brainerd did not dare show his face at the college Commencement, for he was informed that the civil officers were constantly on the look out for him. In November (24th) the church committee, John Pierpoint, James Talmadge, and Joseph Mix, wrote to Wheelock, informing him that 400 subscribers had been procured for printing one of his sermons, preached to the Separate church. They add, "Mr. Sproat was with us the Sabbath before last, and Mr. Read last, and they both got away before the authority could seize them, tho' they were very quick in their attempts. We expect Mr. Bellamy will be with us the next Sabbath, and Mr. Read be at his place. The opposers are very much enraged that we have preaching and are not suppressed."

The letter also states that the Society had held a meeting, at which it was unanimously determined to build a house of worship, and at once to begin and go as far as God should enable them. It craves the charitable assistance of Christians in other places which Wheelock had given them assurance that they might expect.

The following letter from an anonymous correspondent, ostensibly an intimate friend of Wheelock, gives us the view of the case taken by one who sympathized strongly with the Separatist church, and while a proper allowance may be made for the writer's strong prejudices, especially against the Rev. Mr. Noyes, it enables us to understand the motives of the seceders as well as some of the difficulties with which they had to contend. As a historical *authority* it is of course worth-



less, but it permits us to overhear such expressions of view and feeling as was characteristic of the times.

"NEW HAVEN, March 28, 1743.

"REV. AND DEAR SIR:

After due and humble regards to yourself and spouse, I beg leave just to give a hint or two about the state of affairs here respecting religion. There has been no remarkable change since I saw you last. The *Separate* meeting, remaining (in general) without preaching, and the other party endeavoring by all possible means to defeat 'em in their design. They have partly framed their meeting house, with a design to set it just by Mr. Cook's, on a point of ground Mr. Eliot gave 'em on purpose. But *Wolcott*, that *Captain of Adulterers* of the present age, being still under the power of his ungoverned passions, has forewarned them of proceeding, under pretence of a right he has to the land on the estate of his wife, which he says he was not legally divorced from, and threatening to carry the case home for a trial. [I was privately told that] several gentlemen [their names not mentioned, belonging to New Haven, easy to conceive] urged Wolcott to the prosecution of his devilish design, with the promise of a secret subscription, one, twenty pounds, another, twenty pounds, &c., to bear the charges. Whether Wolcott ever designed this or no, or whether he intended only hereby to frighten the *Separate* church, is what I cannot determine, or whether he would obtain his end if he should go home, is what I don't know: but he did most surely so threaten, and was undoubtedly encouraged by a number of gentlemen, as above said, (though privately). Upon which the *Separate* party have agreed to set it at the corner of Mr. Borrough's lot, just in Mr. Noyes's mouth: much more to Mr. Noyes's grief. Oh! what would not poor carnal men do, who are idolizing their own honors and interest, even to the ruin not only of whole families and towns, and governments; but even of the immortal souls of whole kingdoms and nations, if they were not restrained by the over-ruling providence of an all-wise and all-merciful and an almighty God. Oh! what would become of religion, wounded, bleeding, dying religion, if the great God did not govern the world!

I was told a few days ago, by an aged saint of New Haven, (and so give more credit to the story) that Mr. Noyes made a visit to some of his parish, toward North Haven, and opened his heart very freely about the present state of things, part of which conversation I can't forbear relating. The discourse was with a woman, no friend to the work of God, it seems. He freely told her that this work was of the devil, and the doctrines preached by Mr. Whitefield, Mr. Tennent, Mr. Mills, Mr. Burr, Mr. Bellamy, &c., were of the devil also. At which the woman very shortly replied: Why, sir, you asked several of these ministers to preach for you, especially Mr. Burr; you were urgent that he should preach for you: why were you so urgent? Nay, why did you ask him to preach at all, if his doctrine was from the devil? Most surely, sir, you liked the doctrine then, or you would never have invited the men to preach. At which, Mr. Noyes replied, I never liked the doctrine in my life. Nay, sir, replied she, why did you invite these men to preach? Why, said he, to keep peace in my parish. Peace! said she; would you keep peace with the devil? Would you have a devilish peace? Which put Mr. Noyes very much to the *non plus*. She

added, "Sir, I thought you had a great desire for Mr. Burr to settle with you in the ministry here; how could you desire a man to settle with you, who preaches a doctrine from the devil? Mr. Noyes, being thus handled by a woman, contrary to his expectations—though no friend to the work of God, nor to the Separate meetings—scarce knew what to reply; at length he told her, he had never had any desire for Mr. Burr's settlement, but only was willing to act under disguise, if possible to gain the Separate meeting again; and dropt the discourse. How much of this is true, I am not able positively to say, but I am not in doubt about the chief part of it, nor do I doubt much of any. I firmly believe, if Mr. Noyes did not expose himself so much as to say so, he undoubtedly thought so. Ps. xii. 'Help, Lord, for men of virtue fail.' [*Three verses quoted.*] There is no alterations in college, except for the worse. There was a few Christian scholars had a meeting last night, and seem something engaged to hold up meetings for the future, and there was a very serious appearance, and I have had opportunity since to speak with several. They tell me they felt more than ordinary sensible of ingratitude in their past negligence; would to God this might be a beginning of a revival of religion here again! Dear sir, I want to write a great deal more, but I can't. I have nothing special to say respecting myself, only I see more and more of that cursed fountain of sin in my soul. I never thought I could possibly have so much of the devil in me. But what is worse, is, I am not suitably humbled under it, and burdened with a feeling sense thereof. Oh! that I had a spirit of prayer! Oh! that it was with me [as] in months past. Dear sir, I fear I have quite tired your patience. Farewell, A.

Dear sir, pardon me if I add one word more, respecting some discourse of Mr. Noyes to a poor dying woman. She was an ancient woman, last week dying, and Mr. Noyes made her a visit. When he came, she was, to appearances, past recovery; whereupon, as it becomes ministers at such times especially, he must be talking about dying, and concerning another world. I fear, says he, you are very much discouraged; too much. Don't be discouraged. 'Tis not becoming a woman of your age, that has done so many good things, to be too much cast down at death; you have done a great many good things; you have been the mother of many likely children; and you have been a good neighbor, very helpful among the sick; and many other very good things you have done; and now you are dying, you have no reason to be discouraged. You may comfortably hope it will be well with you, &c. I can't relate all, nor is it fit I should. The woman,\* according to the best of my information, never was any other than worldly, nothing religious, nor were her good works (as he called 'em) much multiplied. Oh! What a miserable soul guide is here! Oh! how dangerous for poor immortal souls to give heed to such.—Dear sir, pray, and excite Christians to pray earnestly for poor New Haven. I am, sir, in the greatest sincerity, your faithful and affectionate tho' most unworthy brother, and obliged humble servant, A.

Mr. Mather and madam are well—as well as common. I visited them last week.

\*It was John Bradley's wife, who once lived in a brick house just as we go out of town to Wallingford. Now he lives up at a mill, just by the west side. She is dead."

A little more than a month later, Sarah Pierpont, the wife of John Pierpont,\* one of the committee of the Separate Church, writes to Wheelock. The letter is dated, New Haven, May 30, 1743.

"REV. AND DEAR SIR :

I received a letter from you in the absence of my husband, who set out the beginning of last week for New York, and is not yet returned, and therefore he can make no reply at present; nor can I, respecting that affair between you, only that he has been very much disappointed in his expectations. I shall be heartily grieved to have you hurt by our means, and know it is what Mr. Pierpont never intended; and, indeed, hope it will be otherwise, but can say no more till he returns.

As to the state of religion among us, things look very dark. Christians are very sleepy; many of them carnal and trifling in their conversation; few if any sinners under conviction. The enemies of religion seem much hardened by the many sad things which a holy and sovereign God has (allowed) to be in one place and another. As you observe, the cloud that hangs over Zion grows more and more dark, but Zion's God still reigns, and blessed be his name, he will reign until he has put all under his feet.

I hear by Dr. Smith and others who have lately seen dear Mr. Davenport (at Stamford) that he lies in the dust before God for his conduct at N. London. Your aunt Howel, who has been the most bitter against him, is lately come from Stamford, and is now so turned in favor of him that she can't bear to hear a reflecting word against him. I perceive by the doctor that Mr. Davenport is very much alone in the world; his friends forsake him; he rides from town to town without any attendance. But by what I can learn, he enjoys a good deal of soul satisfaction, from that God who is an unchanging and never failing friend, and feels the truth of that promise which is more worth than a mountain of gold, viz.: I will never leave you nor forsake you. Oh that I could hear him speaking this to my soul, methinks I should heartily say, farewell all, I have enough in God. But alas! I am often in the dark, often under pressing fears that I never knew the Lord, and am trembling for fear that I shall be forever banished the blissful presence of a glorious Christ, which will be hell indeed. At other times I think, I dare appeal to the Lord and say, Lord, thou hast been my very early and abiding choice, and trust thou wilt be the never failing portion of my soul. And if my heart were not such a mountain of deceit, I should say I want no other portion but God. But alas! the treachery and deceit of my heart is such that I am afraid of it, though this is my comfort, sometimes at least, that even this very heart, vile as it is, is in the hands of a God of infinite power and grace, and that he can make it just such a heart as he would have it to be. But dear sir, though I feel some little freedom to unbosom my soul, I would not be too tedious. From what has been hinted you may guess at my inward [illegible] and as your pity will no doubt be excited, so may the Lord enable you to pray for me, that above all I may be conformed to and even swallowed up in God, that all I have and all I enjoy may be for-

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\* Whose sister was the wife of President Edwards.

ever devoted to God. This seems to be an astonishing thing for a creature to ask, but it is not too great for a God to give.

Good Mr. White preached yesterday at the meeting house, much to the strengthening of God's children, though greatly to the offence of many poor creatures.

Mr. Johnson preached with us, had considerable of the presence of God with him, and I hope some Christians refreshed and strengthened. I add not but my best regards to your dear spouse and yourself, and love to your children.

I subscribe myself your affectionate friend and unworthy servant,

SARAH PIERPOINT."

It was not only at New Haven that the lines of division were thus sharply drawn. The publications of the day indicate the state of popular feeling. Jonathan Dickinson, at the meeting of the Synod in Philadelphia, was not invited to preach by the more zealous spirits, on the ground that he had become but a lukewarm friend to the cause. In 1742, appeared his Dialogue, entitled "A Display of God's Special Grace, etc., vigorously written, soundly evangelical, vindicating the genuine marks of the work of God in the revival, but exposing antinomian and fanatical errors. Andrew Croswell, who, as we have seen, considered Edwards too *cowardly*, came forward in opposition to Dickinson, and he in turn was answered by "Theophilus" (T. Foxcroft?), in "A Defense of a Dialogue, etc., against the Exceptions of Andrew Croswell." William Hooper, of the West Church of Boston, who subsequently went over to Episcopacy, published (Sept. 1742) his Sermon, entitled "The Apostles neither Imposters nor Enthusiasts." David McGregoire of Londonderry, a Presbyterian, appeared in opposition to his co-presbyter of Boston, James Caldwell, in his Sermon "On the Trial of Spirits." Charles Chauncy, of Boston, foreshadowed the spirit of his subsequent volume, exposing the excesses and disorders of the revival, by his Sermon on "Enthusiasm," appended to which was his letter to Davenport.

All these publications, with the single exception of the reply to Croswell, appeared in 1742. Contemporany with them was issued "The More Excellent Way against Enthusiam," by Wheelock's neighbor and intimate friend, Solomon Williams, of Lebanon. No two men in New England, perhaps, had seen more of the good and evil that had attended the re-

vival, or, at least, had been providentially called more carefully and deliberately to consider both, than these two pastors of adjoining parishes. Wheelock was undoubtedly the more zealous and active, but theologically the two were as far as possible identified. In their common action with respect to Davenport, we shall see the position they occupied distinctly defined.

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ART. VI.—PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS.\*

By Rev. F. A. ADAMS, Orange, N. J.

Our attention is here called to a volume of nearly nine hundred pages, professing to describe from their origin in the senses, the phenomena of the Feelings, the Intellect, and the will. The subject is treated with much fullness and detail, and in the main with fairness; or, if not with perfect fairness, yet with what may easily be accepted as such, for the author is at no pains to conceal his foregone conclusions. He frequently denotes his position on some minor point by assuming its necessary agreement with "the doctrines maintained in this work;" and thus, by keeping the reader warned, he stimulates his critical habit, when his own sometimes seems to sleep. A more distinct exception to the commendation of fairness may be taken on the historic part of the work, in which the authors who have treated the various topics pass in review. This historical part is marred by partisan devices in the treatment. Sometimes in a quotation a word which tells in favor of the present author's position is printed in capitals to arrest the eye; or, again, a statement favoring the other side is qualified by a query or counter statement, which, in the absence of quotation marks, the reader may at first ac-

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\* *Mental and Moral Science. A Compendium of Psychology and Ethics.* By Alexander, M. A., Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen. London, 1868.

cept as a part of the quoted author's thought, but which a careful reading shows to be a damaging commentary thrown in, in the making up of the book.

If we could be satisfied to wave primary questions, and study phenomena alone; if we could merge mental science in physiology, and, in this last, stop where the anatomist stops; if the term Intellect suggested only the nerves and the brain and their sensible manifestations, we should have opened in this work a large field of study, full of striking facts satisfactorily explored and reported. But it is just because Mental Science presupposes mind as a substantial entity, with automatic rights and powers for the originating of its own facts, as well as for interpreting those drawn from another sphere; it is because, if nature stands over against the mind, then does the mind stand over against nature just as much, and any denial or disguising of the mind's proper rights and powers, must, in scientific strictness, carry with it, *pari passu*, a dissolution of external nature: it is for these reasons that the work before us fails either to satisfy the philosophical inquirer, or instruct well the student of Psychology.

The stand-point throughout the work is in external nature. Consciousness is not even defined:—of course nothing is said to settle its nature, place and authority, as a source of knowledge in Psychology. The muscular and nervous systems are described; sensible phenomena are traced in their action on these parts of the organization; distinctions of sensations are noted; groupings are made on the principle of resemblance; repetitions and memory establish habits, which are called laws: and the will, whose sole office is to seek pleasure and avoid pain, completes the man.

To show a little in detail the style of treatment, we will take our stand at this point—the Will—and, opening at p. 91, will look a little before and after, and see what it comes to. "The Will is under two influences—pleasure and pain; being urged to the one and *from* the other." This being the fact and law of the Will, we turn back to p. 14, to find the elementary statement as to its origin. "Our movements are stimulated through our senses, but movements arise also with-



out the stimulation of sensible objects, through some energy of the nerve centers themselves, or some stimulus purely internal. Spontaneous activity is an essential element of the Will, on the theory maintained in this work. The following facts are adduced as both proving and illustrating the doctrine." As spontaneous action is an essential element of the Will—is in fact the whole of it—since external stimulation has been declared unessential, we look with interest at the enumeration of the facts that "both prove and illustrate the doctrine." The facts adduced are: "the early muscular activity of infants, and young animals; the spontaneous action of breathing; the tension of muscle, constant even in sleep, of all living animal organism; the permanent closure of the muscles called sphincters." To these lowly forecast shadows we are taught to look for the germ and prophecy of the coming mature will—the responsible man. The promised "stimulus purely internal," has not quite dropped out. It holds its own in the form of a "nervous energy." "The lower extremity of the alimentary canal is kept closed by a self-acting muscle; if the connection of the nerve centers is destroyed, this muscle is relaxed." The severance of the connection with the nervous center arrests the incipient phenomena of Will. It will not now come forth from the hiding place of its power. We must go back of this electric chain to the nervous center itself—the brain—white and gray mass, in which ultimate fibres, fibrils, fibrillæ, are found of exceedingly small diameter—perhaps we should dare to state what a very small fraction of an inch it is, if we could only remember. With such astonishing vigor and minuteness has the search for the Mental Principle been carried on. Could the scalpel, the balance, the microscope, be asked to do more? Should our readers think it strange, that, in a work on Mental Science, the testimony of consciousness should be abandoned, and the instruments of the anatomist trusted instead; that the prime facts of the science in hand should be ignored or disguised by not being looked at in their own light, but only through the media of a supplementary science, they will lose none of their sur-



prise if they follow the author in his development of the Will, onward from page 91.

The essential work of the Will being to seek pleasure and avoid pain, "another foundation of voluntary power is to be sought for in the great law of self-conservation;" and, further, the repeated coincidence of a given activity with pleasure—a repetition accidental at first—awakening attention to itself, is remembered, and the past experience becomes a motion, directing and stimulating the mind to seek further like repetitions; and hence grows up habit, character.

Without dwelling here on the point that "this law of conservation is, from the author's standpoint, an arbitrary assumption, we pass to note the outcropping of these positions in the plane of Freedom and Virtue. And first, of Freedom. As, in the author's system, the will is merely ancillary—a servant whose lords are the sense of pleasure and the sense of pain—it is in strict logical sequence that he regards the question of the freedom of the will as a pure impertinence; for if the solicitations of sense are in their very nature sovereign over the will, then there is no freedom of the will different in kind from the freedom of a stone to fall through the air, or the freedom of water to run down hill. The Freedom of the Will is, on this scheme, freedom from foreign restraint—nothing more.

The bald, mechanical fatalism of such a scheme is not more striking than is the insouciance with which the author disposes, in a page or two, of a question that lies in the very heart of his subject—a question that has attracted the acutest and noblest minds ever since the dawn of moral science, that has left its record in the literature of all cultivated nations, and has again and again compelled the recognition of history by the power with which it has impressed itself on public movements both in church and state. If the voluntary power is only the servant of sense, whose sole work is to seek pleasure and avoid pain, then moral praise or blame, as these feelings are revealed in the consciousness, is an inexplicable fact in human experience. To give these feelings a place can only be done by mistaking the voice of conscience, disguising its

moral verdict, and finding in it only a decision of the understanding on a question of profit and loss. If the will is the servant of sense, moral aspiration is a Quixotic folly. The idea of Virtue, as it is felt in the consciousness of unperverted minds, has no answering reality. It is a name only, and means only a shrewd scheming for getting pleasure and avoiding pain. To this dreary abyss does the scheme fall by its own gravitation.

The author endeavors to avoid this conclusion of his system by bringing in the power of sympathy. While one is pursuing his own pleasure he has the power to think how much his neighbor might enjoy could *he* have the same. Here then is a motive for waiving one's primary pleasure for the reflex pleasure of witnessing another's enjoyment: hence comes disinterested action, or what serves the same good turn in the uses of society. This way of avoiding the conclusion that this system justifies supreme selfishness is in several points unsatisfactory.

In the first place this feeling of sympathy is secondary, and necessarily weaker than the primary regard for self out of which it grows. In the conflict, then, between the claims of one's self and of one's neighbor, the weaker feeling must be pushed aside. However lively my sympathy with my neighbor, and the consequent joy I may feel in seeing him enjoy my good things, all this joy springs from the more home-felt and solid joy of having and using the good things myself. The real autocracy is my own sense of pleasure; a sovereign makes a fool of himself when he sets up a delegated authority strong enough to dispute the orders of his own throne.

Another difficulty in receiving the author's doctrine is in the nature of this sympathy. It is purely selfish after all. If a reflected feeling, then a reflected selfishness, and no ingenious way of putting it alters its character. Having once placed ourselves within this charmed circle of supreme regard to self, we are bound over to this style of service to the end. Are a man's sympathies lively and strong, promising a fine crop of just and noble deeds towards his neighbor? They are lively and strong just because the primary regards for self,

of which the sympathies are only the reflex, are still more lively and stronger. Are the primary regards for self apparently weak? The sympathies for others, drawing all their power from these, will be still weaker. The rebound of the ball has never the full force of the first impact. Play the game of motives as cunningly as we will on this system, we think the best disciple will not love his neighbor quite as well as he loves himself; and he will owe it to his own inconsistency if he does not end by not caring for him at all.

Another difficulty in the way of getting an honest regard for others out of a reflex selfishness is found in the fact that there is nothing binding in the connexion. Allow for the sake of argument that the sympathy is good when you get it, there is no law to compel it: it is a mere incident; there is, in this construction, no adjustment to the explicit command "*thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*" The imperative, to such a soul, is an impertinence. If the sympathy exists, why, so far so good; but what if it does not exist? What truth is there in such a case? What is to vindicate the moral order? The dilemma suggests the case of an aged sinner in one of our cities, talking, on his dying bed, to his pastor, partly in confession, but mainly in the way of apology: "I can not say I have lived a very useful life; indeed I have not done much good with my wealth,—not half as much for others as our friend, Mr. B.: but then," recovering himself, "the fact is I never cared half so much for them; and . . . and," looking up in his pastor's face with tender expectancy, "don't you think the Lord will take that into consideration, and make allowance?" We do not report the pastor's answer; but the system of morals we are examining would furnish one ready to his hand. "Dear troubled soul," he might have said, "if you feel bad because you have not taken thought for your brother, it will be quite sufficient for you to say for yourself that you never had the simplest inclination that way."

On the subject of reasoning, the following passage, involving the author's theory in regard to general names, is sufficiently explicit. "When an Inductive generality has been established, the application of it to new cases is called Deduction."

We note this passage, not to enter into any long discussion, but as an instance of the readiness with which the plainest facts are denied in the interest of a predetermined theory. The application is called Deduction! The real thing is Application, but it passes under the name of Deduction! How is it, then, that mankind have so mistaken the action of the mind in this matter as everywhere and always to misname it? In all languages containing the record of advanced thought, this process is called Deduction—a *leading from*. We might verify by quoting from the languages easily accessible to the student; and the act would not be a piece of empty pedantry; it would be simply standing by the record of dead and living thinkers, and reading that record aright. The forms of thought denoted by the word Deduction and Application are pretty widely different, so much so that the unconscious instinct that rules in speech has uniformly elected the one and rejected the other, to denote the mental act we now refer to. We accept this instructive, spontaneous testimony. It is not by taking away this word, Deduction, and putting another in its place, that we are to be led in the ways of true knowledge here; but by holding fast to the very word which, with its congeners, ages and nations have used, by seeing just what that means, and walking in the light of it. The question is one of Psychology, How do men think: not the Philosophical question, What is their thinking good for. And, on the question in Psychology, the spontaneous language of man is the highest testimony. Or, shall we venture a single step across the line, into the realm of philosophy, and ask, is there not a delusion lurking somewhere in this word *deduction*, implying, as it does, some sort of validity in general notions and general terms. Yes, possibly, even so; for who knows:—but then, is it not a consolation to think that, if mankind are mistaken, always and everywhere, then a single one of them may be mistaken as well?

The author before us consistently denies the existence of all knowledge by intuition. The idea of Cause, and those ultimate determinations of Space on which are grounded the processes of pure Geometry do not merely arise by occasion of

sensation, transcending in their own light the revelations of sense ; but sense gives all that is in them : they "are in the embrace of sensation."

Now if the idea of cause is in its ground nothing but the idea of antecedent, for this is all that sense gives ; if cause and effect are at bottom nothing but *before* and *after*, why not call them so, and done with it? Are men deluded thinking there is such a thing as cause when there is not? This is a fair question to raise: but it is not a question of Psychology. It is a question of Philosophy, and not pertinent in a work on Psychology. The idea of cause—true or false—men have: an idea perfectly distinct in consciousness from that of succession, and the Psychologist's business is to find and report on what occasion it arises, and there stop. We protest against this attempt to discount the facts of experience in order to prop up the credit of sensational philosophy.

With equal explicitness we are taught in this book that the ultimate determinations of pure Geometry are in the embrace of sensation ; they are nothing other than the products of sense, amended, it may be, by comparison with other products of sense. The certainty of a geometric demonstration is reached in the line of experiment and mechanical appliance. The appeal is here, properly, to the consciousness of men. But our author does not deal much with consciousness,—has not even defined it : and therefore we may fail of agreement as to the tribunal before which the question shall be tried. For ourselves, however, walking in the old paths, we say that we believe the testimony of every geometrician who knows his own thoughts is directly opposed to the theoretic assumptions we have quoted. From the first demonstration to the last of pure geometry no conclusion is reached through mechanical appliance, or corrective experiment. Such devices may be suggestive, if the learner is dull ; but if he does not come to know it in a light other than that of the experiment, he does not know it geometrically at all. A cylinder is a certain multiple of a cone of the same base and altitude : the base line of a trigonometrical survey is a certain multiple of a foot : the psychological character of the first predication is essentially

different from the second : the antecedent processes that lead to them respectively are essentially different. The first conclusion, when reached, is grasped once and forever as absolutely true : if the surveyor should claim a like certainty and absoluteness in the proposition respecting his base line, he would show himself a poor surveyor, and no geometrician. The same radical diversity comes out everywhere in comparing truths of pure geometry with related truths of magnitude found by experiment and survey. But this diversity could not be found if the mind had no autocratic power and freedom in space except as that space should be filled with material substance. If, like a thief in the night, groping his way with his hands along a cellar wall, the mind were lost in space except as it rested on body, the science of pure geometry could not exist. Body is too vile and coarse for its fine conclusions. "But can we not," we are asked,—can we not attain a pure geometrical idea, of a straight line for example, by imagining an actual line, as the edge of a board with all its inequalities, protuberances, and irregularities rubbed away? The very terms used suggest the lurking fallacy; *inequalities* from what? What is the *aequum* in the light of which there is something in hand that is *iniquum*? *Protuberances*, from what *surface*; *irregularities*, according to what *regula*? The very questions shaken a little and turned over, show that the questioner has unconsciously in his mind the very idea he thinks he is searching for: and without it he could not ask his questions. Let him be comforted : he is not the first one who has searched the house diligently to find his spectacles, when they were on his nose all the while and helping him in his search.

The work before us *is* in a line of thought specially popular at the present time. It is an able and faithful endeavor to read the whole of thought, of experience and nature from the external side; to push the science of the soul aside into some dark pocket, where the less that is said about it the better, and where cultivated men will soon cease to speak of it at all. It is well that such a mode of surveying the realm of truth should receive a distinct and able exposition; the sooner will the true character of the proceeding come to be understood,



and all concerned be able to adjust themselves to it. That this course causes a rejection of Psychology, in any proper sense of the word, from the circle of liberal studies, is only an incident, involved of necessity in the proceeding; that it will, by a like necessity, not so immediate but equally sure, work the death of a true science through the whole circle of nature, is another incidental fact, but no valid objection to a statement of the system, so long as the system has numerous adherents:—*patet isti jauna leto*. But when the sons of truth have passed far enough through this gateway to the death of science, they will of their own accord turn back, and, accepting the old dualism, toil on in the honest way of induction, remembering, that in philosophy as in all else, an act of plundering turns out in the end to be a stealing of one's own goods.

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ART. VIII.—DAVID HUME.

By Rev. JOHN HUNT.

[From the "Contemporary Review," for May, 1869.]

Mrs. Mallet, the wife of David Mallet, "the beggarly Scotchman" on whose head Samuel Johnson poured out the concentrated essence of his hatred of Scotland, once said to Hume, "Allow me, Mr. Hume, to introduce myself to you. It is right that we Deists should know each other." "*Madam*," replied Hume, "*I am not a Deist, and do not wish to be known under that name.*" If Hume had been asked what he was, and by what name he wished to be known, he would probably have declined to answer. If he had been willing to answer, he would probably have found it difficult. No mind would have rebelled more than his against being classed and labelled.

Hume's first publication was the "Treatise on Human Nature." As this work was afterwards disowned by its author, we need not do more than mention it. Its place was supplied by the "Essays," in which the chief questions were treated with more accuracy and clearness, while many of the more intricate and ingenious but less important reasonings were omitted.

We shall best begin by viewing Hume in his relation to Locke. He was avowedly an experimentalist, holding the senses to be the only channels of knowledge. Through them



the mind has what Hume calls *impressions*. The *memory* of these impressions constitutes ideas. Upon these the mind works. It arranges them, transposes them, and reasons upon them. There is here an unusual meaning attached to the word *ideas*, but that meaning is definite, and the peculiarity itself clearly marks Hume as on the side of the sensuous philosophy. He can not find in the mind any innate ideas, or any infinite ideas, such as those of infinite time or infinite space.

The title generally applied to Hume was that of Sceptic, and this both in philosophy and religion. He follows experience till he finds there is something beyond experience. Then he either acknowledges that we must fall back upon natural instincts, and trust to reason, such as it is, or he gives way to despair, and with an easy indifference flings the problem aside as insoluble, bidding us be content with our ignorance, for all is an enigma, a riddle, and a mystery. These two states of mind are clearly distinguishable in Hume. They are both called Scepticism, yet they are so different that the one leads to inquiry, the other to indolence.\* The one was a quality of his own keen intellect, the other was learned in France. It is only the first which we care to notice further.

Locke imagined that he found in experience the grand remedy for the reveries of schoolmen and metaphysicians. It was a method which suited the practical character of the English mind. Hume, who was not disposed to be a metaphysician, but a man of the world, accepted it readily; but being by nature a metaphysician, he could not escape a previous question, What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? nor a subsequent inquiry as to how we were to solve questions not soluble by experience. Every subject in philosophy which he touches plays round this word. The first inquiry always is, How far do we know it by Locke's method? This knowledge in Hume's searching analysis invariably turns out to be small. It was objected to Locke by Stillingfleet that he discarded substance out of the world. Bishop Berkeley, for an object in no way sceptical, showed the impossi-

\* This has been well expressed by Professor Maurice in his admirable remarks on Hume. "It is not when he is pushing his investigations as far as they will go that we ever complain of him; *then* he is doing a service to truth and to mankind. It is when, as often happens in this treatise, he declines investigation, laughs at the effort to make it as useless and ridiculous, flings himself into his arm-chair, becomes as indolently and contemptuously acquiescent as any priest ever wished his disciples to be; it is then that he exhibits the state of mind to which we are all tempted; and against which, what ever others do, the believer in a God of truth must wrestle to the death."—*Modern Philosophy*.

bility of our ever being able to demonstrate the existence of a material world. Hume accepted Berkeley's arguments and Berkeley's conclusions. We are conscious of mind. There is an intellect which perceives,—but what does it perceive? Impressions and ideas that belong to it? or impressions and ideas that belong to an external world? Without the mind to perceive, where would be that which we suppose to be perceived? The mind is conscious only of its own impressions and ideas, but it has no certainty of any existence beyond that of which it is conscious. So far Hume went with Berkeley. But experience not only fails to guide us to an external world, it does not even prove to us the existence of mind. When we say we are conscious of mind we assume as much as when we say we are conscious of matter. Our consciousness extends only to impressions and ideas, so that the existence of a mind perceiving is as much beyond demonstration as the existence of an external world perceived. Here is the first of the shortcomings of experience. The existence of matter and mind is demitted to the limbo of scepticism.

The common-sense philosophers have always reckoned themselves certain of matter and motion—that motion could not exist without a mover, nor any effect without a cause. But how did they come by this knowledge? Hume showed that it can never be reached by experience. We cannot discover that force or energy which produces an effect. We can never see what that is which makes an effect the infallible consequence of a cause. All we know is that one follows the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is all that is manifest to the *outward* senses. From the first appearance of any object we never know what effect will result from it. By experience we know that certain effects follow certain causes—that heat, for instance, is the constant attendant on flame. But prior to experience we do not know that flame contains that force which we call heat. The idea is evidently not derived from the contemplation of bodies. Some philosophers say it is an inward impression, or an idea derived from reflection on the operation of our mind, or a conclusion reached by our reasonings guided by experience. These are suppositions. All that we can say is simply that such a thing follows another because we have seen before a similar conjunction. What the connection is we do not know. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse or by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected with

the other, but only that they were conjoined. It is not till after he has felt these events to be connected, by having observed several instances of the same nature, that he can fortell the existence of the one from the appearance of the other.

When Hume writes of morals, experience is still playing its part. For a time it is a guide, then it fails, and Hume, after stumbling on other philosophies not experimental, falls finally into doubt and uncertainty. He proves by observations drawn from experience that virtue is the interest of man. He proves also, though this is not his object, that the distinctions of right and wrong exist anterior to all experience. For those who deny the reality of these distinctions he has no other name but "disingenuous disputants." Their reality must be admitted. The only questions are those which concern their extent and their foundation. The pleasure of a virtuous deed may be the motive that leads to it. This motive Hume founded on what he calls a *sentiment*. This is in opposition to the philosophers who find the motives of virtue in reason. This *sentiment* he calls an internal sense, or fine feeling. It is, in fact, the "moral sense" of Lord Shaftesbury—an intuition of the mind not in any way derived from the external world or from experience of human life. To separate this from reason could only be done by giving reason a limited meaning—a meaning which it may have had in Locke's philosophy, but to which it was never limited in any other philosophy. With Hume, reason means merely reasoning. It does not include what the Germans understand by *Vernunft*, nor what Plato and the ancient philosophers meant by that reason in which the world is constituted. Hume accordingly finds that these ancient philosophers, and such as Shaftesbury among the moderns, were confused between *reason* and *sentiment*. The former, he says, often affirmed that virtue is nothing but conformity to reason, and yet they considered morals as deriving their existence from taste or sentiment. The moderns talk much about the beauty of virtue and the deformity of vice, yet they commonly account for this distinction by metaphysical reasonings, and by deductions from the most abstract principles of the understanding. Having in this way placed "sentiment" in opposition to "reason," Hume admits that there are many specious arguments for both sides, and concludes with something of the confusion of which he complains in others. "In many orders of beauty," he says, "particularly those of the fine arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning in order to feel the proper sentiment, and a

false relish may be frequently corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude that moral beauty partakes much of the latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind." After saying this he announces that he will confine himself to the experimental method; fact and observation being the only ground for a system of ethics. From this ground he comes to a conclusion partly sceptical; regarding virtue as unquestionably the interest of man, yet adding an exception perhaps in the case of justice. "*That honesty is the best policy* may be a good general rule, but it is liable to many exceptions, and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom who observes the general rule and takes advantage of all the exceptions." In the treatise on "Human Nature" the question was discussed, if moral distinctions are to be found in nature. The answer is, that if by natural we are to understand the opposite of miraculous, they are in nature, and also if by natural is to be understood the opposite of unusual; but in the sense of natural as opposed to artificial, some virtues are said to be natural and others artificial.

Experience always landed Hume in scepticism, but in his really philosophical moods he was never willing to stay there. He believed in an external world as much as the most ordinary individual who puts his foot on this firm earth. He no more doubted the existence of his mind than he doubted of his doubts. Nature provides a remedy for scepticism. Hume could not discover the connection between cause and effect, but he never denied its existence or the validity of our reasonings concerning it. "Allow me to tell you," he says in one place, "that I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that any thing might arise without a cause. I only maintained that our certainty of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition nor from demonstration, but from another source . . . There are many different kinds of certainty, but some are satisfactory to the mind, though perhaps not so regular as the demonstrative kind.

Hume refused the name of Deist, but it is probable that he would not have refused to be called by the Greek equivalent, Theist. There is a story that once dining with a large company at the Baron D'Holbach's, the discourse turning on natural religion, Hume said that as for Atheists he did not believe there ever was one. "You have been a little unfortunate," said the baron, "you are now at table with seventeen

for the first time." It was not generally admitted that Hume was a Theist. He came with his experience to find out if it could lead him to a demonstration of the being of a God. As in other cases, it came short. He had never seen God, he was not with Him before the mountains were brought forth. He saw effects in the world, but no agent producing them. He saw workmanship, but no hand at work. His experience did not reach a handbreadth into the deep that is infinite. Hume, however, brings forward his objections avowedly as "sceptical paradoxes" with a distinct affirmation that he does not approve of them. In the essay, "Of a Providence and Future State," a philosopher of the sect of the Epicureans is supposed to address the common people of Athens. He urges them to abide by the ancient religious traditions of their forefathers, and not to attempt to establish religion upon reason. The religious philosophers indulge a rash curiosity. They excite doubts which they never satisfy—they paint in the most magnificent colours the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe, and then ask if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. This is an argument from effects to causes. It is inferred from the order of the work that there must have been design and forethought in the worker. The Epicurean philosopher answers that he allows the argument to be solid so far as it goes, but its advocates must not pretend to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify. When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. We cannot return back from the cause and infer other effects from it besides those by which it is known to us. No one merely from the sight of Zeuxis' pictures could know that he was also a statuary or architect. We may fairly conclude the workman to be possessed of the talents and taste displayed in his works, but we have no right to infer that he has any talents beyond what he manifests. Supposing the Deity to be the Author of the existence and order of the universe, we can ascribe to him that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence which appear in His workmanship, but nothing more. The supposition of further attributes is mere hypothesis, and so too is the supposition that in distant regions of space or periods of time there will be a more magnificent dis-

play of these attritutes. We can never be allowed to mount up from the effect to the cause, and then descend downward to infer any new effect from that cause. It is objected that as we reason from a half-finished building that it is a work of design and contrivance, and justly return to the cause to infer that the building will soon be finished, so may we infer the completion of what is wanting to the perfection of this world. If we find on the seashore the print of a human foot, we would conclude that a man had passed that way, though the sand may have effaced the print of the other foot. Why then may we not reason that the Author of nature is capable of producing something greater than nature at present manifests? The answer is, human art and divine are not the same; man is a being whom we know by experience, and from our knowledge of him and his works we can draw a hundred inferences of what may be expected from him. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove that there was some figure adapted to it by which it was produced, but the print of a *human* foot proves likewise from our other experience that there was probably another foot which also left its impression.

"The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single Being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can by analogy infer other attributes or qualities in Him. As the universe shows wisdom and goodness we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shows a particular degree of these perfections we infer a particular degree of them precisely adapted to the effect which we examine."

The source of our mistake is said by the Epicurean philosopher to be that we tacitly consider ourselves in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude that—

"He will act on every occasion according to our ideas of what is reasonable. But the ordinary course of nature might convince us of the contrary. It is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours. We can not reason from ourselves to a Being so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper."

Bolingbroke had already reasoned in this way with reference to the divine attributes of power and justice, but by a singular inconsistency he did not hold his reasoning applicable to the attributes of wisdom and goodness. Hume proposes to introduce these objections as "sceptical paradoxes," nothing more than curious; but in a note to the essay, where he speaks in his own person, he says it may be established as a maxim that, when any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that "cause."



It is still, however, not evident how far Hume agreed with the philosophy of his Epicurean philosopher. The subject was resumed in a tract, which was published after his death. This was called "Dialogues on Natural Religion." The principal disputants are Philo and Cleanthes. The one is a Sceptic, the other a Theist. The author of Hume's Life, John Hill Burton, says that Hume showed most sympathy with Cleanthes, and indeed, very nearly professed the theistical doctrine for his own. Philo says that the inquiry can never be concerning the *being*, but only concerning the nature of the Deity. The being of God is not to be questioned. It is a truth self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause, and the original cause of the universe we call God, and piously ascribe to him every perfection. But as all perfection is purely relative, we ought never to imagine that we can comprehend the attributes of the Divine Being, or suppose that His perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. We justly ascribe to Him wisdom, thought, design, knowledge, because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language nor other conception by which we can express our admiration of Him. But we must not think that His attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and comprehension, and is "more the object of worship in the temple than of disputation in the schools." Cleanthes saw in the world but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivision to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace or explain. All these various machines, and even the most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends throughout all nature resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance, or human design. And since the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble each other, and that the Author of nature is in some way similar to man, though possessed of much greater faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of His work. By this argument, *a posteriori*, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of Deity and the likeness of the divine mind to the human.

Philo answers that if we see a house we conclude with the greatest certainty that it had an architect or builder, because



this is precisely the species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But we can not affirm that the universe bears such resemblance to a house that we with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect.

Cleanthes dwells on the resemblance, which he maintains is not slight, on the economy of final causes—the order, proportion, and arrangement of every part. And Philo points out to Damea, another of the speakers, that Cleanthes tacitly allows that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design, but only so far as we have experienced it to proceed from design. For anything we know, *a priori*, matter may contain the spring or source of order originally within itself as well as mind, and there is no more difficulty in conceiving that the several elements, from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than in conceiving that these ideas in the great universal mind, from a like internal cause, fall into the same arrangement.

Cleanthes allows the equal possibility of both suppositions, but finds from experience that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter, and as from similar effects we can infer similar causes, so he concludes that the adjustment of means to an end is the same in the universe as in a machine of human contrivance, and, therefore, the causes of both must resemble each other.

Philo is scandalized with this comparison made between the mind of God and the created mind. Thought, design, or intelligence, he says, such as we discover in men and animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat and cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others, which fall under daily observation. Why should thought be the model of the universe? It is true that in this minute globe of earth, stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not an order of arrangement without human art or contrivance, but it does not follow that the universe has not its order without something similar to human art. Is a part of nature a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? This is not to be allowed. The inhabitants of other planets, have they thought, intelligence, and reason, or anything similar to these faculties in man? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe *can we imagine that she incessantly copies herself*

throughout the universe,\* and if thought is confined to this narrow corner, with what propriety can we assign it as the original cause of all things?

Cleanthes answers that if even in common life we assign a cause for an event, it is no objection that we cannot assign a cause for that cause, and answers every new question that may be started. What philosophy could submit to so rigid a rule? Philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to be unknown, are sensible that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena are still as inexplicable as the phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the place, use, and intention of every part and organ, all these bespeak, in the clearest language, an intelligent Cause, an Author. The heavens and the earth give in the same testimony. The whole chorus of nature raises a hymn to the praise of the Creator. "You alone," says Cleanthes to Philo, "or almost alone, disturb the general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections. You ask me, What is the cause of the cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity, and here I stop my inquiry. Let them go further who are wiser or more enterprising.

Philo admits that the grandeur and magnificence of nature are arguments for Deity, but shows that on Cleanthes' *a posteriori* principles they become objections by removing the Deity further off from likeness to man. He also points out to Cleanthes that by confining himself to this method of reasoning he renounces all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of Deity. For as the cause ought to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite, we cannot ascribe this attribute to the Divine Being. Nor can we, on Cleanthes' principles, ascribe perfection to God, for there are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of nature which, if we allow a perfect Author to be proved *a priori*, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace infinite relations. But on the rigid final cause supposition these difficulties become real; and, further, were the world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain whether all the excellencies of the work can justly be

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\* Had the discoveries now known as morphology and typology been known in Hume's day he would scarcely have made Philo reason after this fashion.

ascribed to the Workman. He may have botched and bungled many worlds throughout an eternity. Ere this system was struck out much labor may have been lost, many fruitless trials made, and slow but continual improvement in the art of world-making carried on during infinite ages. Nor by this reasoning solely can we prove the unity of God as a piece of human workmanship—a house, a ship, or a city; though unity be in the work, a great number of men may be employed in working.

In the essay on the "Natural History of Religion," Hume, speaking in his own person, declares himself decidedly on the side of Theism. The whole frame of nature, he says, bespeaks an intelligent Author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment in regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and religion. This belief Hume thinks is not an original instinct or primary impression. It is the result of reasoning. There are nations, he says, without any sentiment of religion, and there are no two nations, perhaps no two men, that ever precisely agreed in their religious ideas. By studying the works of nature we come inevitably to the conclusion that there is an Author of nature; but if we leave the works of nature and trace the footsteps of invisible power in the various and contrary events of life, we are necessarily led to Polytheism. From this Hume argues that Polytheism preceded Monotheism. The apparently capricious powers of nature would be the first divinities—beings corresponding to the elves and fairies of our ancestors. As men advanced in the knowledge of nature they would see that the work of nature could not be ascribed to these deities. The idea of the unity of God being once reached, the human mind could never again lose sight of it. The intelligent Pagans never ascribed the origin and fabric of the universe to these imperfect beings. Hesiod and Homer suppose gods and men to have sprung equally from the unknown powers of nature. Ovid speaks of the creating Deity in the doubtful terms, "*Quisquis fuit ille Deorum*;" and Diodorus Siculus, beginning his work with the enumeration of the most reasonable opinions concerning the origin of the world, makes no mention of a Deity, or intelligent mind. Hume denies the universality of the religious sentiment in order that he may deny the existence of a primary instinct, which, as a mere experimental philosopher, he was bound to do; yet here, as in other places, he is forced to go beyond his own philosophy to find a rational explanation of the phenomena of religion. A

people, he says, destitute of religion are but a few degrees removed from the brute. And again, he says, that if the propensity to believe in invisible intelligent power be not an original instinct, it is, at least, a general attendant on human nature, and may be considered as a mark or stamp which the divine Workman has set upon His work, and "nothing surely," Hume adds, "could more dignify mankind than to be thus selected from all other parts of the creation to bear the image or impression of the universal Creator. What a noble privilege is it of human reason to attain the knowledge of the Supreme being, and from the visible works of nature be enabled to infer so sublime a principle as its Supreme Creator!" After saying all this, Hume's natural dislike to religion comes upon him. He finds ignorance the mother of devotion, revolts at the corruptions of theological systems and the evils which they have given rise, and finally sinks into his wonted scepticism, finding that all is an "inexplicable mystery; that the result of inquiry is "doubt and uncertainty, from which our only escape is into the calm though obscure regions of philosophy."

Hume was in Paris about two years after the great excitement that had been raised by the miracles supposed to have been performed at the tomb of the Abbé Paris. He had many conversations with the priests about the reality of these and other miracles. A Jesuit of La Flèche once answered Hume that the same objections which he urged against Catholic miracles were valid against those of the Gospel. Hume says he admitted this as a sufficient answer. If there are no real miracles but those recorded in the Bible, they become so exceptionable that there is a very strong probability against their being genuine. The order of nature is visible to us; a Gospel miracle comes to us only on the authority of testimony; which, then, is the stronger evidence, our senses or testimony? Archbishop Tillotson had already weighed the question in arguing against the doctrine of the *real presence*. This doctrine might have the authority of Scripture or tradition, but these can not overbalance the testimony of our senses. The Apostles saw the miracles of Jesus. To them the evidence was equal to the evidence of the senses; but to us, who have only their testimony, it is not equal. When we believe anything on human testimony the principle of our belief is founded on an observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Here all the experiments and observations give a probability in favor of the truth of that to which testimony is made. But when the

fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two opposite experiences. The Indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost reasoned justly. It required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts which bore so little analogy to the events of which he had constant and uniform experience. The action of frost was not *contrary* to his experience, but it was not conformable to it. It was *extraordinary*, not miraculous. In a wider knowledge of nature it was found to be within the operations of nature. A miracle Hume defines as a *violation* of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be. The Indian prince rightly required strong testimony to believe in ice, but no testimony is sufficient to evidence a miracle.

No writer on miracles omits to notice Hume. To refute him has been the ambition of every Christian apologist for the last hundred years; but what could really be said in reply was said in his lifetime. It is recorded of a professor in the University of Edinburgh that he annually refuted the great sceptic, and with as much complacency as regularity. A portion of his lectures was always introduced with the words—"Having considered these different systems, I will now, gentlemen, proceed to refute the ingenious theories of our late respected townsman, Mr. David Hume." As there really was but one answer, that answer has been repeated with variations and amplifications by all who have undertaken to meet his objections.

William Adams, who is described as chaplain to the Bishop of Llandaff, was one of the first who wrote on miracles with reference to Hume's argument. Adams at once objected to the definition of miracle as a "transgression of the law of nature." If the Author of nature performs any work different from what we see going on every day, He does not thereby violate or transgress any law. He does not even depart from the order of nature, but only from what we know of the order of nature. Our idea of a natural law is nothing more than our observation of what usually goes on in the world. It is not contrary to nature that the dead should be raised, or that the winds should be controlled by a word. It only supposes a power in nature greater than what is manifested in our daily experience. Our individual observation may testify to a uniformity of sequences in nature, but we have no right to make this the universal measure where so much evidently lies be-

yond our knowledge. Extraordinary occasions may require extraordinary manifestations of power. For the truth of these we must depend on testimony. If they became frequent they would cease to be extraordinary, and so cease to serve the end for which a miracle is wrought. The uniformity of nature must be acknowledged before we can acknowledge a miracle. This, says Adams, is a position which has been laid down by all who write in defense of miracles, and he expresses wonder to see it now pleaded as decisive against them. Adams sometimes speaks of God changing or subverting His laws, which are not much better words than "transgressing" or "violating." He confesses a necessity of speaking in this way, for a miracle is apparently a subversion of law, but in reality it is conformable to nature. This was taking the force out of the distinction which Hume made between the extraordinary and the miraculous.

It appears from Dr. Campbell's "Dissertation on Miracles," that Hume in the first edition of his "Essay" maintained the impossibility of miracles. Some of the reasoning still looks in that direction, and many who replied to Hume argued against the thesis that miracles are impossible. In the early editions there was a passage which read thus—"Upon the whole, it appears that no testimony for any kind of miracle *can* ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." The passage now reads thus—"Upon the whole, it appears that no testimony for any kind of miracle *has* ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof." This fairly changes the question from possibility to probability. While Hume maintained that miracles were improbable, Campbell held that they were not only probable, and might be proved from testimony, but that the miracles on which the belief in Christianity is founded *are* sufficiently attested.

Campbell refuses to admit that our belief in testimony has its foundation in experience. He regards it rather as an original instinct or intuition. It is not, therefore, to be put into the balance against experience. He makes this simple illustration of the case between him and Hume: He lived near a ferry; he had seen the ferry-boat cross the river a thousand times and return safe. One day a stranger come to his door and seriously tells him that the boat is lost; he stood on the bank and saw it upset. Here is what Hume would call "a contest of opposite experiences;" but Campbell maintains that his having seen the boat cross and recross a thousand times in safety is no proof against the testimony of the



stranger—that must be overthrown by contrary testimony. Another person testifies that he had seen the boat safe; that it has not been upset. Here the things balanced are homogeneous, here is testimony against testimony; but until the second testimony came there was no inconsistency in believing that, though the boat had crossed a thousand times in safety, it was now upset. A fallacy may be noticed in the application of this illustration. It might be said that we have experience that boats are upset, but we have none that dead men are raised to life. But in making this objection we should be carrying with the word experience an ambiguity which Campbell is careful to mark. Did Hume mean by experience his own, personally? If so, there is no fallacy in Campbell's illustration. He may never have seen a ferry-boat upset. Did Hume mean by experience that of men in general? If so, what did he know of other men's experience except by testimony? This boasted uniformity of nature, then, has only testimony for its foundation, the same as that on which miracles depend; so that testimony really forms the greater part of that experience which was to overthrow the validity of testimony. To make Hume's case valid, evidence is required from experience that ferry-boats have never been upset. This is a considerable change from Dr. Tillotson's argument about transubstantiation, with which Hume began his "Essay." The argument rested on the superiority of sense over testimony. The apostles saw the miracles of Jesus; they had the evidence of their senses. But if our senses can not be trusted,—if what appears bread and wine is not bread and wine, but flesh and blood,—we overthrow not only testimony, but the evidence on which the testimony rests, which is the veracity of sense. Here the things opposed are the evidence of our senses and an external authority. In Hume's argument the opposition is between his own personal experience, added to what he knows traditionally of the general experience of mankind, an external testimony of certain facts which, though out of the range both of general experience and his own experience personally, are yet not incompatible with either. This seems to be the force of Campbell's argument, but Hume had sheltered himself by a subtle distinction which it was necessary to examine. The Indian prince who did not believe in ice because he had never seen it, and could not conceive the possibility of it, having no conception of the conditions on which its existence is possible, reasoned rightly on the whole. It required strong testimony to convince him. Both sides

agree in this. Both sides also agreed that the testimony might be such as it would be unreasonable for him to reject. Hume says that his unbelief might be overcome by testimony, because, though it is not *conformable to his experience* that water should be turned into ice, it is yet *not contrary to it*. This is just what Campbell says of miracles. They are not contrary to our experience, but they are outside of it or not conformable to it. Our acquaintance with the laws of nature is only partial. In the idea of a miracle as contrary to experience, Hume is still working upon his definition that it is "a transgression of law," which Campbell of course rejects. To illustrate his meaning, Hume says it is no miracle that a man in seeming good health should die suddenly, but it is a miracle that a dead man should rise to life. The main difference is, according to Campbell, that the one is common—conformable to experience,—the other is not conformable to experience; so that the Indian prince would not have been more unreasonable in refusing on the strongest testimony to believe in ice, than we should be in refusing on the same testimony to believe that a man was raised from the dead.

But Hume comes even nearer to his opponents than this. He grants that there may possibly be "miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony." There may be; but he does not grant that there has been. Suppose, he says, there was a universal testimony that for the first eight days in January, 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth. Such a testimony ought to be received by philosophers, and the cause of the miracle investigated. By "miracle" Hume evidently means here something natural, for philosophers are to investigate the cause of it. But this is not surely the kind of "miracle" concerning which he wrote his "Essay;" yet into something of this kind Dr. Campbell resolves all the miracles which he defends,—miracles which are variations from the usual course of nature, but not violations of the *actual* system of nature. The conclusion is, that the kind of miracle against which Hume writes, is a kind of miracle whose existence Christians, as represented by Dr. Campbell, do not profess to believe.

John Douglas, Bishop of Salisbury, wrote "The Criterion; or, Rules by which the True Miracles in the New Testament are distinguished from the spurious Miracles of Pagans and Papists." Douglas connects Hume's argument against miracles with his doctrine of cause and effect. It is only when

our experience connects a cause with a particular effect that we believe it. Testimony is not sufficient. The plain inference made by Douglas is that Hume's argument proves too much. It is equally valid against the Christian miracles, and everything wonderful in nature which has not yet come within the narrow limits of our experience. Douglas assumes the omnipotency of God, and from that reasons for miracles. He notices the contradiction pointed out by Campbell, that Hume in the plainest terms admits that human testimony may in some cases give credibility to a miracle. He also noticed a limitation which Hume expressly wishes should be noticed, that only such miracles as are made the *foundation of a new system of religion* can not be made credible by testimony. His previous reasoning had struck at all miracles; but "he is lost in a labyrinth, surely," says the author of "The Criterion," "when he now applies it only to miracles connected with religion." Bishop Douglas argues for the necessity of revelation. Socrates had seen this necessity when he told Alcibiades of a Great Teacher who was to teach men their duty toward God and man. The expediency of a revelation involves the expediency of miracles. The "rules" for testing miracles are that the accounts be not published too long after the time when the miracles were said to have been performed, nor distant from the place; and if published at the time and place, not allowed to pass without examination. The "Life of Apollonius Tyaneus," by Philostratus, was not published till a hundred years after the death of the hero. Moreover, the whole of that biography is made up of imitations of New Testament miracles. The "Life of Ignatius," by Ribadeneira, in the first two editions contained no miracles. These were first inserted in an abridgment printed at Ypres in 1612, fifty-five years after the death of Ignatius. Bishop Douglas examines at some length the miracles said to have been wrought by the influence of the Abbé Paris, and does not find that they were so wonderful as the curses of Valentine Greatrakes, which were attested not only by the Bishop of Dromore, but by such rational theologians as Dr. Cudworth, Henry More, Bishop Wilkins, and Bishop Patrick, with many eminent physicians, and yet they were not accounted miracles.

The introductory part of Dr. Paley's "Evidences of Christianity" is devoted to Hume's argument; but Paley only repeats, in a condensed form, the substance of Dr. Campbell's dissertation. The very first sentence of Paley's book assures us that the writer is a man who understands an argument and

can reason calmly. The previous advocates of Christianity generally held it necessary to exalt the light of the Gospel, and to contrast with it the darkness and insufficiency of natural religion. This was done under the belief that the Deists had exalted the light of natural religion so as to make Christianity unnecessary. Paley at once states the case as it appears to every dispassionate and unbiased mind. It is unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a revelation, because, he says, "I have met with no serious person who thinks that even under the Christian revelation we have too much light." On the supposition that there is a Creator and Governor of the world, and a future life for man, it is not unlikely that God will give a revelation. The probability that God would acquaint men with the fact of the future life, is not greater than the probability that he would do it by miracles. To say that these doctrines, or the facts connected with them, are violently improbable, is a prejudication which should be resisted. Hume's position is stated to be that it is contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false. The narrative of a fact, Paley says, is only contrary to experience when the fact is related to have existed at such a time and place, at which time and place, we being present, did not perceive it to exist. This is properly contrary to experience. This was Tillotson's contrariety. There is no intelligible meaning that can be attached to the words contrary to experience, except that we ourselves have not experienced anything of the kind related, or that such a thing has not been generally experienced by others. We can not say that *universal* experience is against it, for that would be to assume the whole question. Paley accepts it as a fair statement of the controversy, "whether it be more improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false;" and he asks, in argumentative justice, that in considering the probability of the miracle, we should be allowed to take in all we know of the existence, power, and disposition of the Deity. A miracle will appear more incredible to one who does not believe in God than to one who does; and more improbable when no purpose can be assigned, than when it is done on an occasion which seems to require it. Paley concludes by defending the Christian miracles as well attested, and showing that some pretended miracles are not well attested.

When Dr. Chalmers wrote his "Evidences of Christianity," which were published in 1836, he reviewed the whole of the

controversy which had been raised by Hume's "Essay." He remarked how differently it had been treated in the two countries—England and Scotland. The English mind, best represented by Paley, came directly to the argument with full confidence in the faculties with which nature has endowed us. The Scotch mind always started a previous question, and with Hume, reasoned about our reasoning. He naturally sympathized with the metaphysical bent of his countrymen, yet he says the English apologists were not deceived in the result, just because nature has not deceived them. She has not given original principles to her children for the purpose of leading them astray. Chalmers would not agree to Dr. Campbell's position, that belief in testimony was an instinct anterior to experience. He returned to Hume's belief that it was resolvable into experience. The two things, then, experience and testimony, are homogeneous, and are fairly balanced against each other. Chalmers is willing to contend with Hume on this ground, and he undertakes to prove that the testimony for miracles may have a superiority of experimental evidence in its favour. Hume classed *all* testimony as one; and because some testimony had deceived, he concluded that all might deceive us. Chalmers claims that testimony should be separated into its kinds, and he affirms that a testimony is conceivable—nay, that a testimony has often been given having such marks and characteristics of unlikelihood or moral impossibility of its falsehood, that we can aver with the utmost confidence that it never has deceived us and never will.

Archbishop Whately's "Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte" illustrates the extent to which scepticism may be carried. We never saw him, and even the multitudes that did profess to have seen him may have been deceived as to the actual person. The whole story of his life is marvellous, incredible, extraordinary, miraculous, improbable, yet it is well authenticated. It reads like a romance, yet it is true. No one will justify the scepticism that doubts the existence of Napoleon and his strange history. Hume would here make distinctions of extraordinary and miraculous, contrary to experience, and not conformable to it; but practically, and so far as the argument is concerned, the distinctions do not mark a difference. Hume himself, as Whately shows, uses the term *miraculous* as synonymous with *improbable*, and throughout Hume's "Essay" the difficulty of believing the miraculous is the same in kind as the difficulty of believing the marvellous.

Bishop Warburton wrote "Remarks on Hume's 'Natural History of Religion.'" They are not of much value; in fact, this is one of Warburton's poorest performances. His words were many and strong, his arguments few and feeble. Warburton defended Christianity by throwing mud at his opponents. He denied that Polytheism preceded Monotheism. His argument was "the authority of an old book." When Warburton reviewed Bolingbroke, he extolled Toland and Tindal as good reasoners. He described them as men who really had something to say, and could say it; "but as for Bolingbroke, he was the mere essence of emptiness and nonentity." Now that Hume is to be brow-beaten, Bolingbroke is extolled as a man who knew how to reason; but as for Hume, he "insults common sense," and defends "dogmatical nonsense with scepticism still more nonsensical."\*

We have abstained in all the preceding papers from any remarks on Leland's "View of the Deistical Writers." Leland was industrious, he had good intentions, he was disposed to be candid, and yet he was one-sided. His book does not deserve the reliance which has generally been placed on it. Two of the writers especially were entirely beyond him. These were Hobbes and Hume. Of the former he does not say much; of the latter he says a great deal too much. He is most successful with Bolingbroke. He fails entirely with Hume. He says that the tendency of Hume's writings is to confound rather than to enlighten the understanding. But this depends on the character of the understanding. He marks a few things in Hume's writings that "strike at the foundation of natural religion." When Leland wrote this, the "Dialogues on Natural Religion" had not been published, so the reference was probably to the essay on "Providence and a Future State." Hume, as we have seen, distinctly avows that he did not approve the principles advocated by the Epicurean philosopher. The extent to which he did agree with him, as expressed in a note at the end, is only unfavorable to natural religion as different people may view it differently. The impossibility of tracing the connection between cause and effect Leland would have been willing to pass by as a display of metaphysical subtlety, if Hume had not made it the foundation of conclusions relating to matters of great importance. Now this was just

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\* The "Remarks" were published by Cadell, in 1777, as written by Bishop Hurd, in the form of a letter to Bishop Warburton, with the addition of a few lines at the beginning and a few at the end.



one of the things which Hume denied he had ever done. The inquiry was limited to the question of the source whence we have the idea of power in causation. The answer is that it is from experience, and not from intuition or demonstration, but the fact of its existence and the validity of our arguments depending on it remain the same. With his own interpretation of Hume's doctrine of causation, Leland finds Hume inconsistent, when treating of liberty and necessity he speaks of necessary connection.

It may be some excuse for Dr. Leland that he was not alone in supposing that Hume's principles were unfavorable to natural religion. The objection which Hume put into the mouth of Philo, that we have no ground for ascribing to the cause more than we found in the effect, did not invalidate the argument from design, but it showed that it had limitations. It might prove a Creator, but it did not prove an infinite. It might prove that there was some analogy between the mind of God and the mind of man, but it could not annihilate the manifest interval between the Divine and the human. Yet the things suggested by Philo have been taken into account by all philosophical Theists. They are to be found in Plato and Plotinus, in John Scotus Erigena and Benedict Spinoza. The acknowledgment of them has caused all philosophy of religion to be charged with what is called Pantheism.

Hume's "Dialogues" were continued by Dr. Morehead, a clergyman of the Episcopal Church in Scotland. Philo becomes a Christian, defends the Berkeleyan philosophy, and "all for the best," while Cleanthes remains a simple Theist. In Dr. Morehead's "Dialogues" Philo admits that he never denied the validity of the design argument. His error, as he explains it, was in esteeming it merely analogical and founded on experience. Now he maintains that its foundation is deeper. Wherever he sees marks of order, disposition, plan, he must acknowledge a designing mind by a necessary decision of the understanding previous to all experience.\* Were there no works of art in existence, we might still perceive traces of intelligence in the universe of nature. The universe may be a machine, an animal, a vegetable, or the production of a concurrence of atoms; in any case, the mind reads intelligence in it. Reason was employed in putting the machine together, generating the animal, sowing the seeds of vegetation, or reducing into form or order the irregular dance of

\* This was the argument of the Scotch metaphysicians, Stewart, Brown, and Reid, in reply to Hume.

atoms. What the supreme nature is we do not know, but we do know that the universe manifests an intelligent mind. The nature or reality of all things is hid from us. Inquiries into real essence invariably lead to scepticism; but there is another region accessible to us—that is, the natural sentiments which we can not but form upon questions of this kind. The reality of existence may be very different from our conception of it, yet when we have reached the genuine and unbiased apprehensions of the human mind, we have reached the only view on which it can be contemplated. Thus, to trust our faculties is to trust in God. Philo, in Dr. Morehead's "Dialogues," differs chiefly from the Philo of Hume in having added Christianity to his philosophy.

We should not omit altogether an ingenious argument against Hume's sceptic which is urged by Hugh Miller in his "Testimony of the Rocks." It is drawn from geology, and though not remarkable for metaphysical keenness, is yet, in its sphere, and, so far as it goes, such as Hume would have welcomed. Miller considers Hume as identical with Philo, and so supposes the argument against the perfections of Deity, from the singularity of the effect, as Hume's own. This misconception brings with it some confusion, for Miller has not seen that Hume, in his stern impartiality, was simply trying to mark out the precise boundaries of our knowledge as derived from the measure of the capacity of the human mind. Miller's reply to the sceptic is that we have in geology that experience in world-making which no longer makes the world a "singular effect." We have at least five distinct "foot-prints on the sand;" that is, five distinct creations,—the *Azoic*, the *Palæozoic*, the *Secondary*, the *Tertiary*, and the *Human era*. In the first era it might have been said that it was unphilosophical to argue that the producing Cause was competent to form anything beyond gases and earths, metals and minerals; yet in the *Palæozoic* we have tall araucarians and pines, reptiles of very low standing, and highly organized fishes. It is evident now that in the first creation the producing Cause had put forth but a part of His power. In the *Secondary*, the manifestation of this power is still higher. In the *Tertiary*, we have noble forests of dicotyledonous trees with sagacious and gigantic mammals. In the *Human era*, the greatest of the Divine power is yet more fully revealed. Each creation has been higher than the one that preceded it. With this experience, Miller asks, is it still unphilosophical to reason that the producing Cause will yet put forth greater

energy and realize the hopes of the deeply-seated instincts which lead us to look for new heavens and a new earth? There is certainly in this a probability that yet higher creations will succeed the present; but the point of Philo's argument is, that in strict reasoning we must always measure the producing Cause by precisely what is manifested in the effect.

The result of Hume's criticism of the design argument has been finally settled by Kant. In the *pure reason* which leads to scepticism, it loses its force, but finds it again in what Kant calls the *practical reason*. It is valid as far as it goes. In concluding his essay on Miracles, Hume said with a sneer that our religion is not founded on reason but on faith. Those who replied to him found at least that it was not against reason. The internal sense which men have of the truth of religion is properly called faith; not that it is opposed to reason, nor in the sense of implicit reliance on authority, but as designating a state of mind rather than an act of the mind. In this sense the most devout and rational Christians of the present day will not object to taking Hume's conclusion seriously, that the foundation of our belief in Christianity is not from a process of reasoning concerning miracles, or any other external evidence, but really has its foundation in something which is called *faith*. Why should Hume have sneered at this? He had proved that reason, as he understood it, had failed in everything, even in proving its own existence. He had shown, too, that our only escape from scepticism was to return to reason, such as it is, and to put faith in it. So that a rational faith really is practical reason.

Hume's biographer, Mr. Burton, claims that Hume's place should be not among the sceptics, but among the philosophers of the porch. There is some justice in this claim when the easy French philosophy is put off. Hume's character is that of the genuine Stoic—calm, patient, unbiassed, self-sacrificing. In the Essays on Epicurean, Stoic, Platonist, and Sceptic, each of the philosophers is made to speak as if Hume felt that each of them had some truth on his side. Though avowedly a disciple of the experimental philosophy, his eagerness to follow principles to their last results continually leads him to some region which that philosophy forbids its disciples to enter. He refused to engage in controversy. The agitation of mind which that kind of gladiatorship produces, he did not think conducive to the discovery of truth. When Dr. Campbell, through his friend Dr. Blair, submitted to him the manuscript of the "Dissertation on Miracles," Hume sent to

Campbell one of the kindest letters ever written. If it had not the name of Christian, it had the reality without the name. To Dr. Blair he wrote that whenever they met it must be with the understanding, that no subjects relating to his profession were to be introduced in their conversation. He had made up his mind; and such subjects might destroy the good feeling which existed between them. The entire simplicity of Hume's character, as delineated by his friends, is in keeping with all that we know of him from his writings. It is traditionally recorded that his mother, speaking of her son David, once said, "Our Davie's a fine, good-natured cratur, but uncommon wake-minded." It is possible that David, destitute of the religious element, without prejudice or bias, may have appeared to his devout mother precisely in this light.

Hume lived in a dark age—dark, we mean, as regards religion. The eighteenth century had so many men remarkable for their virtues, their great human gifts, and their practical common sense, that we often wish it were possible to vindicate it from the usual charge of irreligion. But all the evidence is against us. Hume says that the clergy had lost their credit; their pretensions and doctrines were ridiculed; and even religion could scarcely support itself in the world. We have the same testimony from Bishop Butler, Archbishop Secker, and others. Hume was penetrated with the spirit of the age. There is no great man of whom we know anything who had by nature so little of the sentiment of religion. His mind was essentially pagan, without one Shemetic element. The whole spirit of the Bible was alien to him. He does not seem to have had even a taste for its literature or its lessons of human wisdom. In every great English writer, passages, similes, or illustrations from Scripture are plentiful in almost every page, interweaving themselves in the happiest sentences of our most brilliant orators and our most finished essayists; but in all Hume's philosophical writings we have marked only two references to the Scriptures. One of them is about the treasures of Hezekiah. It is introduced in a political essay, and with the indifferent words, *if I remember right*. In the whole history of his life there is but one occasion where he ever manifests the least sense for religious feeling. When in London he learned of the death of his mother. His sorrow was overwhelming. His friend Mr. Boyle said to him, "You owe this uncommon grief to having thrown off the principles of religion, for if you had not, you would have been consoled with the firm belief that the good lady, who

was not only the best of mothers, but the most pious of Christians, was completely happy in the realms of the just." To which Hume answered, "Though I throw out my speculations to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as you imagine." This is a solitary instance, and, if really genuine, is altogether exceptional. When he drew near his own end, with all his faculties entire, he amused himself and his friends with jests about crossing the Styx, and how he would banter old Charon, and detain him as long as he could on this side the river before he entered the ferry-boat.\*

Hume's principles, of necessity, made him many enemies. We may praise the zeal of those who opposed him, but we can also admire the calm, self-possessed spirit which bore the opposition with meekness and patience. There is a story, well authenticated, that when an old man, and very heavy, he fell into the swamp at the bottom of the wall that surrounded Edinburgh Castle. He was unable to get out, and in great dread of there ending his life, he called to an old woman for assistance. The old woman told him that he was "Mr. Hume the Deist, and she would help none of him." "But, my good woman," said Hume, piteously, "does not your religion teach you to do good even to your enemies?" "That may be," she replied, "but ye shall'na come out o' that till ye become a Christian yoursel', and repeat the Lord's Prayer and the Belief." He performed the task, and got the promised assistance. David Hume is not the first whom ability to say the Creed has helped out of a ditch.

JOHN HUNT.

\* A saying of Bishop Horne to Hume illustrates this defect in the sceptic's character. Hume had used it as an argument against the alleged consolatory effect of religion, that all the religious men he had met with were melancholy persons. "The sight of you," replied Horne, "is enough to make a religious man melancholy at any time."—ED.

## ART. VIII.—HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE REUNION.

By J. F. STEARNS, D. D., Newark, N. J.

THE wise man tells us "there is a time to rend and a time to sew," "a time to break down and a time to build up." And, no doubt, as the world now is, seasons of separation and disintegration must be expected to occur which, in the economy of God's inscrutable providence, may be made to subserve important and useful ends. Such is the case manifestly in the history of the Christian church. The rending and the breaking down perform important functions in the freeing and the purifying. And this may serve to reconcile us, in many instances, to what must otherwise have been regarded as an unmitigated evil.

In the deplorable separation which, for more than thirty years, has impaired the influence and hindered the progress of the Presbyterian Church, we find much to illustrate this principle. Those whose memory runs back to the years immediately preceding the rupture of 1838 will readily call to mind the strife and turmoil which, from year to year, disturbed the deliberations of the General Assembly, and provoked the harsh, and certainly not elegant remark, of one who himself shared the contentions, that "Hell itself held a jubilee whenever that body was in session." Matters had come to such a pass that of two evils that of separation was the least. And, though many believed that the difficulties might and ought to have been settled and the rupture avoided, all must acknowledge, as they look back, that important ends have been subserved by the long season of mutual rivalry and separate action into which the two parties were precipitated. Problems have been wrought out, on the one side and the other, by the logic of experience, which all the arguments of the most cogent reasoners could not have solved. Slavery and anti-slavery, ecclesiastical Boards and voluntary Associations, liberty of thought and expression and a vigilant inquisition against heresy—"the *ipsissima verba*" and "the substance of doctrine," Divine sovereignty and the free agency of man—time has done that for the adjustment of these questions, and to bring about a common understanding in respect to them, which continued controversy, within the pale of the same church, would only have hindered. And, meanwhile, each party going its own way, and acting on its own convictions and preferences, has been able, it may be conceded, to accom-



plish more for the general cause than it could have done in any such union as might then have been practicable.

But separation, whatever temporary or incidental benefits may accrue from it, is not by any means the normal condition of the church, as the whole character and design of the institution as well as the explicit assertions of the Holy Scriptures, constrain us to believe. Temporary necessity may require it. But it is always an evil. They who create the necessity or without a necessity force it on, must be held responsible. And when the necessity passes away, immediately the obligation to reunion becomes imperative. Two bodies of professed Christians occupying the same field, holding substantially the same faith, practicing the same form of worship, governed by the same law, and pursuing the same methods of action, may justly be required to show cause why they should hold towards each other so unnatural a relation. In default of reasons, and those strong and tangible, they can not but be held guilty of schism, and incur severe censure in the eyes of the church at large and of all reasonable men.

Such was the posture in which the Old and New School branches of the Presbyterian Church stood towards each other for more than thirty years. And though the attempt was constantly renewed, by unkind imputations on the one side, which were immediately and indignantly repudiated on the other, to exhibit a justifying ground, neither party ever succeeded in satisfying the judgment of impartial men, nor, with the exceptions of a few rigid sticklers for minute distinctions, their own consciences. Prejudices gained a hold here and there and were but slowly dislodged. But individual members passed from one side to the other and felt no difference. Ministers were transferred from one connection to the other and in a few months melted into the new fraternity as if they had always been of it. Efforts were made here and there to check this natural tendency. Members applying for certificates of dismission were informed that the church in — street was the only one of "*our* connection" in the place to which they were going, and they should take a recommendation to that, or, if they insisted, a form out of the regular course and containing a sort of protest was perhaps furnished them. We copy a specimen, the production of a distinguished Doctor of Divinity in one of our principal cities.

"This may certify that Mrs. — is a member of the — Presbyterian Church—in good and regular standing. As such she is affectionately commended to the fellowship of *God's people* wherever her lot may be cast. *She has expressed a desire* to connect herself with a branch of the Church of Christ not

*in correspondence* with the General Assembly with which this church is connected, and *so no form of dimission* is provided in such cases. But she is a dear child of God and we shall be happy to hear of her church relations being pleasantly foamed *anywhere*, as we feel sure she will be a comfort to her brethren in the Lord. Should she be received by *any church* it will confer a favor on us to be advised of that fact by the proper authority that her name may not be retained on the roll of this church.

BY ORDER OF THE SESSION.

\_\_\_\_\_, 1850. \_\_\_\_\_."

This letter was intended for one of the oldest, soundest and most respected Presbyterian churches in the land, and shows the embarrassments into which good men were thrown in their efforts to keep up not only a distinction but a separation without a difference. In the nature of the case, such attempts could not succeed, except partially, and, as time wore on, their folly became every year more and more apparent.

The question may be entertained here, whether there ever was such difference in doctrine between the two parties as to justify the separation. From a careful examination of the whole matter, we are quite settled in the opinion that there was not. In every large body of earnest thinkers there will always be more or less of diversity. This every one must admit, although, in times of jealousy and sharp controversy, some will be very reluctant to give their opponents the advantage of an explicit admission of it. Besides minor differences, to which little regard will be paid, there will generally be found two opposite poles of thought, to one or the other of which differently constituted minds will be likely to tend. Among the adherents to the same system there will be an extreme right and an extreme left, as well as a *juste milieu*. Be as minute and stringent as you will in your definitions of orthodoxy, different men, adopting the same statements, and, as they verily believe, holding them in their true meaning and intent, will be found ranging themselves toward one or the other extreme. Cut the body in the middle, and one of the halves will take one of the extremes, and the other the other; and the two halves may be characterized accordingly, though the great body in both will still be substantially alike. Something like this took place in the great rupture of the Presbyterian church—not exactly, it is true, for as the differences of doctrine were but one among several causes of the separation, there was a considerable mixing up in this particular, and both parties had to tolerate more or less of both the opposite extremes.

The Presbyterian Church, as we all know, has a very minute, carefully digested, and clearly defined Confession of

Faith. Nobody can doubt that it contains essentially the Calvinistic or Reformed system distinctively so called. There is no compromise in it between Calvinism and Arminianism, as has been claimed for the "Thirty-nine Articles"—no intentionally ambiguous phrases which men may interpret differently to suit their convenience. But here two things are to be carefully noted. Even this sharply-defined and comprehensive system does not pretend to cover the whole ground of revealed truth, nor to distinguish between the different forms of Calvinistic doctrine. The Confession states, for the most part, only that which all good Calvinists, sublapsarian and supralapsarian, mediate imputationists like Calvin himself, and immediate imputationists, have held in common. Outside of this, the widest differences, whether of philosophy or of statement and illustration, are no breach of doctrinal unity. And then, again, the Presbyterian law of subscription, as contained in the questions answered at ordination, does not require the adoption of the "ipsissima verba" even of the Confession itself, nor allow it to be accepted by any as an infallible rule. This prerogative it reserves exclusively for the Scriptures, and prescribes the Confession only as *containing* the *system* of doctrine *taught* in the Scriptures. The real *Basis* of Presbyterian orthodoxy is, after all, the Scriptures honestly and truly interpreted, and the Confession and Catechisms, important as they are, fall rather into the rank of declarations or testimony. This we say in no spirit of latitudinarianism. No man can receive and adopt the Confession of Faith who does not hold as true and Scriptural the system of doctrines contained in it. Therein are found the terms of our fellowship, a solemn affirmation to each other of what we actually believe, a systematic form of what we understand to be the leading truths of our religion. But the Confession of Faith is not the Bible, and the Bible, not the Confession of Faith, is the source and law of Presbyterian doctrine and preaching.

What we mean to affirm, then, in respect to the question before us, is just this, that, leaving aside extremes, which must exist everywhere, to be corrected or excluded as best they may, the doctrines of the Confession as prescribed in the questions for ordination, were at the time of the rupture, have been ever since, and are now, held and preached by the two bodies, in the same sense, with equal truth, sincerity and affection. Differences there are, no doubt. But whereas the differences between the Calvinist and the Arminian, the Trinitarian and the Arian or Socinian, are clear and well de-

fined, those between the Old and New Schools are shadowy, and belong far more to the accidents than the substance.

The question has been raised, whether, since the division, one or both of the parties have not changed. Professor Smith once made the admission that "our branch of the church is much closer to its Standards, taken in the strictest interpretation, than it was a quarter of a century ago," and the remark was seized upon and applied in an offensive sense quite contrary to his meaning. Probably both branches of the church are not conscious, and would be very slow to admit, that they have undergone any material change. And yet, in both, no doubt, there has been a change in some respects perceptible to others. In their modes of "viewing, stating, explaining and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession," the two bodies are much nearer alike than they were in 1838. Causes which then operated to produce difference in all these particulars have now ceased to be operative, and other causes acting equally upon both have had the effect to produce closer agreement.

At the time of the division, and for several years previous, the controversy with Unitarianism in New England was in the very height of its career. With such an antagonist it was of no use to adhere closely to the old phraseology, or confine oneself to the old statements and arguments. The phraseology would be misinterpreted, and the arguments without the slightest effect. The defendants of the old faith had to begin *de novo*, to come down to the first principles, and adopt terms and expressions common to themselves and those who differed with them in regard to the very elements of their faith. Most of the charges of heresy made against Dr. Lyman Beecher had their origin in efforts on his part to bring the truths of the old system of Puritan and Presbyterian orthodoxy into a shape intelligible and undeniable to this new class of antagonists. In some cases the defendants themselves seem to have misapprehended some of the old terms, and to have abandoned them on that account. Even so able a theologian as Dr. Leonard Woods, whose reputation for Old School orthodoxy used to stand pretty high at Princeton, was constrained to confess, in his old age, that in his controversy with Dr. Ware he discarded the word *imputation* because he did not then understand its true technical meaning.

At the same period, in that and other parts of the country, occurred those great revivals of religion by which the churches received a vast increase of numbers and a new stimulus to ef-

forts of evangelization. Had the divine influence reached only those who had been nurtured in the bosom of the Church, and trained from infancy in its principles, the task assigned to the preachers and pastors of that period would have been much less difficult and critical. But it swept through society, from its lowest to its highest extremes. Men of the world as ignorant as babes in regard to the true meaning of the evangelical doctrines—men whose hearts being averse to the truth, and their intellects keen to discern and skillful to attack every weak point in the statements of its advocates, required to be dislodged from the refuges of error into which their convictions of sin drove them, and made to see the reasonableness and feel the binding force of the great saving truths of the Gospel. Many of the statements, so violently assailed at one time, in the writings of Albert Barnes, find their true explanation and their harmony with other parts of his writings, in the consideration of this laudable object. Nor is it strange if some, in their eager pursuit of it, have been betrayed unconsciously into expressions or illustrations imperilling if not impairing the integrity of their own theological system. No doubt they seemed to do so to some, who, not considering the occasion, did not make due allowance for the unaccustomed forms of expression.

In these and similar respects, unquestionably, as times and occasions have changed, there has been a change of methods and views. We think we can see a corresponding change in not a few of our Old School brethren. We do not meet now with those strong expressions bordering on antinomianism which used to startle some of our theologians. Nor do we find among them that eager sagacity in the scenting of heresy. There is no need of sensitiveness in this matter. We must have been dull scholars in the school of Scripture as well as reason and experience, if we have made no progress for the better in the course of thirty-one years. But this we may say: If the two bodies do remain unchanged, they were much nearer alike at the beginning than they generally took each other to be. And, if they have changed, one or both of them, so as to come nearer together, that fact is conclusive against the supposition of a radical difference. Separated bodies are likely to follow the law of their separation. And had ours been a radical difference of doctrine, the current moving in its own line, unobstructed since the division, must have carried us farther apart during these thirty-one years instead of bringing us nearer together.

It is the general conviction, that we are now at least substantially one that has led the two bodies with a unanimity hardly to have been expected to resolve no longer to continue apart. Various causes have operated to bring about this conviction. The excited feelings which aggravated the real differences, and threw a false coloring over the opinions of one party in the eyes of the other, have been gradually subsiding. Many of the men who took part in the contest by which division was effected and whose prejudices were strongest have passed away. A new age with new issues and a new generation of men with new views have very nearly superseded the old. The steady persistency with which both parties have adhered to the same standards and prided themselves in the same denominational name could not but have its effect. The experiences of the late war did much to subserve the same end, as they did likewise to prove the essential agreement of all our evangelical denominations. Men met on the field of battle and in the camp and hospital administering the principles of their faith to the wounded and the dying, and never thought of their denominational distinctions. New School and Old School taught precisely the same doctrines in the same way. And the question, "What is the difference?" failing of an answer, led to the question next in order, "Why are we not organically and ecclesiastically one?"

The first movement towards such a result, as far as we know, was made in the Spring of 1862, when the Assembly of the Old School, at their meeting at Columbus, Ohio, adopted a resolution proposing "a stated annual and friendly interchange of Commissioners between the two General Assemblies," which resolution, officially communicated to the Assembly of the New School at their meeting at Philadelphia in 1863, received the following response :

*"Resolved,* That this Assembly, with heartfelt pleasure and Christian salutations, accept the proposition thus made, hoping and praying that it may result 'in securing a better understanding of the relations,' which, in the judgment of this Assembly, are proper to be maintained between the two Assemblies."

The telegraph forthwith conveyed the message of peace and mutual good-will from Philadelphia to Peoria, where the Assembly of the Old School was then in session, and immediately delegates were appointed on both sides, who proceeded, as soon as practicable, to the discharge of their respective duties. This was a measure intended, no doubt, by some who advocated it, to be permanent and final. It seemed enough to take off the scandal of thirty years of mutual estrangement



and contention. But it did not and could not satisfy the Christian consciousness of brethren really one in doctrine and polity. The taste which it gave of fraternal sympathy only increased the desire of more and made manifest its practicability.

The next year (1864) witnessed a long stride in the direction of reunion. In the Assembly of the New School, met together at Dayton, Professor Henry B. Smith, the retiring moderator, who had at Philadelphia welcomed and warmly responded to the Christian salutations of the first delegation from the Old School, broke ground in his opening sermon, distinctly and earnestly, in favor of the speedy obliteration of the distinctions that separated us. His discourse, entitled, "CHRISTIAN UNION AND ECCLESIASTICAL REUNION," based upon the 13th verse of the fourth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians: "Till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man unto the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ," is a beautiful and masterly argument in favor of union in general, and Presbyterian reunion in particular, which deserves to be carefully studied by all our ministers and members, and to be made a permanent document in the history of the movement in question. Nowhere have we seen a fuller or happier statement of the reasons for the measure, the difficulties that might be expected to obstruct it, the basis on which the reunion must be established, and the spirit and method in which it must be pursued. "Such union," he says, "implies three prime conditions. The first of these is that there be a spirit of mutual concession; the second, that both accept in its integrity the Presbyterian system of church order; the third, that the reunion be simply on the basis of the Standards, which we equally accept without private interpretation—interpreted in their *legitimate grammatical and historic sense* in the spirit of the Adopting Act, and as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures. My liberty here is not to be judged of another man's conscience. Any other view not only puts the Confession above the Scriptures, but also puts somebody's theological system above the Confession."

Meanwhile steps had been taken for a movement in the same direction in the other Assembly, which was to be convened at Newark, N. J., at the same time. At a meeting of ministers and elders in attendance upon that body a paper was adopted and published, both urging the measure and pre-

senting as the basis the same simple ground which had been recommended in the sermon of Professor Smith. "It is believed," says that paper, "that the great majority in each branch sincerely receive and adopt the Confession of Faith as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Scriptures, and approve of the same Government and Discipline. On this basis we may unite, mutually regarding and treating the office bearers and church courts of each branch as coördinate elements in the reconstruction." This document was signed by 70 ministers and 43 ruling elders, representing the reunion sentiment of every section of the church.

The ball had now begun to roll, and at every revolution its size and force was destined to increase. In the Spring of 1866, both the Assemblies met in the city of St. Louis, and to both memorials were sent up urging forward the object. In the minutes of that of the New School we find the following: "The Committee on the Polity of the Church report overtures numbered 5 to 16 on the subject of the Reunion of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church—from the Presbyteries of New York 3d, New York 4th, Newark, Dubuque, Greencastle, Alton, Steuben, Athens, Munroe, Keokuk, Long Island, Trumbull and San José. All these Presbyteries, with different degrees of urgency, recommend to this General Assembly to initiate or to respond to proposals looking to an entire reunion of the churches represented by the two General Assemblies now in session in the city of St. Louis." At the same meeting the Rev. Phineas Gurley, D. D., and the Hon. Lincoln Clark, appeared as delegates from the Assembly of the Old School, and presented on its behalf the following communication, viz.:

*"Resolved,* That this Assembly expresses its fraternal affection for the other Branch of the Presbyterian Church and its earnest desire for Reunion at the earliest time consistent with agreement in doctrine, order and policy, on the basis of our common standards and the prevalence of mutual confidence and love, which are so necessary to a happy union and to the permanent peace and prosperity of the united church.

*"Resolved,* That it be recommended to all our churches and church courts, and to all our ministers, ruling elders and communicants, to cherish fraternal feeling, to cultivate Christian intercourse in the worship of God, in the promotion of the cause of Christ, and to avoid all needless controversies and competitions adapted to perpetuate division and strife.

*Resolved,* That a Committee of nine ministers and six ruling elders be appointed, provided that a similar Committee shall be appointed by the other Assembly now in session in this city, for the purpose of conferring in regard to the desirableness and practicability of reunion, and if, after conference and inquiry, such reunion shall seem to be desirable and practicable to suggest suitable measures for its accomplishment and report to the next General Assembly."

To this communication the Assembly of the New School responded as follows, viz. :

"*Resolved*, That this Assembly tender to the Assembly representing the other Branch of the Presbyterian Church its cordial salutations and fellowship and the expression of its earnest wish for Reunion on the basis of our common standards received in a common spirit.

"*Resolved*, That a Committee of fifteen, nine of whom shall be ministers of the gospel and six ruling elders, be appointed to confer on this subject in the recess of the Assemblies with the Committee to be appointed by the other General Assembly, and to report the results to the next General Assembly.

"*Resolved*, That we enjoin upon this Committee, and upon all our ministers and church members, to abstain from whatever may hinder a true Christian fellowship, and to cherish and cultivate those feelings and purposes which look to the peace and prosperity of Zion, the edifying of the body of Christ, and the complete union of all believers, especially of those who live in the same land and have the same history and the same standards of doctrine and polity."

In pursuance of these resolutions the Committee of Conference were appointed. Those on the part of the Old School were

#### MINISTERS.

J. M. Krebs, D. D., Chairman,  
C. C. Beatty, D. D.,  
J. F. Backus, D. D.,  
P. D. Gurley, D. D.,

J. G. Monfort, D. D.,  
W. D. Howard, D. D.,  
W. E. Schenck, D. D.,  
Villero D. Reed, D. D.,

T. J. Brown, D. D.

#### RULING ELDERS.

James M. Ray,  
Robert McKnight,  
Samuel Galloway,

H. K. Clark,  
George P Strong,  
Osmond Beatty.

Those on the part of the New School were

#### MINISTERS.

Thomas Brainerd, D. D., Chairman,  
William Adams, D. D.,  
Edwin F. Hatfield, D. D.,  
Jonathan F. Stearns, D. D.,

Philemon P. Fowler, D. D.  
James B. Shaw, D. D.,  
Henry L. Hitchcock, D. D.,  
Robt. W. Patterson, D. D.,

Henry A. Nelson, D. D.

#### RULING ELDERS.

Edward A. Lambert.  
Joseph Alli-on, LL. D.,  
Henry Williams,

Truman P. Handy,  
Robert W. Steele,  
William H. Brown.

It is a fact worthy of notice, and which served deeply to impress upon the committee the sense of their responsibility, that before they had opportunity to meet, both the chairmen appointed as above were smitten down in the providence of God,—Dr. Brainerd by sudden death, and Dr. Krebs by an utterly disabling, and, as it afterwards proved, fatal disease.

The committees were called together by the gentlemen next in order on the list, Dr. Beatty of the Old School, and Dr. Adams of the New, who both took the places vacated by their brethren as chairmen of their committees respectively. They met in the city of New York, February 20, 1867, first separately, and then as a joint committee. Dr. Beatty was elected chairman of the joint committee, and Dr. Hatfield clerk. The meeting continued till a late hour on the evening of the 22d of February. Most of the time was occupied with prayer and fraternal conference, apart and together. At first, as was natural, a degree of shyness was manifest between the two parties, but as they proceeded with their deliberations, and the essential oneness of their views and wishes became more and more apparent, reserve was thrown aside, and they communed together with the utmost frankness. By adjournment, a second meeting was held on the 1st day of May, the members having meanwhile charged themselves with the duty of inquiry and correspondence, to ascertain the views and wishes of the church generally in their respective localities. In this case, they remained together an entire week, and the whole time was occupied in hard work, not without much and earnest prayer. In their Report, they say with truth: "All the meetings of the Committee were distinguished by a degree of courtesy and unanimity which was more than common. Composed of men of decided individuality, representing divers interests and sections, they have discussed every question, many of them of admitted delicacy and difficulty, with the utmost frankness, without one word or expression of any kind ever to be regretted by Christian brethren who felt the grave responsibilities of their position." The result was the preparation and adoption of a paper entitled: "PROPOSED TERMS OF REUNION BETWEEN THE TWO BRANCHES OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, to be submitted for their action to the two General Assemblies." It consisted of a short Preamble and fourteen Articles, the contents of which we shall have occasion to examine more particularly hereafter. They were adopted with a remarkable unanimity, with only one dissenting voice on the final vote, and that only on three points, and were thus reported by their respective committees to the two General Assemblies, met in the month of May, 1867, that of the New School in the city of Rochester, N. Y., and that of the Old School in Cincinnati, Ohio.

The Report did not recommend immediate action on the

whole merits of the question, but that "the terms of the Reunion shall be published by direction of the General Assemblies of 1867, for the deliberate examination of both Branches of the Church; and the Joint Committee shall report to the General Assemblies of 1868 any modification of them they may deem desirable in view of any new light they may have received during the year." The New School Assembly approved and adopted "the whole report with entire unanimity, appointed the legal committee recommended in Art. 13, and authorized the Joint Committee to recommend needed changes in the Constitution, as requested in Art. 14. In that of the the Old School, parts of the Report encountered opposition. The special committee to whom it was referred brought in two Reports. That of the minority asking the Assembly to instruct the Reunion Committee "to obtain a more *definite statement of the doctrinal basis*," the exclusion of "Committee men" from the Church Courts, and a "distinct and formal recognition of the right and *obligation* of every presbytery to be satisfied as to the soundness of every minister it receives," was, after discussion, rejected by a large majority, yeas 152, yeas 64. Pending a resolution to adopt that of the majority, the resolution to instruct the Joint Committee to propose changes in the Constitution, as recommended in Art. 14 of the Plan, was unanimously stricken out, another was added declining to express either approbation or disapprobation of the terms presented by the Committee of Reunion in detail, and the rest adopted without a count, containing the Resolution "that this Assembly has listened with grateful and profound satisfaction to the Report of the Committee on Church Reunion, and recognize, in the unanimity of the Joint Committee, the finger of God as pointing toward an early and cordial reunion of the two sister churches now so long separated.

In this posture of affairs the Report of the "Terms of Reunion" went out to the churches and presbyteries. It was, by order of both Assemblies, published in the Appendix to the Minutes of both and in the religious newspapers, and commended to the careful consideration of the whole church. During the Summer and Autumn the provisions of the Plan were very freely discussed by the press and in the presbyteries, and various opinions and suggestions were elicited concerning them. The PRINCETON REVIEW, in its July number, attacked the whole scheme with great vigor in an article written by Dr. Hodge, and afterwards published under his

own name in a pamphlet form. The object of that article, he says in the preface to the pamphlet, "is threefold: *First*, To show that the true principle of subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith requires that those who profess to adopt the system of doctrine therein contained should sincerely receive in their integrity all the doctrines essential to the *Reformed or Calvinistic system*. *Second*, That this is the principle adopted and insisted upon by our church from the beginning, and to which the Old School body stand solemnly pledged before the Christian world. *Third*, That however numerous may be the orthodox members of the New School Presbyterian church, that church, as an ecclesiastical organization, *never has and does not now* adopt and act upon that principle; and, *therefore*, that union between the two churches under these circumstances would be not only *inexpedient but morally wrong*." An answer to this article appeared in this REVIEW in the number for October, handling the whole subject in a masterly manner, written by Professor H. B. Smith, and afterwards published separately and widely scattered through both branches of the church. In this article the charge of loose subscription made against the New School was positively and indignantly denied and proof challenged. On the contrary, it was affirmed that the sense in which the New School church received and adopted the Confession was *precisely the same* with that claimed as the true one by Dr. Hodge, viz., the Calvinistic or Reformed. This discussion was very generally read and had a powerful influence in disabusing many minds of their prejudices or misapprehensions. Both the admissions of Dr. Hodge and the denials and assertions of Professor Smith tended to the same result, the conviction of the substantial oneness of both bodies in the *receiving and adopting* of the Confession of Faith in the true, honest, liberal, common sense and Presbyterian signification of those words.

But the question still remained in the minds of some: Is Prof. Smith, in this respect, a fair representative of the opinions of the New School church?

In the month of November of that same year occurred that remarkable meeting of Christian men in the city of Philadelphia, known as "THE PRESBYTERIAN NATIONAL UNION CONVENTION." "It originated in a proposal, made in the Synod of the Reformed Presbyterian Church at its meeting in the city of New York in May, 1867, by George H. Stuart, Esq., an elder in that body," and had for its object "to inaugurate



measures to heal Zion's breaches and to bring into one the divided portions of the Presbyterian family." Though entirely spontaneous and without ecclesiastical authority, this meeting was composed of delegates sent by the respective presbyteries of the different branches of the Presbyterian family in all parts of the land, and had a most important influence on the progress of the measures in operation for the reunion of the Old and New School. The presence of the Spirit of God was never more sensibly felt, and scenes were there enacted which will be remembered when the prayer of the departing Saviour shall have reached its complete fulfillment, "That they all may be one." In this meeting the proposition was very early entertained and adopted to attempt an *organic union* of these different churches, and a Committee to prepare and report a "basis of union" was appointed, consisting of one minister and one elder from each of the churches.

This Committee went immediately to their work, and the next day brought in their report. Meanwhile, as the discussions and devotional exercises proceeded, all hearts seemed melting into one. The strongest expressions of desire for the accomplishment of the design were uttered by the speakers of every branch of the church represented, and from every part of the land. A Convention of Episcopal brethren in session in the same city had turned aside from their business to pray for God's blessing upon our deliberations. We had reciprocated the fraternal action and sent a delegation with our Christian salutations to them. The delegation had returned, reporting their very cordial reception, and the desire on the part of the Episcopal convention to reciprocate the courtesy by sending a corresponding delegation to us. The Report of the Basis had been read and largely explained and commented upon by the members of the Committee. The highest degree of enthusiasm prevailed. The first article containing an acknowledgment of the Scriptures had been revised and adopted, and the second, declaring that "in the United Church the Westminster Confession of Faith shall be received and adopted as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures," was before the Convention.

All this while Dr. Hodge, a member of the Convention, had remained perfectly silent. Except a short prayer, very guarded in its language, which he offered at the request of the Moderator, he had not uttered a word. The reason, as was supposed, and as he afterward avowed, was his great surprise at seeing the turn which the affairs of the Convention took, and

the spirit and desires of its members. "Mr. President," he said the next day, "I came to this Convention under an entire misapprehension, and I presume that this is true of the majority of our Old School brethren. We thought it probable that some plan of *federal* union, which would allow each member of the confederation to retain its own peculiarities and revolve in its own sphere, might be proposed and recommended. But, sir, from the first hour of our coming together, with the solitary exception of the remarks of Dr. R. J. Breckenridge on the first day of the convention, I have not heard a word uttered or a prayer offered from the members of any of the bodies here represented, which did not assume that the organic union of all the Presbyterian churches in the land was the object contemplated and desired. Such being the case, I have taken no part in your deliberations, but have sat in silence waiting to see what God, in his providence and spirit, would bring to pass."

It was late in the evening at the close of the second day, and the question was just about to be put, when Prof. Smith, also a member of the Convention, and who, unlike Dr. Hodge, had from the beginning taken a warm interest and a prominent part in all its deliberations and actions, arose and said: "Mr. Moderator, it seems to me that, in this article, we have reached the central point, and that here we need to be careful and circumspect, because we have come to the article where there is the most controversy. There will be the most difficulty in respect to the terms of subscription as to the sense in which we assent to the doctrines presented, and receive the Confession of Faith as containing the doctrines taught in the Holy Scriptures. I move that the following words be added to that article, namely: "It being understood that this Confession is received in its proper historical, that is the Calvinistic or Reformed sense." The proposition took the Convention by surprise. Some did not see the need of it, others feared it would raise a new and unnecessary discussion. But the mover persisted. To a friend who suggested to him that some would prefer to have him withdraw it, he replied, "I have offered it, and the Convention may dispose of it as they like, vote it down if they do not like it." His object is manifest from the history of the case as already given. It was, *first*, to meet the objections to the organic union then contemplated, on the part of a considerable section of the Old School body, of which the *Princeton Review* was the representative; and, *second*, to test, in an open and explicit manner, the po-

sition of the New School on the subject of accepting and adopting the Confession. In this latter view its success was most signal. There had been no concert. The mover acted on his own responsibility. But when the question was put to the New School portion of the Convention every man, except two, (46 ayes to 2 nays,) immediately voted in the affirmative. And from that time to this we have never heard from any quarter in our branch of the church a single voice dissenting from the position there taken by their delegates. The result proved, as might have been expected, eminently acceptable to all candid men in both parties. Even Dr. Hodge whispered to Dr. Musgrave that it met his approval. It had, no doubt, a most important influence in producing harmony and confidence between the two parties in all parts of the church.

The meeting of this Convention was preceeded and attended with meetings for prayer in various parts of the land, and followed by a series of union conventions in different localities accompanied in some cases with special united celebrations of the Lords Supper, all which served to deepen the influence.

In the month of March following, 1868, the Joint Committee of Reunion came together in the city of Philadelphia, to revise and complete their plan of *Terms* to be recommended to the General Assemblies. Vacancies in their ranks had been filled by the appointment of Dr. J. Edson Rockwell in the place of Dr. Krebs, Dr. Geo. F. Wiswell in the place of Dr. Brainerd, and Elder Jacob F. Farrand in the place of Elder F. T. Brown, since deceased. The transactions of the eventful past year were before them, and they came together with the earnest desire, on all hands, to meet the demands of the case as manifested by what had occurred.

When the doctrinal Article came before them, the members of the Committee from the New School were satisfied to let it stand just as it was. The resolutions of the Convention at Philadelphia had answered their end. They were not intended for a basis for reunion between the Old and New Schools. On the contrary they expressly disclaimed any such purpose. In many respects they were not adapted to this use. But those of the Old School greatly preferred the doctrinal Article adopted at the Convention, especially in view of the Smith amendment, popularly so called. And those of the New School were quite disposed to acquiesce, provided that Article could be so modified as to adapt it to the demands of the case. There was a

little clause in the original Article which they thought ought to be retained, viz., the words "as it is accepted by the two bodies," thus recognizing the equal standing of both churches in respect to their adoption of the Confession. But this was objected to. The clause had met with misinterpretation and objection, it was said, from numbers in the Old School body. We must not throw it back upon them. At one time there was danger of a very serious disagreement. But the New School members of the Committee, wishing to avoid such a result, offered a choice of three distinct propositions, to either of which they would cheerfully assent: viz., to take the original Article, formally approved by one of the Assemblies, and not disapproved by the other, just as it stood. 2. To take the same Article, with the *addition* of the Smith amendment, and with no other alteration. 3. To take the Philadelphia Article, *including* the Smith amendment, with the insertion of the clause from the original plan, slightly modified so as to make it more acceptable: "as it is now *maintained* by both the separate bodies." In case these should be unacceptable, their brethren of the other side must, they insisted, furnish something to the same effect more satisfactory to themselves. *It was in these circumstances that the Gurley amendment, so called, was produced.* It had been prepared by Dr. G., no doubt, in conference with his brethren; for they had been in separate meeting, as had also the New School part of the Committee, most of the morning. That amendment, we are happy to say, proved eminently satisfactory to both parties. The New School Committee abandoned all their own propositions, and, after a short examination, the new clause was *unanimously* adopted by the Joint Committee, who thereupon, with overflowing hearts, and even sobs of joy, gave thanks to Almighty God for their happy agreement.

The Gurley amendment was a happy counterpart of the Smith amendment. The one declared the sense in which both the parties do and always have understood the Confession of Faith. The other secured that reasonable liberty within the limits of the Confession which our Presbyterian standards manifestly contemplate. It stood as follows: "It is also understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession *which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system*, are to be freely allowed in the united church as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches."

The *second* article remained as before, except some alter-

ations of phraseology not materially effecting its substance, and the insertion of the word *expected* after *advised*, and also the clause "within the period of five years," as designating the limit of time within which the "imperfectly organized" churches should endeavor to become thoroughly Presbyterian. The *fourth* had simply a clause added to avoid disturbing rights of property. The *eighth*, relating to the publications of the churches, is less stringent, and trusts more than its predecessor to the candor and discretion of the Board or Committee hereafter to be selected. The *ninth*, relating to theological seminaries, is changed in phraseology and adds a provision for an official recognition and approbation to be given by the Assembly to such seminaries, now independent, as shall put themselves under ecclesiastical supervision. The *tenth* of the old plan becomes the *eleventh* of the new. The new *tenth*, on the subject of examinations, is inserted in its place. The *third*, *fifth*, *sixth* and *seventh* are without alteration. The rest, framed with reference to matters of temporary interest, are dropped and others suited to the present stage of the business substituted in their places.

In this state the Plan was presented, in May, 1868, to the two Assemblies, that of the New School meeting at Harrisburg, Pa., and that of the Old at Albany, N. Y. It encountered in both more opposition than did its predecessor. In the Old School, strange as it seemed to those who knew the history of those additions, the opposition centered chiefly on the amendments to the first article; in the New, on the provisions of the tenth. In both, however, the whole plan was adopted and overtured to the presbyteries for their action by a very large majority. In the Assembly of the New School the minority, having had opportunity to express their dissent on particular points, with few exceptions waived their objections when the vote was taken on the whole plan, and acquiesced in the will of the majority. In that of the Old School a protest was entered, which was answered in a very able paper drawn up by Professor Shedd and adopted by the Assembly. Near the close of the session, in the hope to conciliate the minority, who had given some intimations of their willingness to be so conciliated, that Assembly adopted the following resolution: "While the Assembly has approved the Report of the Joint Committee on Reunion, it expresses its preference for a change in the first item in the basis leaving out the following words, viz.: 'It being understood that the Confession is received in its historical—that is, the Calvinis-

tic or Reformed sense. It is also understood that various methods of viewing, stating, explaining and illustrating the doctrines of the Confession, which do not impair the integrity of the Reformed or Calvinistic system, are to be freely allowed in the united church as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches." The Assembly believes that by omitting these clauses the basis will be more simple and more expressive of mutual confidence; and the Permanent Clerk is directed to telegraph this proposed amendment to the Assembly at Harrisburg, and if *that Assembly shall concur* in the Amendment it shall become of effect as the action of this Assembly also. The Assembly also appoints the Rev. C. C. Beatty, D. D., the Rev. V. D. Reed, D. D., and ruling elders Robert Carter and Henry Day, a Committee to proceed to Harrisburg and personally to lay this action before the other Assembly." This Committee immediately put in execution the trust assigned to them, and, on their arrival at Harrisburg, were very cordially received, and, by their presence and warm expressions of fraternal love, did much to advance the interest of reunion. But the Assembly at Harrisburg was now very near its close. Many of its members had already obtained leave of absence, and on investigation it was found that there was no longer the requisite constitutional quorum for reconsidering the action which had been taken. A free conference on the subject, however, seemed to warrant the belief that the Assembly would have been willing to concur in the proposal, if their brethren of the other Assembly would add the *tenth article* to the portions to be omitted. The Committee returned to Albany and reported the result of their mission, and there the matter was left when the Assemblies severally adjourned.

The plan recommended by the Joint Committee and adopted by both Assemblies was now the overture, and the *only one* regularly before the presbyteries. If, however, having acted upon that, any of them had chosen to express their approval of the proposed amendments, subject to the concurrence of the two Assemblies, no embarrassment would have arisen. But, unfortunately for the immediate success of the effort for reunion, other councils prevailed. The presbyteries of the New School acted upon the regular overture and approved it by a very large majority, but the presbyteries of the Old School voted, some for the overture, some for the amended plan proposed but not adopted by their Assembly, and still others ignored both for the basis of "the standards pure and



simple;" and by far the largest number effectively rejected the only measure legally before them. In this state of affairs, seeing that that measure was defeated, not intentionally on the part of most of the presbyteries, but by confusion of action, the Reunion Committee, on the part of the New School, which had been continued by that Assembly while that of the other Assembly had been dissolved, hoping still to bring about an agreement, and deeming it within the limits of their authority to attempt to do so, met in the city of New York in the month of January, 1868, and adopted the following paper:

ADDRESS OF THE REUNION COMMITTEE TO THE PRESBYTERIES.

In pursuance of a resolution of the General Assembly, at its meeting at Harrisburgh, Pa., May, 1868, continuing the Committee on Reunion for the purpose of "furnishing such information as they may deem best to the churches, in order to secure intelligent action on the subject of reunion," the said Committee met in the city of New York, on the 20th day of January, 1869.

It appeared from the best evidence that could be obtained, that while a large proportion of the New School presbyteries, acting on the overture sent down by both General Assemblies, had given their approval of the same, most of the Old School presbyteries had given their approval only to an amended basis, for which their Assembly had expressed a preference, in case the Assembly at Harrisburgh should concur; that is, to the basis of the overture with the omission in the first article, of the following words: "It being understood, etc., or, as some of them have expressed their action, the basis of the Standards pure and simple."

It thus appeared that, while on both sides there has been a very general approval of reunion itself, a difference of action has prevailed which, as the case now stands, is likely to defeat what we believe is the earnest purpose of a very large majority of the members of both branches of our Church, to wit: the accomplishment of reunion at the meeting of the next General Assemblies.

That the other Assembly did not intend to make any alteration in the *principles* of the plan submitted by the Joint Committee, is clear from the fact that, having adopted that plan by a large majority, the amendment was proposed only as a matter of "preference," subject to the concurrence of our General Assembly; and the reason given for the preference is, that, so amended, "the basis would be more simple and more expressive of mutual confidence." It appears from the statement of the Committee sent by the Assembly at Albany to report their action to the Assembly at Harrisburgh, that they were influenced in part also by the hope of reconciling opposing elements in their own body, and so securing in favor of reunion greater unanimity.

Believing that the Presbyteries connected with us, and our branch of the Church generally, are disposed to make any concessions to their brethren of the other body not inconsistent with principle, and that express guarantees, both in regard to doctrine and polity, may be safely dispensed with, now that free discussion of the subject has brought about so good an understanding, this Committee deem it their duty, in accordance with the purpose of their continuance, to call the attention of the presbyteries to the present posture of the case; and, without assuming any authority, would recommend that, at a regular meeting

preceding the next General Assembly, they express their assent to the amendment referred to, with the *additional* one (which to us appears to carry with it all the reasons that apply to the other, and is regarded by some as quite necessary in case the other is adopted), viz.: the omission of the whole of the Tenth Article. We can not but trust that our Old School brethren will concede this additional omission, since it is but the application of the same principle to the *polity* of the Church which they have applied to its *doctrine*; and, while it will serve to harmonize differing preferences among us, as theirs does among them, will be equally with theirs expressive of the same "mutual confidence."

Should the requisite number of Presbyteries in both the bodies, agree to both these modifications, the two Assemblies may find themselves in a position to consummate the reunion at the approaching meeting, and thus avoid the delay of another year, which is much to be deprecated, in order to frame and send down a new overture. It must, however, be well understood, that, by agreeing to the omissions in question, the Presbyteries do not relinquish nor deny the right to all reasonable liberty in the statement of views, and the interpretations of the Standards, as generally expressed in the First Article as it now stands; and also that the interpretation of their own language by the Joint Committee in the preamble and conclusion of their Report, May, 1868, is to be accepted as the true interpretation.

With these views, and in order to prepare the way for definite and uniform action on the part of the Presbyteries, the Committee beg leave to submit the following form, not to supersede but to follow their previous action, in case they have already approved of the terms of the overture:

"This Presbytery, having already approved of the basis of Reunion overtured by the last General Assembly, do now, in order to a final and harmonious adjustment of the whole case, consent to the amending of the Basis, by the omission

"First: Of that part of the First Article of the Basis that begins with the words 'It being understood,' &c., and ends with the words 'In the separate churches.' And

"Second: Of the whole of the Tenth Article of the Basis.

WM. ADAMS, Chairman."

This address was sent to all the presbyteries in connection with our own branch of the church, and published in the religious papers, for the information of all parties concerned. Unfortunately, again, and as if some fatality must attend every such endeavor, no sooner had the adoption of the address been made known through the press, than the Central Presbytery of Philadelphia, with the best of intentions, we are bound to believe, but without the slightest consultation with the Committee or any of the members of our church, adopted and issued a circular to the presbyteries of the Old School, advising them to abandon the whole plan overtured by the Assemblies, and vote for the union on the basis of the Standards, without explanations or agreements, leaving all the delicate questions on which the Reunion Committee had labored for nearly three years to be settled as best they might, after the union should be consummated. The result

was as might naturally have been expected. While the presbyteries on the one side voted for the Committee's measure of attempted conciliation, those on the other were as much confused in their action as before, and again there was no agreement.

It was in this posture of affairs that the two Assemblies met in the city of New York, May 17, 1869. It can hardly be thought strange that in the New School portion of the church a considerable degree of coldness had begun to manifest itself. Not a few of them began to feel that they had been trifled with. With the utmost confidence in the good will and sincerity of purpose of the friends of Reunion in the other church, they could not see why they should still pursue their efforts to conciliate a small minority in their own body, who had been opposed to reunion from the beginning, to the extent of ignoring the opinions and policy of its friends in the New School body, who had battled with them side by side for many years, and of neglecting to take them into their counsels. This was the case especially with some of the laymen. Two eminent jurists, members of the Assembly, expressed as much during the course of its meetings. One of them, who had been a member of the Reunion Committee from the first, and had declared himself warmly for reunion as early as 1864 at the Assembly of the Old School at Newark, declined for the first time to concur with the Committee when they put forth the January letter, thinking it unwise and beneath our dignity to make any further attempts in such circumstances.

It may serve to explain the embarrassments under which our Old School brethren labored, and account for the frequent shifting of their ground, if we allude here to the very obvious want of confidence, which prevailed in some quarters among them in the sagacity or firmness of their own portion of the Reunion Committee, and perhaps, also, in the frankness and fairness of those of the other side. No mistake, we think, could have been more unfounded. The Committee from that branch of the church, though chargeable with no censurable partisanship, were, we think, quite as sharp to discern and eager to maintain the views and wishes of the body they represented as were their colleagues of the other side. Indeed, the whole proceedings of the Committee were characterized by such fraternal frankness, and such earnest desire to secure such agreements as would harmonize and satisfy the whole church, and produce a real and lasting union, as that the bare suggestion of overreaching or being overreached seems, to those who know the facts, almost ridiculous. And it is cer-

tainly a very strong testimony to the wisdom of their action, that in the final revision of the plan, by a new committee, composed on that side entirely of new men, every one of the provisions to which the former had agreed, even those which had been most severely criticized, are retained substantially, without alteration.

However that may be, the fact is that on the convening of the Assemblies, the overtures framed by the Committee were found to have been virtually rejected, and the prospect of an immediate reunion seemed to many at that moment very unpromising. But the Lord had the case in his own hands, and the spirit of love and concord was not dead in the hearts of his servants. The meeting for prayer at the Brick Church the evening previous to the opening of the two Assemblies, though designed and announced as strictly for devotional purposes, served to manifest what was uppermost in the thoughts of the members, and helped to kindle the flame.

In the New School Assembly, at the Church of the Covenant, the opening sermon by the retiring moderator was from the words of our Lord, John xvii, 21: "That they all may be one." And very soon after the organization of the two Assemblies, a committee of conference, consisting of five ministers and five ruling elders from each Assembly, was appointed, who at once gave very close and earnest attention to their duty, and on the seventh day of the session brought in their report, signed individually by every member of both sides, clerical and lay; which is as follows:

The Committee of Conference appointed by the two General Assemblies, have attended to the duties assigned to them; and after a very free interchange of views, with prayer to Almighty God for his guidance, are unanimous [great applause] in recommending to the Assemblies for their consideration and, if they see fit, their adoption, the accompanying three papers, to wit:

1. Plan of Reunion of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America;
2. Concurrent Declarations of the General Assemblies of 1869; and
3. Recommendation of a Day of Prayer.

WILLIAM ADAMS, Chairman.

OLD SCHOOL.  
G. W. Musgrave,  
A. G. Hall,  
L. H. Atwater,  
Willis Lord,  
H. R. Wilson,  
Robert Carter,  
C. D. Drake,  
Wm. M. Francis,  
John C. Grier.

NEW SCHOOL.  
J. F. Stearns,  
R. W. Patterson,  
S. W. Fisher,  
James B. Shaw,  
W. Strong,  
Daniel Haines,  
William E. Dodge,  
J. S. Farrand,  
John L. Knight.  
HENRY DAY, Secretary.

I.—PLAN OF REUNION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Believing that the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom would be promoted by the healing of our divisions, and that the two bodies bearing the same names, having the same Constitution, and each recognizing the other as a sound and orthodox body [applause] according to the principles of the Confession common to both, can not be justified by any but the most imperative reasons in maintaining separate and, in some respects, rival organizations; we are now clearly of the opinion that the reunion of those bodies ought, as soon as the necessary steps can be taken, to be accomplished, upon the basis hereinafter set forth.

1. The Presbyterian Churches in the United States of America, namely, that whose General Assembly convened in the Brick Church in the city of New York, on the 20th day of May, 1869, and that whose General Assembly met in the Church of the Covenant in the said city on the same day, shall be reunited as one Church, under the name and style of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, possessing all the legal and corporate rights and powers pertaining to the Church previous to the division in 1838, and all the legal and corporate rights and powers which the separate churches now possess.

2. The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common Standards; the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments shall be acknowledged to be the inspired word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be sincerely received and adopted as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures; and the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States shall be approved as containing the principles and rules of our polity.

3. Each of the said Assemblies shall submit the foregoing basis to its presbyteries, which shall be required to meet on or before the 15th day of October, 1869, to express their approval or disapproval of the same, by a categorical answer to the following question:

Do you approve of the reunion of the two bodies now claiming the name and rights of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, on the following basis, namely: "The reunion shall be effected on the doctrinal and ecclesiastical basis of our common Standards; the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments shall be acknowledged to be the inspired word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice; the Confession of Faith shall continue to be sincerely received and adopted as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures; and the Government and Discipline of the Presbyterian Church in the United States shall be approved as containing the principles and rules of our polity?"

Each Presbytery shall, before the first day of November, 1869, forward to the Stated Clerk of the General Assembly with which it is connected, a statement of its vote on the said Basis of Reunion.

4. The said General Assemblies now sitting shall, after finishing their business, adjourn, to meet in the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on the second Wednesday of November, 1869, at 11 o'clock, a. m.

If the two General Assemblies shall then find and declare that the above-named Basis of Reunion has been approved by two-thirds of the Presbyteries connected with each branch of the church, then the same shall be of binding force, and the two Assemblies shall take action accordingly.

5. The said General Assemblies shall then and there make provision for the meeting of the General Assembly of the united church on the third

Thursday of May, 1870. The Moderators of the two present Assemblies shall jointly preside at the said Assembly of 1870 until another Moderator is chosen. The Moderator of the Assembly now sitting at the Brick Church aforesaid shall, if present, put all votes and decide questions of order; and the Moderator of the other Assembly shall, if present, preach the opening sermon; and the Stated Clerks of the present Assemblies shall act as Stated Clerks of the Assembly of the united church until a Stated Clerk or Clerks shall have been chosen thereby; and no Commissioner shall have a right to vote or deliberate in said Assembly until his name shall have been enrolled by the said Clerks, and his commission examined and filed among the papers of the Assembly.

6. Each Presbytery of the separate churches shall be entitled to the same representation in the Assembly of the united church in 1870 as it is entitled to in the Assembly with which it is now connected.

II.—CONCURRENT DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF 1869.

As there are matters pertaining to the interests of the Church when it shall have become reunited, which will manifestly require adjustment on the coming together of two bodies which have so long acted separately, and concerning some of which matters it is highly desirable that there should be a previous good understanding, the two Assemblies agree to adopt the following declarations, not as articles of compact or covenant, but as in their judgment proper and equitable arrangements [applause], to wit:

1. All the ministers and churches embraced in the two bodies should be admitted to the same standing in the united body, which they may have held in their respective connections, up to the consummation of the union.

2. Imperfectly organized churches are counseled and expected to become thoroughly Presbyterian, as early within the period of five years as may be permitted by the highest interests to be consulted; and no other such churches shall be hereafter received.

3. The boundaries of the several Presbyteries and Synods should be adjusted by the General Assembly of the united church.

4. The official records of the two branches of the church for the period of separation should be preserved and held as making up the one history of the church; and no rule or precedent which does not stand approved by both the bodies, should be of any authority until reestablished in the united body, except in so far as such rule or precedent may affect the rights of property founded thereon.

5. The corporate rights now held by the two General Assemblies, and by their Boards and Committees, should, as far as practicable, be consolidated, and applied for their several objects, as defined by law.

6. There should be one set of Committees or Boards for Home and Foreign Missions and the other religious enterprises of the church; which the churches should be encouraged to sustain, though free to cast their contributions into other channels if they desire to do so.

7. As soon as practicable after the union shall have been effected, the General Assembly should reconstruct and consolidate the several Permanent Committees and Boards which now belong to the two Assemblies, so as to represent, as far as possible with impartiality, the views and wishes of the two bodies constituting the united church.

8. The publications of the Board of Publication and of the Publication Committee should continue to be issued as at present, leaving it to the Board of Publication of the united church to revise these issues and per-



fect a catalogue for the united church so as to exclude invidious references to past controversies.

9. In order to a uniform system of ecclesiastical supervision, those Theological Seminaries that are now under Assembly control may, if their Boards of Direction so elect, be transferred to the watch and care of one or more of the adjacent Synods; and the other Seminaries are advised to introduce, as far as may be, into their Constitutions, the principle of Synodical or Assembly supervision; in which case they shall be entitled to an official recognition and approbation on the part of the General Assembly.

10. It should be regarded as the duty of all our judicatories, ministers, and people in the united church, to study the things which make for peace, and to guard against all needless and offensive references to the causes that have divided us; and in order to avoid the revival of past issues by the continuance of any usage in either branch of the church, that has grown out of former conflicts, it is earnestly recommended to the lower judicatories of the church that they conform their practice in relation to all such usages, as far as is consistent with their convictions of duty, to the general custom of the church prior to the controversies that resulted in the separation.

#### III.—RECOMMENDATION OF A DAY OF PRAYER.

That the counsels of Infinite Wisdom may guide our decisions, and the blessing of the Great Head of the Church rest upon the result of our efforts for reunion, it is earnestly recommended to the churches throughout both branches of the Presbyterian Church, that they observe the second Sabbath in September, 1869, as a day of fervent and united prayer to Almighty God, that he would grant unto us all "the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord," and in the new relations now contemplated, enable us to "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bonds of peace."

It had been thought by many that the Assembly was fully competent to consummate the union by their own act, without any further overture to the presbyteries. But in the Old School thirty presbyteries, or more, had remonstrated in advance against the measure, and in the New there was great aversion to what might operate as an enlargement of the powers of the General Assembly. It was thought best, therefore, though at the cost of delay and expense, to wait for a new overture and an adjourned meeting of that body.

The plan as now presented has some very decided advantage over either of its predecessors. It preserves all that was ever regarded as of much value in the old ones, and by carefully distinguishing things that differ avoids the recurrence of misapprehension and confusion.

The Report, it will be observed, consists of three separate papers. The *first*, entitled "Plan of Reunion," etc., is, with the exception of one article, entirely a new draft. Its first article distinguishes by their appropriate designations the two bodies to be united, defines the name and style of the new

body and determines its rights and powers. The *second*, which is the doctrinal article, is precisely the same as in both the former ones, except the omission of the explanatory clauses. The third prescribes the duty of the presbyteries in the case and recites the overture to which alone they are to send back a *categorical* answer. The *fourth* provides for an adjourned meeting of the two Assemblies, and determines the majority required in the action of the presbyteries in order to a declaration of the Assembly that the Reunion is effected. The reduction of this majority from one-fourth to one-third seemed but reasonable, that it might not be in the power of one-quarter of the presbyteries in either body—one-eighth of the whole, and those perhaps among the smallest, either by opposition or neglect to act, to defeat the will of the entire church. The *fifth* makes provision for a meeting of the General Assembly of the united church and settles the respective duties of the two retiring moderators, and states the conditions of membership. The *sixth* states the ratio of representation.

The *second paper* consists of a preamble and ten articles taken almost verbally from the Plan of 1868. The *first* article of that Plan is of course omitted, having been inserted in the first paper. The *twelfth* and *thirteenth* fall out for a similar reason. The *tenth* is omitted. All the rest, with the single exception of the word *should* substituted for the word *shall*, the better to define their intent, stand just as they did in that document. The disposal of the Plan of Union, churches, of the rules and precedents of the separate bodies, the Boards and permanent Committees, the Publications of two churches, and the Theological Seminaries, has not undergone the slightest alteration. There is, however, one very important difference in this paper. Both its preamble and its title clearly define the intent and force of the provisions contained in it. It is true they were never intended as a part of the basis. Both the Plan of 1868, and that of 1867, explicitly declare that "*the Reunion shall be effected on the Basis of our common standards.*"

The rest were only terms, explanations, agreements, mutual understandings. But they were confounded with the Basis in the minds of many. Now they are not only distinguished but *separated* and their force and bearing so clearly defined that there can be no mistake. By withholding them from the action of the presbyteries, the risk is avoided of their being regarded as in the nature of constitutional rules. They are adopted for the sake of a good understanding, as, in the judg-

ment of the two Assemblies, proper and equitable arrangements, though they have had virtually the sanction of the presbyteries of both the churches, and therefore are not altered even in phraseology, they bear the title simple of "concurrent declarations" of these two General Assemblies. They are not articles of compact. They carry with them the *obligation* of GOOD FAITH among Christian gentlemen, and nothing more.

The *third paper*, as its title indicates; is simply a recommendation of a day of prayer.

There is also a preamble prefixed to the first paper taken from the original preamble, but considerably abridged. Matters no longer liable to question required no repetition. One new clause, however, has been inserted, viz., the words: "each recognizing the other as a sound and orthodox body according to the Confession." The omission of the qualifying amendments to the first article had carried away the contested clauses: "as it is accepted by the two bodies," "as it is now maintained in the two bodies," "as they have hitherto been allowed in the separate churches." But this clause answers the end originally contemplated in them, by a frank and full acknowledgment of the equal standing of both the churches in respect to their orthodoxy. And while it proved eminently acceptable to the New School, it was the only one which, on the reading of the Report in the Old, was greeted with a spontaneous "applause."

It was a happy circumstance that the two Assemblies met in the same city of New York within a few minutes walk of each other. The brethren of both Schools could thus meet face to face and heart to heart, and see for themselves how much their differences amounted to. Morning after morning they met in the same houses of worship, and joined in the same prayers, exhortations, and songs. A large social gathering and entertainment, provided by friends in New York, at Apollo Hall, gave opportunity for the freest interchange of views and sentiments in a social way. Delegations had been exchanged between the two Assemblies, and the eloquent and warm-hearted addresses of Drs. Beatty and Musgrave in the New School, and Dr. Adams and Hon. Wm. E. Dodge in the Old, had kindled to a high degree the enthusiasm of both.

At 10½ o'clock on Thursday, the seventh of the session, the Report was read in both Assemblies simultaneously.

In that of the Old School, Dr. Musgrave, chairman of the Committee, on their part explained the character of the three papers. He "was rejoiced," he said, "that in the preamble,

each recognized the other as sound in the faith founded on the Confession. Hence the united body will never tolerate heresy. They had understood each other, also, on the question of liberty. The impression had been made that the Old School would tolerate no difference of opinion, but insist on the *ipsissima verba* doctrine. There always have been shades of opinion in the old church. May the day never come when one man shall think for all. There must be allowed reasonable liberty of opinion." Dr. Atwater, a member of the committee, and, in times past, understood to be a strong opponent of reunion, said "he felt that the time was now come for union. There was ground for misgiving. He hoped and prayed and labored for the best. He knew the teaching in the seminaries at New York and Auburn to be orthodox. They had a formative influence on the church." Dr. Spring objected only to the postponement. He thought the Assembly had full power to finish the business. At the time of the disruption *he protested against it*, and it was his great desire to die a member of the unbroken Presbyterian church. Henry Day, Esq., a member of the Committee, spoke upon the legal bearings of the report. Every interest is protected as fully as human sagacity could provide. But if all the property is to be lost, let it go, and let us have the union. The warm hearts of these Presbyterians would supply ten times as much." The Rev. Alexander McLean said "Dr. Hodge asked last year 'Where will be the Old School Presbyterian church?' A new generation has arisen. We are able to judge of the doctrines of the church, and out of these two churches will arise a purer and more glorious church. When the Holy Spirit is poured out these two bodies will be melted into one." A few spoke feebly in opposition, or criticised and excepted to certain portions of the plan. But it was of no use. The vote was taken and the result was yeas 270, nays 9.

In the Assembly of the New School there was a strong disposition to take the question at once. But a desire was expressed on the part of some to have an opportunity to speak, and the decision was deferred till the afternoon session. The Committee explained the different parts of the Report, several members took the opportunity to explain their past views and present position, and the appointed hour having arrived the Assembly occupied one minute in silent prayer, and then the Moderator announced the question. The whole Assembly rose in affirmation of the Report, and the Moderator announced its unanimous adoption. And the Assembly join in singing from

Dr. Watts' version three verses of the 102d Psalm. With thrilling force the grand old words of that inspiring song rolled upward from that vast assembly of strong, earnest, resolute Christian men, standing there in a solid body:

"Let Zion and her sons rejoice ;  
Behold the promised hour,  
Her God hath heard her mourning voice  
And comes to exalt his power.

The Lord will raise Jerusalem  
And stand in glory there ;  
Nations rejoice before his name  
And kings attend with fear.

This shall be known when we are dead  
And left our long record,  
That nations yet unborn may read  
And trust and praise the Lord."

The Rev. Dr. Skinner, senior professor in the Union Theological Seminary in New York, led the Assembly in a fervent prayer, and forthwith a committee was dispatched consisting of Dr. Adams and Hon. Wm. Strong, LL. D., to announce the decision in the other Assembly.

The question now goes down by overtures from the two Assemblies to their presbyteries respectively; and on the approval of the Basis by two-thirds of each of those bodies the union will be sanctioned. We do not anticipate any considerable opposition. Appearances indicate that there will be almost an entire unanimity, and great is the rejoicing throughout the length and breadth of the long sundered, but now to become, we trust, hearty and effectively one, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

In conclusion we would, as New School men, express our hearty thanks to our brethren, the friends of Reunion in the other branch of the church, for their uniting zeal and vigilant effort in the prosecution of this desirable result. Our zeal would have flagged more than once in the discouragements encountered, had it not been reinforced by their determined perseverance. Nor have we a word to say in the way of censure of those who have acted in opposition to the measure. They have no doubt acted conscientiously, and, so far as they have acted, frankly and directly. We rather thank them for the opportunity which their arguments and objections have given us to set the real, and we think eminent, merits of the cause in a clearer light. Whatever may have been their objections—whether a sympathy with the truth, a desire to maintain what they would call a "witnessing church," a strong, natural attachment to their own separate body, expressed in

the words, "our dear Old School Church," or "our dear New School Church," or a preference for a small compact body over a large, noisy, many-sided, forth-pushing one, or a fear lest the union of organization would not be a union of heart, or that such union would not prove as effectual as competition—they had a right to their opinions, and most of them, we have little doubt, will yield gracefully to the will of the majority.

In all this course of events, and the happy results we anticipate, we recognize with profound gratitude the gracious guidance and interposition of the Providence and Spirit of God. Beyond our fears, beyond even our hopes, he has removed the obstacles, softened our prejudices, brought us to see eye to eye, and brought about a degree of conscious unity and affection which, when we consider the past, as strange as it is, is gratifying to the Christian heart.

It is not likely that we have yet surmounted all the difficulties of our position. Questions of great delicacy which no "Concurrent Declarations" could provide for before-hand, will yet come up for decision. And we shall need on both sides the greatest charity, forbearance and mutual conciliation. In particular those who think themselves the special guardians of orthodoxy will have to be very considerate in their application of their principles, and those who are zealous for liberty of thought and language will have to be very wise and moderate in their use of it. We stand upon the Confession of Faith by the most solemnly renewed pledges to each other, and wherein our views differ from those of our brethren, we are bound to express our differences that they will not through any fault of ours be mistaken by them for departures from our common standards. Boldness of thought and expression may be a virtue. But it must not be allowed unnecessarily to hinder charity. If the special guardians of the doctrines are to remember the prophetic censure upon them, "That make a man an offender for a word," equally must those of the liberties of the church remember the admonition of St. Paul: "Take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weak."

The great object for which we are coming together is not the pride of greatness, either in numbers, talents or resources; it is not the pleasure, great as that may be, of enjoying the goodly fellowship of so large a body of brethren and friends; it is service to Christ, efficiency of action in his cause, the combination of our abilities, resources and counsels in enter-



prises for the glory of God and the good of man, for the advancement of the real interests of humanity, of our country and of the church. If we would be happy in our union, we must be efficient in our work. We trust the two General Assemblies who are to meet for the consummation of this union in the month of November next, will not leave the city of Pittsburg till they have concerted and are prepared to advise some definite measures for at least a practical beginning of this beneficent coöperation.

We thank God that we are now able to look forward with so much confidence to a new era of honor and usefulness for a beloved church. The rending and the breaking down, we trust are ended. "The time to cast away stones," even the precious stones of the sanctuary, is gone, we hope, never to return. "The time to gather stones together," "the time to build up" in this our land and in the world the holy temple of the Lord, "the time to sew," to close up the unseemly rents in the beautiful robes of Christ's mystic bride, are at length come. May God give us grace not to be wanting, since, in his favoring providence, we have "come to the kingdom for such a time as this."

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#### ART. IX.—NOTES ON RECENT BOOKS.

##### CHURCH HISTORY AND HOMILETICS.

*History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne.* By WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECCKY, M. A. In two volumes. D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. pp. 498, 423. To characterize this work rightly, would require a variety of terms expressive of approval and disapproval. Some things we greatly dislike. They are either impertinent, inconsistent, or unwarranted. But there are large portions of the work which are well conceived and forcibly and eloquently expressed.

The theme is an important one. The history of the moral life of a nation or of the race, must ever be a most attractive and profitable subject of investigation to thoughtful minds, and few periods of the past have more claims upon our attention than the early centuries of Christian history and the period of the Reformation. Mr. Lecky has selected the first of these, and while on some points—mainly of minor importance—his generalizations are drawn from imperfect data, or lack the proper and full evidence to support them, yet more usually he indulges, we might almost say revels, in a multiplicity of historical illustrations, which seem at least to abundantly sustain his positions.

His opening chapter, which is quite extended, is more metaphysical than historical. It presents the character, claims, bearings and relative merits of the two schools of morals, the Intuitive and the Utilitarian. To the former of these Mr. Lecky decidedly and emphatically inclines. Indeed, his professed devotion to truth for its own sake, irrespective of its bearing upon human interests or sacred institutions, commits him beforehand to the cause which he defends. His reasoning, for the most part, is forcible and unexceptionable, while the school of Bentham and his sympathizers, including Mill, Buckle,

Comte, and others, receives some severe thrusts, administered, however, with something of brotherly tenderness. After an elaborate and ingenious effort to reconcile the Intuition theory of morals with moral progress, and showing that the two do in fact harmonize, he proceeds to the proper task which he has undertaken. His picture of Roman morals under Augustus and his immediate successors is ably, and for the most part faithfully drawn. The career of the Stoic and Epicurean systems, with their bearings upon social and civil life are somewhat minutely traced, and while the latter as sympathizing with utilitarianism is seen in all its degrading tendencies, the insufficiency of the former for regenerating a corrupt and dying empire is vividly presented.

The introduction and spread of Christianity throughout the bounds of the Roman Empire, are next considered. This is one of the most interesting portions of the work. Mr. Lecky freely admits the paramount importance of the influence exerted by the new religion upon social morals. He makes admissions equal to what the most devoted friends of Christianity will be apt to claim. Its superiority to every thing that had preceded it, is eloquently set forth.

"No other religion, under such circumstances, had ever combined so many distinct elements of power and attraction. Unlike the Jewish religion, it was bound by no local ties, and was equally adapted for every nation and every class. Unlike Stoicism, it appeared in the strongest manner to the affections, and offered all the charm of a sympathetic worship. Unlike the Egyptian religions, it united with its distinctive teachings a pure and noble system of ethics, and proved itself capable of realizing it in action. It proclaimed, amid a vast movement of social and national amalgamation, the universal brotherhood of mankind. Amid the softening influences of philosophy and civilization, it taught the supreme sanctity of love. To the slave, who had never before exercised so large an influence over Roman religious life, it was the religion of the suffering and the oppressed. To the philosopher, it was at once the echo of the highest ethics of the later Stoics, and the expansion of the best teachings of the school of Plato. To a world thirsting for prodigy, it offered a history replete with wonders more strange than those of Apollonius; while the Jew and the Chaldean could scarcely rival its exorcists, and the legends of continual miracles circulated among its followers. . . . To a world that had grown very weary gazing on the cold, passionless grandeur which Cato realized, and which Lucan sung, it presented an ideal of compassion and love—an ideal destined for centuries to draw around it all that was greatest as well as all that was noblest upon earth—a Teacher who could weep by the sepulchre of his friend, who was touched with the feeling of our infirmities. . . . The chief cause of its success was the congruity of its teaching with the spiritual nature of mankind."

So, also, Christianity is spoken of as "an agency which all men must admit to have been, for good or for evil, the most powerful moral lever that has ever been applied to the affairs of men." As to the early church, it is remarked, "there has probably never existed a community whose members were bound to one another by a deeper or purer affection than the Christian in the days of persecution. . . . and more successful in reclaiming and transforming the most vicious of mankind." It may seem strange that such an anomaly as Christianity is conceded to have been in the old Roman world, should have no tribute paid to its claims to a divine origin, or that its character as altogether superhuman should not have been more than incidentally illustrated. Yet Mr. Lecky exhausts his learning and skill to make the very idea of miracle appear improbable, if not impossible—although he is on his guard against asserting the impossibility—and thus appears utterly to ignore everything supernatural in human history.

Essayng in substance the solution of the same problem on which Gibbon and others have exhausted their ingenuity, he seems to us to fail in much the same way. He assumes facts as explanations, when these same facts themselves stand in equal need of explanation. He makes much of the organization of the early church, but who does not see that that organization was no originally complex contrivance, but the simple adaptation of the church as a social body to the circumstances and necessities of its position? The organization, so effective, is only a single exponent of the inward life that shaped it. Whence that wonderful life? is the real question. And when that is asked, others come thronging upon us. Whence in a time of almost universal moral decay, a system of morals and religion, so beneficent, so sublime, so superior to all the philosophies and religions of the world, as Christianity? Whence this "most power-

ful lever that has ever been applied to the affairs of men?" The existence of the lever needs to be explained, far more than its effects. But this Mr. Lecky has failed to do. He says indeed, as if excusing himself from fairly facing the difficulty, "The first rise of Christianity in Judea is a subject wholly apart from this book. We are examining only the subsequent movement in the Roman Empire. Of this movement it may be boldly asserted that the assumption of a moral or intellectual miracle is utterly gratuitous."

Be it so then. But why is it? Only because the miracle was already wrought—because the wonderful agency that was to effect the wonderful regeneration already existed and already had been brought into play. Surely after a distinct confession that the vital point of the explanation of the difficulty has been intentionally passed over, it seems to us scarcely the right thing to laboriously endeavor to eliminate "miracle" from all subsequent history, and leave the impression, as Mr. Lecky unquestionably does, upon the reader's mind, that "miracle" is nowhere to be sought, discovered, or implied, in the conditions of the problem. He explains certain results which are the consequence of the great fact which constitute the problem, and not the fact itself.

He depreciates the extent and importance of the ten persecutions. He represents the miraculous incidents of Christian history as so suited to the credulity of the time as to be a help rather than a hindrance to the acceptance of the new religion. On these he expatiates at considerable length. Yet he fairly distinguishes the moral elements of Christianity, in kind as well as degree, from those of the pagan systems. He brings out in very clear light the changes wrought by Roman conquest and the introduction of foreign worship and foreign religions. The nature of Roman toleration is also displayed. Repeatedly also do we meet with passages that are at once suggestive and important. For instance, he says, after depicting the changes wrought by Christianity:

"It is well for us to look steadily on such facts as these. They display more vividly than any mere philosophical disquisition the abyss of depravity into which it is possible for human nature to sink. They furnish us with striking proofs of the reality of the moral progress we have attained, and they enable us in some degree to estimate the regenerating influence that Christianity has exercised in the world; for the destruction of the gladiatorial games is all its work. Philosophers indeed might deplore them; gentle natures might shrink from their contagion, but to the multitude they possessed a fascination which nothing but the new religion could overcome."

Yet there is frequently an under current of thought coming to the surface which is indicative of strong prejudices, and which assumes what the author certainly does not prove, if it is not actually inconsistent with what he elsewhere asserts. Several instances of incongruity in his statements have come under our notice, in which he comes near to contradicting himself. We think, moreover, there is some reason to complain that he repeatedly fails properly to distinguish between Christianity and its perversions, leaving the former to bear the odium of the latter.

In the fact that Christianity makes salvation dependent upon an orthodox belief, Mr. Lecky seems assured that he has found the necessary antecedent to persecutions that have been wrought by nominally Christian bodies. Intolerance, he thinks, is necessarily involved in the tenet, even while he admits elsewhere that the dangerous state of fallen man appeals strongly to Christian sensibility, and evokes the power of Christian love. He can not endure anything of a Calvinistic type. It is the founder of Pelagianism who wins from him the epithet of noble. The idea of "original sin" is to him utterly repulsive, and he does not fail to set forth what he considers its absurdity. Even while paying his tribute to the leaders of the Protestant reform, he stigmatizes Calvin, commingling admiration with censure.

"The true teachers of those ages were the reformers, who arose in obscure towns of Germany and Switzerland, or that diseased recluse, who, from his solitude near Geneva, fascinated Europe with the gleams of a dazzling and almost peerless eloquence, and by a moral teaching which, though often feverish, paradoxical and unpractical, abounded in passages of transcendent majesty, and of the most entrancing purity and beauty."

Against what he denominates the *theological* spirit, in opposition to the *scientific*, he inveighs with a bitter severity. It is represented as the barrier to all

progress, as the foe to all intellectual freedom. No proper distinction is made between the spirit of Roman Catholicism and that of Protestant theology. Both are involved in the same condemnation.

The claims of the Church for service in the cause of morals, after the days of Constantine, are carefully weighed, and, with a few exceptions, the conclusions reached will stand the test of criticism. The overthrow of the system of gladiatorial shows, the repression of infanticide, the new sense of the value attached to human life, the gradual abolition of Slavery, the frequent ransom of captives, the development of forms of active and self-denying charity, unknown before, are all justly ascribed to the power and influence of Christianity. The claims of monasteries in behalf of learning are more closely scanned and more reluctantly admitted. The change from the anti-military spirit of the early church to that which introduced chivalry and the crusades, is accounted for, and the second volume closes with an extended historical and critical sketch of "the position of women."

The author gives no formal or elaborate summary of the conclusions which he reaches, or of the scope of his work as a whole. The reader is left to infer these as he proceeds. But the thoughtful student will find many facts and suggestions more or less original, which will richly repay a careful perusal of the work. But he must not, and will not, read it with an implicit faith. He must make due allowance for the theological antipathies of the author. He must be on his guard against the undue bearing which is sometimes given to the facts cited, nor must he always accept the facts with unquestioning confidence. The author's remarks on the mendicants show that he has either imperfectly examined their history, or imperfectly presented the results of his reading. He speaks of "Nicolas de Clemanges, a leading member of the Council of Constance," when he was not a member at all, but was engaged, at a distance from that famous city, writing his letters and essays and reading the Scriptures in his quiet retreat at Langres.

But a work of this kind is characteristic of the age. The author evidently reflects in his views the doubting, hesitating, skeptical state of mind which prevails among a large class of intelligent and educated minds. He is at a point where two seas meet—the theological and the scientific—and his skiff is tossed between both. Yet we see in him an evident love of truth, combined with strong prejudices that bar his progress toward a correct and impartial apprehension of it. He is a decided champion of intuitive morals, and yet he eulogizes, if he does not exaggerate, the service rendered by an Utilitarian philosophy. He admits the merits of Christianity, and, to a certain extent, its claims, yet he ignores utterly its supernatural elements and its divine original. He sees distinctly the great reforms which it has accomplished, and yet with keener vision *thinks* he discerns the mischiefs which are logically consequent upon the acceptance of what he would call a Calvinistic, but which we choose to denominate an evangelical, creed.

It is thus that he combines in his mental constitution, and thus embodies in his work, contradictory and conflicting elements. On one page, we read, approve and admire; on another, we question, criticize and condemn. We feel that he occupies a position logically and consistently untenable. He can not go with the utilitarian and the scoffer; he will not go with the Christian believer. With a lofty standard of morals, he criticises sharply Pagan and Christian, Roman Catholic and Protestant; and yet he would have a moral system disowning and rejecting material elements of that record and that gospel revelation from which it sprung.

His present work, like its predecessor (*The History of Rationalism*), is, in a literary point of view, more than usually attractive. Its style is exquisitely pure, tasteful, and elegant, sometimes perhaps elaborately so, but always clear and forcible. It will undoubtedly go into the hands of many who will be more apt to admire than criticize, and who may be prejudiced in its favor by its charm of style and fertility of illustration. A preliminary essay, noting its defects, and pointing out its unfounded assumption, might have added greatly to its value, and obviated some false impressions which it is calculated to make.

*The Student's Scripture History.* The Old Testament History, from the Creation to the return of the Jews from Captivity. Edited by WILLIAM SMITH LL.D. Harper & Bros. 12mo. pp. xiv, 715. The great progress made in Biblical studies of late years demands some better text-books for the illustration of Old Testament history than has hitherto existed. "It is surprising," says the author, "that a subject of such universal importance should have no manual which can for a moment compare in fullness, accuracy, and scholar-like treatment, with the histories of Greece and Rome in general use in our best schools." The learned author of Smith's Dictionary has here met this want, and met it in a way which leaves nothing to be desired. Besides giving the Old Testament history, with notes, references, citations, etc., the work contains an account of each of the books of the Bible, the geography of the Holy Land and bordering countries, together with the political and ecclesiastical antiquities of the Jews, historical and genealogical tables, etc. It forms one of the series of valuable "Student's Histories" which the publishers are bringing out.

*History and Repository of Pulpit Eloquence.* Historical Sketches of Preaching, in the different countries represented, and Biographical and Critical Notices of the several Preachers and their Discourses. By HENRY C. FISH, D. D. Two Volumes in one. M. W. Dodd. 8vo. pp. xx., 1035. This work was published in 1836, but has been out of print for some years past. We are glad to see a new edition of it, and the two volumes embraced in one, as it thereby lessens the cost. And large as the volume now is, it is not unwieldy, and the publisher has shown good taste in the matter of style. Such a work needs no commendation. Here are indeed "the master-pieces of Pulpit Eloquence," wisely selected from Bossuet, Bourdaloue, Massillon, Barrow, Hall, Watson, McLaughlin, Chalmers, Evans, Edwards, Davies, and John M. Mason, with the most noted Discourses of Chrysostom, Basil, Gregory-Nazianzen, Augustine, Athanasius, and others of the "Fathers," and from Wickliffe, Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, Knox, and Latimer of the "Reformers," and sixty other celebrated sermons from as many eminent divines in the Greek and Latin, English, German, French, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and American churches—many of which have now for the first time been translated, the whole arranged in proper order, and accompanied by Historical Sketches of Preaching in the different countries represented, with valuable Biographical Sketches of these noted preachers, and Critical Notes on their discourses. Except a complete set of the *National Preacher*, we know of no work of the kind to compare with this, in point both of interest and value to the preacher, and if every parish would put a copy of it in the library of their pastor, they would soon be able to discover its quickening influence on his style of thought and manner in the pulpit.

*The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry.* By JAMES M. HOPPIN, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in Yale College, Sheldon & Co. 8vo. pp. viii, 620. "This volume," says the author, "is chiefly designed as a text-book in Homiletics and Pastoral Theology, for those who are in a regular course of training for the ministry of the Gospel." The object has not been to strike out a new plan but to produce a good class-book of judicious rules, not to present original views and personal opinions but to state well-grounded and accepted principles. Judged of in this light it is a highly creditable and useful performance. Prof. Hoppin is familiar with the best writers on the subject, and avails himself freely of their thoughts and suggestions. His ideal of Preaching and of the Pastoral Office is a high one, and he has evidently devoted much time and study in the arrangement and execution of the work, making it as full and as valuable as possible. The style is analytical, necessarily so on account of the great number and variety of the topics treated of. For originality and vigor of treatment the work will not compare with Prof. Shedd's Homiletics, or with Vinet's, or with the little work of Dr. Skinner on Preaching, from all of which the author quotes; but it covers a broader field than any other work. Besides the introduction in which the greatness of the work of the Ministry is considered, the Homiletical portion of the work is divided into two parts. Part I. Preaching. 1st Division. The History and Art of Preaching.

2. The Analysis of a Sermon. Part II. Rhetoric applied to Preaching. 1st Division. General Principles of Rhetoric. 2. Invention and Style. The other branch is treated of in four parts. I. The Pastoral Office in itself considered. II. The Pastor as a Man. III. The Pastor in his relations to Society. IV. The Pastor in his relation to the Church. Public Worship. The Care of Souls.

*The Apostolical and Primitive Church*, Popular in its Government, informal in its worship. A Manual on Prelacy and Ritualism carefully Revised and adapted to these Discussions. By LYMAN COLEMAN, D. D., Author of "Ancient Christianity Exemplified," &c. J. B. Lippincott, Philadelphia. The object of this work is to present and vindicate the simplicity in government and worship of the early Christian Church, and the writer's positions are well sustained by a very sufficient reference to competent authorities. He writes not as a Presbyterian or Congregationalist, but simply as an opponent, in the interests of a pure Christianity, of Ritualism, High Churchism, and the whole *genus*. The plan of the work is comprehensive, including a large variety of topics on which High Churchism takes ground antagonistic to Gospel truth and simplicity. The summary here presented, is well designed to be useful to theological students and ministers, for ready reference, and covers a field with which, in these times, they should be familiar.

#### BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

*A General View of the History of the English Bible*. By BROOKE FOSS WESTCOTT, late fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. London and Cambridge, 1868. New York; Scribner, Welford and Co., 1 vol. 12mo. A most important service is here rendered to the history of our vernacular Bible. Viewed in its entire history, the English Bible is the most remarkable product of the Anglo-Saxon mind. Of the several successive stages through which it passed, before attaining to its present comparative completeness, the external history has been repeatedly written. On the contrary, its *internal* history has been almost entirely overlooked. Hitherto, no attempt had been made to show the mutual relation of these successive stages of the work, how far and in what respects they differed, from what sources their respective authors drew the materials for its improvement, and by what principles they were guided in the use of them.

The work of Mr. Westcott is what it professes to be, "a general view" of the history of the English Bible. In his first division, he goes briefly over the already occupied ground of the external history, correcting occasional misapprehensions of previous writers, by a more critical examination of their authorities. From the nature and object of his book, it has not all the romantic interest of some preceding ones on the same subject, which have dealt more with personal details in the lives of the pioneers in the work of translation. But he says enough to show that they have no parallel in the world's history, in the grandeur of their object, the obstacles they encountered and overcame, their untiring perseverance, disinterested love and zeal, patience in suffering, and heroic defiance of danger and death. Their story of exile, privation, peril, and martyrdom, reads like a fiction of romance, though bearing the seal of authentic history. In the words of Mr. Westcott's brief summary (p. 371): "The work was crowned by martyrdom, and the workmen labored at it in the faith and with the love of martyrs. Tyndale, who gave us our first New Testament from the Greek, was strangled for his work at Vilvorde; Coverdale, who gave us our first printed Bible, narrowly escaped the stake by exile; Rogers, to whom we owe the multiform basis of our present version, was the first victim of the Marian persecution; Cranmer, who has left us our *Psalter*,\* was at last blessed with a death of triumphant agony."

Of those who love and prize their English Bible, as God's precious gift, few know at what cost to his faithful servants they enjoy it. If they better knew its history, they would prize it all the more. For "no other Christian peo-

\* In the Book of Common Prayer.



ple can show a vernacular Bible with such a history as ours; so consecrated by high purpose and noble sacrifice, so baptized in the tears and blood of faithful souls, so linked with the inmost life and history of the people."\*

In the second, the larger and now more important division of his book, Mr. Westcott traces the internal history of the successive revisions of our vernacular Bible. Their common relation is thus briefly stated on page 94: "From Matthew's Bible, itself a combination of the labors of Tyndale and Coverdale, all later revisions have been successively formed. In that the general character and mould of our whole version was definitely fixed. The labors of the next seventy-five years were devoted to improving it in detail." "But we have still to inquire," (says the author, on page 163), "how it was made; with what helps; on what principles; by what laws it was modified from time to time; and how far our authorized version bears in itself the traces of its gradual formation?" These interesting problems are briefly but very satisfactorily investigated, by showing the state of sacred learning at the time, and by comparison of the several translations and revisions with each other and with foreign versions, and with the then accessible sources of philology and criticism. This is a work which cannot be done out of England, where alone there is access to complete and authentic copies of all, or nearly all, of the different impressions of these earlier vernacular versions.

It would be useless to attempt an abstract of such a work, or an illustration of its value by the quotation of isolated passages. On every page may be found valuable information for one who is interested in the literary history of the English Bible. A few points only can be here noted. The author fully vindicates the originality and independent scholarship of Tyndale, the founder of our version, and shows the permanent influence of his example on its style. "He established a standard of Biblical translation which others followed. . . . His influence decided that our Bible should be popular and not literary, speaking in a simple dialect, and that so, by its simplicity, it should be endowed with permanence." (P. 211.)

The characteristics of Coverdale's version are fairly exhibited, and with a more just appreciation of his peculiar merits than has been shown by previous writers. "Though he is not original, yet he was endowed with an instinct of discrimination which is scarcely less precious than originality, and a delicacy of ear which is no mean qualification for a popular translator. It would be an interesting work to note the subtle changes of order, and turns of expression, which we owe to him. In the epistle from which most of our illustrations have been taken, 'the pride of life,' and 'the world passeth away,' are immeasurable improvements on Tyndale's 'the pride of goods,' and 'the world vanisheth away;' and the rendering, 'shutteth up his heart' (due to Luther), is as much more vigorous than Tyndale's 'shutteth up his compassion,' as it is more touching than the strange combination of the authorized version, 'shutteth up his bowels of compassion.'" (Pp. 216, 17.)

It may well be questioned whether the author is equally just in the following comparison: "He [Coverdale] may have carried his respect for some so-called 'Ecclesiastical' words to an excessive length; but even in this respect his merit was substantial. It was well that Tyndale should for a time (?) break the spell which was attached to words like *charity, confess, church, grace, priest*, and recall men to their literal meaning in *love, [ac] knowledge, congregation, favor, elder*; but it was no less well that the old words, and with them the historical teaching of many centuries, should not be wholly lost from our Bibles." (Pp. 219, 20.)

It is much to be regretted that the "spell," once broken by Tyndale's honest preference of the "literal meaning," should have been bound again by the spirit, and in the interests, of Ecclesiasticism. It is sufficient to instance the word *congregation*, now irretrievably lost in the sense in which it was used in all the early English versions, where it was the uniform rendering of

\* Mrs. H. C. Conant, Preface to *History of the English Bible*.

the Greek *ἐκκλησία*, and was one of their characteristic features, representing the generic idea of the Christian body as a community of equals. Even Cranmer invariably used *congregation*.<sup>\*</sup> In the Genevan version it began to give place, but only partially, to the word *church*. Archbishop Parker, in the Bishops' Bible, though making it a rule to depart as little as possible from the old "authorized version" of Cranmer, made in this case a noteworthy exception, and supplanted *congregation* by *church*. In two remarkable instances he retained the old authorized rendering; namely, Matt. xvi., 18, "And upon this rock I will build my congregation,"† and Heb. xii., 23, "And unto the congregation of the first-born, which are written in heaven." King James' revisers made the substitution in these two passages also; and thus the word for which Tyndale and other early English reformers so earnestly contended, and which had witnessed on the sacred page against hierarchical usurpation, was blotted from the English New Testament.

Little is known of the wealth of "English undefiled," that lies buried in the mines of these early English versions, of Wyclif, Tyndale, Coverdale, Matthews (so-called), Cranmer, Taverner, Cheke, Genevan, Bishops. Many beautiful turns of expression, many happy and truthful renderings, were overlooked by King James' revisers, and should not be neglected by any who may hereafter undertake the work of revision.

Few are aware of the occasional influence of the Romish translation from the Latin Vulgate (Rhemish and Douay) on our authorized version. On pages 334, 352, and 362, the author gives some noteworthy instances of this influence. "Examples," he remarks, on p. 352, "of words derived from the Rhemish version have been given already; but the use of this version is so remarkable, that it may be well to add more unequivocal proofs of its reality. Thus, in the Epistle to the Romans, the following phrases are found, which are common, I believe, to the Rhemish and authorized versions alone, and it is impossible that the coincidences can have been accidental. Ch. i., 10, *if by any means*; 13, *I would not have you ignorant*; 23, *changed the glory* (so 25); 28, *did not like* (liked not Rh.). Ch. ii., 5, *revelation of the just* [righteous] judgment; 10, *glory, honor, and peace to every man that worketh good*; 13, *for not the hearers of the law are just*; 15, *the work of the law*. Ch. iii., 7, *why yet am I also judged as a sinner*. Ch. v., 3, *and not only so*; 15, *but not as the offence so also*. Ch. x., 10, *with the mouth confession is made unto salvation*. Ch. xi., 14, *provoke to emulation*. Ch. xii., 16, *be not wise in your own conceits*. Ch. xiii., 4, *minister unto thee for good*; 8, *owe no man anything*. Ch. xiv., 9, *for to this end*‡.

These are certainly worthy of acknowledgment, as may be seen by comparison with the Bishops' and Genevan versions. For example: Ch. i., 10, Bishops, "that by some mean, at the last, one time or other," Genevan, "that by some means one time or other; 28, Bishops and Genevan, "as they regarded not to know God." "Ch. ii., 13, Bishops, "For in the sight of God, the hearers of the law are not righteous;" Genevan, "For the hearers of the law are not righteous before God;" 15, Bishops, "the works of the law," Genevan, "the effect of the law." Ch. iii., 7, Bishops, "Why am I as yet judged as a sinner," Genevan, "Why am I yet condemned as a sinner." Ch. v., 15, Bishops, "But not as the sin, so is the free gift," Genevan, "But yet the gift is not so, as is the offence." Ch. xiii., 4, Bishops and Genevan, "Minister of God for thy wealth."

It is said, on p. 338, that "these versions (Rhemish and Genevan), were not contained in the list which they (King James' revisers) were directed to

\* The word *church* he used but once, and then as the translation of the Greek for a *temple or sacred edifice*.

† Perhaps on account of the use made of this text by the rival Church of Rome; for it could hardly have been through inadvertence.

‡ The phraseology in Ch. x., 10 ("confession is made") and in Ch. xiv., 9 ("to this end") is credited, by inadvertence, to the Rhemish version. The rendering in both passages is that of the Bishops' Bible.

consult." This is an inadvertance in regard to the Genevan version. The direction given them is found in the rule quoted on p. 153: "These translations to be used when they agree better with the text than the Bishops' Bible; Tyndale's, Matthew's, Coverdale's, Whitchurch's (Cranmer's), Geneva."

An Appendix is specially devoted to the examination of the history of the English Bible by Mr. Froude,\* who, as the author says with just severity, "has lent the support of his brilliant narrative to a surprising series of errors." In this Appendix, of eight pages, he exposes in detail the errors of "the strange narrative, which, under the authority of the historian of the Tudors, is likely to be for most Englishmen the popular story of the Bible."

T. J. C.

*Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, of the Book of Psalms.* By ALBERT BARNES. In 3 Volumes. Vol. II. III. Harper & Brothers. With appropriate and touching words does the author allude to the completion of his labors as a commentator on the Holy Scriptures, extending as they do over a period of more than forty years.

"I can not close this work without emotion. I can not lay down my pen at the end of this long task without feeling that with me the work of life is nearly over. Yet I could close it at no better place than in finishing the exposition of this book; and the language which the Book of Psalms itself closes seems to me to be eminently appropriate to all that I have experienced. All that is past, all in the prospect of what is to come, calls for a long, a joyful, a triumphant HALLELUJAH."

Multitudes will sympathize with Mr. Barnes in this tender and solemn utterance. As a commentator for the masses he has no superior, if any rival. Others have followed in his footsteps but none have outdone or outstripped him. He has been of eminent service to the church by reason of his "Notes," familiar, practical, and adapted to the Sunday-school teacher and to the mass of readers. A million copies of them already in use on both sides of the ocean, to be followed by millions more in the coming years—who can estimate their influence on the Christian thought and life of the world! What occasion has he for a devout "Hallelujah," as he lays down his pen, in view of what God has aided and spared him to do for his own and for future generations! And he has lived also to see the doubt and suspicion which controversy and bitterness threw upon him in early life, in a great measure done away with, and the rent church, which he loved and served so faithfully, and of which he was a distinguished ornament, coming together again in the spirit of fraternal love and confidence.

*The Gospel Treasury, and Expository Harmony of the Four Evangelists.* Compiled by Robert Mimpriss. Two Volumes in one. M. W. Dodd. 16mo. pp. cx., 855. Seldom have we seen the same amount of matter compressed into so little space as in this book. It is almost incredible. There is enough to fill several ordinary octavos. The type is exceedingly fine, (too fine we think) and every bit of space is literally crowded to the utmost. The matter too is excellent. The Gospel Treasury is one of the most valuable aids to the study of the New Testament that can be had. It is not an ordinary commentary. Nor is it a dry skeleton of facts. The author has evinced great patience and industry in its compilation. He has arranged it with faultless system, and with great accuracy and completeness of detail. To the Sunday-school teacher such a work is invaluable. We heartily and conscientiously recommend it. Mr. Dodd has put it into tasty as well as compact form.

#### SCIENCE AND HISTORY.

*The History of Civilization.* By AMOS DEAN, LL. D. In Seven Volumes. Vol. III. Albany: Joel Munsell. 8vo. pp. 508. We have already had occasion to commend both the mechanical and literary execution of this work, and we are glad that it receives sufficient encouragement to warrant the publisher in going on with it. While not a work of genius, nor a specimen of brilliant historical composition, it yet evinces ripe scholarship, patient research, extensive

\* In his History of the Reign of Henry VIII.

reading, calm philosophical thought, and a conscientious regard for the truth.

The present volume is devoted to Rome. I. The Immediate Sources of its History and Civilization. II. Its Industry. III. Its Religion. IV. Its Government. V. Its Society. VI. Its Philosophy. VII. Its Art. The volume contains, besides, a full Index to the three volumes now published.

The subject here discussed is one of peculiar interest, especially to the scholar. And the discussion embraces all the points essential to a complete view of it. The author's materials are gathered from the best sources, and his thoughts are methodically arranged, and expressed in a sensible and intelligent manner. Roman civilization—sustaining almost equal relations with the old world and the new; absorbing and modifying the civilizations of ancient time and moulding and giving birth to much of the modern—is a theme of sufficient moment to inspire even a dull pen with eloquence, and awaken something like enthusiasm in the breast of the reader.

*The Wonders of Optics.* By F. MARION. Translated from the French and edited by CHARLES W. QUIN. Illustrated with seventy engravings on wood and a colored Frontispiece. *Thunder and Lightning.* By W. DE FONVIELLE. Translated from the French and edited by T. L. PHIPSON. Illustrated with thirty-nine engravings on wood. *Wonders of Heat.* By ACHILLE CAZIN. With ninety illustrations, many of them full-page, and a colored Frontispiece. The "Illustrated Library of Wonders," which Messrs. Scribner & Co. are bringing out, bids fair to be one of more than usual interest. The very highest scientific and artistic talent has been engaged in the production of each book, and yet they are written in a style at once popular and entertaining, and adapted to interest the young and cultivate a taste for studies of this kind. They are brought out in a very neat, compact, and convenient form, and must achieve, from their high character, popular style, and the number and superiority of their illustrations, a wide popularity and extensive circulation here, as they have in France, where more than one million copies of them have been sold.

#### BIOGRAPHY AND TRAVEL.

*The Life of Samuel Miller, D. D., LL.D.* By SAMUEL MILLER. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 2 vols. 12 mo., pp. 381, 562. It seems extraordinary that nearly twenty years should elapse after the death of Dr. Miller before his memoirs should appear. While there are some obvious advantages in so long a delay, yet the disadvantages are manifold and serious. The same interest will not be felt in them by the generation that has come upon the stage since he passed away. Never more than now do men live in their *own times*; new questions, new relations, new phases of thought and of life arise with every third or fourth decade of years, and very little comparatively of a man's personal life passes over into the new order of things. Many of the leading questions which occupied the theological, religious, and ecclesiastical world during Dr. Miller's life, and in reference to which he took a deep interest and acted a prominent part, are no longer living questions. In the light of history, too, the past puts on a different look. Now that the thirty years' division and strife of the Presbyterian Church are virtually ended, and the jealousy, suspicion, and bitter spirit which originated them are happily passed away, our judgment is modified respecting the chief actors and measures of that period. We regret to see in these memoirs so positive an effort to justify all the measures of the Old School party, and to criminate the New. Dr. Miller's position and course are well known to all, and were regretted by many of his friends; and it had been wiser in his biographer, and more in accordance with the changed spirit of the times and the logic of providential events, simply to state the facts, and leave the reader to judge him as leniently as possible. But to argue the whole question at this late day, and repeat the charges and arguments which were the staple of the controversy, is to challenge unfriendly criticism and severe judgment in the minds of very many Presbyterians of the year 1869. The sad history of our division, and the bright—yea, the *glorious* record of our Reunion, as it stands out to-

day before the world—constrain us to believe that a *great wrong* was perpetrated, ignorantly and conscientiously, it may be, but yet no less real and tremendous; but a wrong which Infinite Goodness has overruled to increase the oneness and the purity, the strength and prosperity of our beloved Zion. Would that every memorial of the unholy strife had perished! Would that we all might forget as well as forgive the past, and live only in and for that opening future which beckons us onward!

Aside from this feature, these memoirs strike us as admirably written. The arrangement is clear and systematic, the style is pleasing, and the fault, so common, of eulogizing the dead, is not apparent. To a great extent, Dr. Miller has been left to speak for himself. The steel engraving given will be recognized by his friends as an excellent likeness.

*The Malay Archipelago*; the Land of the Orang-Utan and the Bird of Paradise. A Narrative of Travel, with Studies of Man and Nature. By ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE. Harper & Brothers. 8vo. pp. 638. *Travels in the East India Archipelago*. By ALBERT S. BICKMORE, M. A. With Illustrations. D. Appleton & Co. 8vo. pp. 553. We have here two valuable works on the same region, one by an English and the other by an American traveler—a region which, until now, has scarcely been known to us. They are both of them more than ordinary books of travel. They are full of interest to the general reader, taking him for the most part over new fields and presenting him with a great variety of objects, and relating many thrilling adventures. In a scientific point of view, also, they are among the most valuable books of the kind which have of late appeared.

Mr. Wallace spent several years in South America, previous to his visit to the Indian Archipelago, where he made extensive researches, the fruits of which were given to the public in "Travels on the Amazon and Rio Negro, Palm Trees of the Amazon," etc. He spent eight years in gathering the materials of his present work. And no man could have been more industrious than he, for he sent home more than 125,000 specimens of natural history, among which were nearly 3,000 bird-skins, of about 1,000 species. One of the main objects of the author's researches was the beautiful Bird of Paradise, which he found in great variety, and of which manifold beautiful illustrations are given in the volume. He succeeded in bringing several live specimens of them to England. Mr. R. belongs to the Darwin School of Naturalists. He is an enthusiast in the study of nature, and a little too hasty and sweeping in his generalizations. Still it is a creditable performance, and has been received with great favor across the water, as well as Prof. Bickmore's, which appeared from the press of Murray, of London, simultaneously with its publication here. Prof. B., who is connected with Madison University, writes with more care and thoroughness, and, not disposed to generalize or theorize so freely, has produced a more satisfactory book. Naturalists, philologists, and ethnologists, will read its pages with rare interest. In a commercial point of view, also, it is highly valuable. Both works are profusely and effectively illustrated.

*The Old World in its New Face*. Impressions of Europe in 1867-1868. By HENRY W. BELLOW. Vol II. Harper & Brothers. 12mo. pp. 528. We have no occasion to change the opinion we expressed of this work on the appearance of the first volume. (See July No., 1868.) If the author could only forget that he is a Unitarian, or could once bring himself to view other systems of faith other than his own with candor and justice, we should rank him among the most charming of modern travelers. As an observer of men and things he is sharp and discriminating, and the sketches he gives are spirited and instructive.

#### GENERAL LITERATURE.

*Foreign Missions: Their Relations and Claims*. By RUFUS ANDERSON, D.D., LL.D. Charles Scribner & Co. 12mo. pp. xii., 373. This compact and valuable work has its origin in a series of Lectures on Foreign Missions delivered in the Theological Seminary at Andover, and repeated by request, in several other similar institutions, to the edification of all who heard them. The aim of the

author in these Lectures was to embody practical views of the missionary work in its largest sense, contemplated from a missionary stand-point, and to draw illustrations from every part of the great field where they seemed most appropriate. Being for more than forty years at the head of one of the largest and best conducted and most efficient Missionary Societies in the world, and having, in his official capacity, made several extensive tours of observation and investigation among the various missions planted throughout the heathen world, Dr. Anderson was eminently qualified to produce a work "on what may properly be called the science of missions," and he "ventures the hope that this result of his labors may serve, in future times, for a land-mark to those who shall perform the service for their generation, which he has endeavored to perform for his." The scope of the book is to show the extent of the missionary work—providential preparation—the peculiar nature of the work of missions—the extent to which it has been carried—its success—the hindrances and how they may be overcome—and the claims of foreign missions upon the churches and upon ministers of the gospel. The author's theory of missions is that of Paul. The value of local native churches, and the necessity of native pastors as prominent instrumentalities for renovating the heathen world, are insisted upon. The delicate question of church polity is handled prudently. He looks upon the gospel—as all must who study the subject in the light of the Bible—as the only hope of this lost world. The work is worthy not simply to be read but to be studied and carefully weighed.

*Women's Suffrage; the Reform against Nature.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. 12mo., pp. 184. Dr. Bushnell grapples vigorously with this great social problem, and in a brief space, and with calm yet irresistible logic, he shows the fallacies which underlie all the reasonings and appeals of those who are demanding suffrage for women, and demonstrates that the reform which they urge is really against her own nature and the manifest ordination of God. He handles the subject in a temperate spirit, and with marked skill and logical ability. He first conciliates the reader by frankly admitting the justice and necessity of conceding many things claimed in behalf of woman; but this only strengthens him in his main positions. He argues *against* giving to woman the right of suffrage on the ground that this right is not absolute in man or woman, and she must get the right to vote, if she gets it at all, where "man has gotten it, out of history, out of providential preparations and causes, out of the concessions of custom, out of experiences concluded, and debated reasons of public benefit;" on the ground of a subject nature—that "masculinity carries, in the distribution of sex, the governmental function;" on the ground that the two natures, male and female, constitute the proper man, and are, therefore, both represented in the vote of the man: and these views he shows are clearly taught in the Scriptures. He also points out the natural and inevitable effect on woman herself, in the loss of delicacy, refinement, and present type of beauty, to say nothing of morality, and its demoralizing influence on the family constitution, relaxing the bonds of marriage and facilitating divorce—if the attempted reform is accomplished. It is a timely and forcible presentation of the question, and it will require a good deal of vociferation and abuse (which it is sure to receive) in order to do away with its effects. The work of Mr. J. Stuart Mill, who advocates the opposite side, even to the extreme point, will be looked for with interest. It is well that two master minds, on either side of the ocean, should present both sides of this great question, which is destined to agitate society for the next decade of years.

*The Gates Ajar; or Scenes in Another World.* By ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS. Fields, Osgood & Co., 12mo., pp. 248.—*The Gates Wide Open; or Scenes in Another World.* By GEORGE WOOD. Lee & Shepard. 12mo., pp. 354. We class these two books together as they are similar in purpose and scope. The great popularity of the one has brought down from the bookseller's shelves the other, where it had quietly slept for ten years. They attempt to picture the scenes and society of the future world—to describe with all the minutiae of detail its social



and physical life and surroundings. They are purely imaginative, of course, as the Scriptures are significantly reticent on the subject. The latter is the more intellectual of the two, more sensible and probable, and does less violence to one's sense of propriety. Neither of them are very remarkable for literary merit, and but for some occult adaptation to the present state of the public mind, would have attracted no attention. Miss Phelps has been known for several years as a clever writer of stories in Sunday-school books and various magazines. The literary merits of "Gates Ajar" are not equal to some of her other writings. But it is a *novelty* in its way. The style of it is racy, and the subject is handled with dramatic skill. It is exceedingly spicy, and full of smart, and even humorous passages. It is essentially a *novel*—a sentimental love-story—the scene of which is laid in heaven, where earthly loves and predilections are allowed full play at their own sweet will. Under a thin guise of fiction the author draws from the deep well of her own experience. It is a book of intense passion, because her nature is intense, and there is no passion so strong and all-absorbing as that of love. Her loved one suddenly snatched from her by death, and her soul for long years nursing her grief, and brooding over her sorrow, she at length finds relief in "Gates Ajar," in which her vivid and morbid fancy creates a heaven for herself and her dead "Roy." And it is just such a heaven as a bereaved and sorrowing lover would naturally picture—such a heaven as sentimental and love-sick maidens sigh after and go into raptures over! It is amazing how many of this class have suddenly come to talk and dream of heaven, and actually to believe that it is a "lovely" place. But as to any resemblance to the Heaven of the Bible—as to its possessing any moral or spiritual elements adapting it to a holy and glorified spiritual intelligence—we fail to discover it. Miss Phelps's view of heaven is as purely *materialistic* as a Mohammedan's Paradise. She also evidently rejects the doctrine of the resurrection: "There is no resurrection except what takes place at death. The body that is buried is, therefore, never quickened. And what then becomes of the judgment?"

One other feature of the book has a bad look, and the same thing crops out in other works by the same author, showing the *animus* of her feelings. Following the example of many others, secretly or openly hostile to the truth, Miss Phelps habitually associates the orthodox faith with ignorance and vulgarity, while the opposite views are united to culture and social refinement. "Deacon Quick" is the very incarnation of mental stupidity and social boorishness; and "Dr. Bland," her minister, is not much better; while "Aunt Forcythe," who is made the mouthpiece of all her novelties and revelations, is all that intellect and refined sensibility can make her. There is no fairness in this. All such attempts to be wise above what is written—to discourse to us of that world, concerning which Paul affirms that it was not "lawful" for him to utter what he saw and heard when caught up into it in actual vision—are presumptuous in the extreme.

We cannot refrain from expressing our surprise at the sensational style in which this book has been extensively advertised. It is quite unusual among our respectable publishers; it is the first and sole instance, we believe, in the history of the highly respectable house which publishes this book. What is the explanation of the anomaly? Are we to look for it in the *religious* sympathies of the publishers of the *Atlantic Monthly* and *North American Review*?

*The Conscript.* A Story of the French war of 1813. With 8 full page illustrations—*Waterloo*; a Sequel to *The Conscript*. With 6 illustrations. From the French of ERCKMANN-CHATRIAN. C. Scribner & Co. 12mo. pp. 330, 338. Few stories of war have ever fascinated and thrilled us like these. In every artistic and historic respect they are superior. For simplicity of style, fidelity to nature, moral tone, and power of delineation, they have seldom been equaled. The first illustrates powerfully the tyranny and cruelty of the conscript system as practiced under the First Empire, and presents a vivid picture of peasant

life during the bloody wars which it waged. "Waterloo" continues the story of Joseph "The Conscript," down to the final overthrow of Napoleon. The battle of Waterloo is here pictured by the hand of a master. The whole scene is made *real* to you. The eye takes in every minute detail, every move of the contending armies, every part of the field made forever memorable by the events of that day. So real and life-like is the simple story of the soldier that you feel that you personally witnessed and took a part in the sanguinary conflict. The novels of these twin authors serve to intensify one's horror of war, strip it of that false glory which Napoleon shed around it, and make the masses of the people at least see that war is opposed to their best interests. We are not surprised to learn that they have had a very perceptible influence in France, where they have achieved an immense success, in lessening the veneration felt in the common mind for the memory of the "hero of a hundred battles."

*Fishing in American Waters.* By GEORGE SCOTT. With 170 illustrations. Harper & Brothers. 8vo. pp. 484. This can not fail to be a popular and standard work on this fashionable and health-improving recreation. It is full of matter, curious, amusing, and informing, respecting the various piscatory tribes, and is lavishly illustrated by a superior class of engravings. We advise our readers, if they have no time for angling, or are opposed to it on conscientious or humane grounds, not to buy this book. The sight of it—so artistically beautiful and so fascinating in description—we fear a temptation will be too great for human nature to bear.

#### FICTION.

Of the making of *novels* there is certainly no end. Dull as the book trade in general may be, there is a strong and ceaseless tide of fiction setting in upon society. Not content with what native pens can produce, England, France, Germany, Sweden, and even Russia, are laid under contribution. And as the current product of all the world fails to satisfy the inordinate demand, our great publishers are vying with each other in the extent and rapidity with which they are reproducing, in every conceivable style, the creations of the old masters of fiction. We have not space so much as to name, much less criticise, the multitude of novels—good, bad and indifferent, original and reprints, in all styles of binding and grades of mechanical execution, most of them marvels of cheapness—which three months have gathered upon our table.

Among the new editions of old writers specially worthy of note, we name the Messrs. Harpers' editions of the complete writings of THACKERAY and CHARLES READE; the Messrs. Fields, Osgood & Co.'s neat and compact edition of the same, and the Messrs. D. Appleton & Co.'s edition of the *Waverley Novels*. The most noteworthy new novel of the quarter is unquestionably *Villa Eden*, by AUERBACH, the foremost living novelist of Germany, rival editions of which have been published by Leypoldt & Holt, of this city, and Roberts Brothers, of Boston. It is a work of decided literary merit—very unlike and yet equal in interest and power to "On the Heights,"—free from sensational elements, and healthy in moral tone, but infidel and even atheistic in a religious point of view. Two of his earlier works have also appeared here—*Black Forest Village Stories*, which established his reputation in Germany, and *Edelweiss. Problematical Characters*, by FRIEDRICH SPIELHAGEN, a German writer of great reputation (Leypoldt & Holt). *Warwick*, by MANSFIELD TRACY WALWORTH; an American tale, thoroughly sensational yet ably written, though as unreal in all its characters as the "Arabian Nights" (G. W. Carleton). *A Stranded Ship*, by L. CLARKE DAVIS; overwrought and lacking in every element of a good story (G. P. Putnam & Son). *Oldtown Folks*, by HARRIET BEECHER STOWE; a vivid picture of New England life sixty years ago, but hardly truthful in all its representations of the religious faith and teachers of that period (Fields, Osgood & Co.). *Malbone; An Oldport Romance*, by THOMAS WENTWORTH HIGGINSON; one of the best

American stories we have read, republished from the *Atlantic Monthly*. *Stretton*, by HENRY KINGSLEY; mere rubbish (Harper & Brothers, also Leyboldt & Holt). *Kathleen*, by the author of "Raymond's Heroine;" a very stupid story. *Breaking a Butterfly*, by the author of "Guy Livingstone;" a story worth the reading. *For Her Sake, and Poor Humanity*, by FREDERICK W. ROBINSON. *The Sacristan's Household*, by the author of "Mable's Progress." *He Knew He Was Right*; as good as anything ANTHONY TROLLOPE has ever written. *Phineas Finn*, the same author. *That Boy of Norcott's*, by CHARLES LEVER. *My Daughter Elinor*; a powerfully-written novel descriptive of American society, by an anonymous author (all from the prolific press of the Messrs. Harper). *The Dead Guest*, by HEINRICH ZSCHOKKE; a brief and mysterious story. And *The Lost Manuscript*, by GUSTAV FREYTAG; somewhat in the style of the Mühlbach novels. Both from the German (D. Appleton & Co).

#### ART. X.—THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

##### ITALY.

[This intelligence was received at the last moment from our associate, Prof. HENRY B. SMITH, who, under date of *La Tour, Piedmont, June 10th*, writes what we know will give pleasure to his numerous anxious friends: "I am gaining day by day in health and strength in these old Waldensian valleys, which I have always so longed to see. The country is charming . . . I am getting to climb hills and ride donkeys, etc. I begin to feel some surer hope of being quite well again. J. M. S."]

The second volume of the new edition of the Vatican Codex is promised for June. The other four volumes will appear at intervals of ten months. Though this Roman edition is much more carefully edited than was that of Cardinal Mai, yet it is doubtful whether it can be considered as final. The Codex is not perfectly reproduced. Some of the marginal readings (supposed by the editors to be of late date, or to be worthless), are altogether omitted in this edition of the text, and are to be reproduced only in the last (the 6th) volume of the work, which is to contain the critical notes, tables, and other apparatus. Thus it will be a long time before scholars can be put into possession of the whole MS.; and even then they will not have it just as it is—which is what they want.

The most distinguished living Roman controversialist, Perrone, of the Roman College, has recently published a little book, badly got up, on *The Protestants in Italy*—directed against the new schemes of evangelization, and especially against the Waldenses. It is simply a repetition of the old abuse and misrepresentation of Protestantism, made somewhat more piquant by the new times. Rome is aggrieved and astonished at the "cloud of witnesses" which is rising up all over Italy, and thronging around the Eternal City—soon, though not without one stout struggle more, to enter into the only capital Italy can have. The Waldensian preachers and evangelists, bearing the very names of the old martyrs (as if risen from the dead), are everywhere preaching the gospel for which their fathers were imprisoned and slain—or shut up among the hills. From these old, consecrated hills they are coming down, with peaceful banners, to evangelize the plains, now thrown wide open.

The subject of the projected Council, called at Rome, is acquiring increased interest, and its probable programme, influence and result, are sharply debated. Some say, that the opposition to its supposed aims is already so decided, especially among many French and German bishops, that it will be found expedient to postpone it indefinitely. It seems to be generally supposed that Rome wants the *Syllabus* sanctioned, and the personal infallibility of the

Pope pronounced; and it is even reported that Cardinal Manning is to take the lead in advocating this personal infallibility, and Archbishop Dupanloup in opposition to it. The Italian Government, and all liberal Catholics, are opposed to the holding of the Council: and this opposition is expressed, not only in the public newspapers, but also in special pamphlets. I have before me a pamphlet of some forty pages, entitled, *The Œcumenical Council and the Rights of the State*—written in the interest of the Italian Government, by an ecclesiastic of high standing in northern Italy (printed in Florence, published in French, with the name of a Paris publisher on the cover), ably advocating the position that, according to the law and precedents of the (R. C.) Church, no council can be considered as general which is not convoked by the civil, as well as by the ecclesiastical authority. In the north of Italy there is undoubtedly a growing opposition to the Papal pretensions. Milan feels the need of its old, relative independence. Several of the bishoprics, whose incumbents are deceased, are now filled by vicars (since Pope and King cannot agree); and these vicars are generally favorable to the national cause. Great changes are undoubtedly rapidly going on.

The fourth centenary of the birth of Macchiavelli, was celebrated at Florence on the 3d of May. It was a quiet and well-arranged festival, but had nothing of the character of a popular demonstration. Macchiavelli's monument was visited in the church of Santa Croce (the Westminster Abbey of Tuscany); then his house was thronged; in the afternoon there were festivities in the gardens. Oricellari, in the coming MS. translation of the *Andrea* of Terence, was produced at one of the theatres, and there was also a public exposition of his manuscripts and of the various editions of his works, in the halls of the Uffizi. The celebration was made to have a semi-political character, adapted to our times, by representing Macchiavelli, as a leader in the cause of Italian independence and unity. This is signified in the inscription upon the marble tablet which was set up for the occasion on Macchiavelli's house, viz.:

"A. NICCOLO MACCHIAVELLI,  
Della Unita Nazionale  
Precorritore audace ed indovino  
E d'Armi proprie e non avvantizie  
Primo Istitutore e Maestro—  
L'Italia Una ed Armata  
Pose il 3 Maggio, 1869,  
Quarta di lui Centenario."

The municipal government of Florence also offer a considerable prize for the best work on his life and times, the manuscript to be sent to Terenzio Mainiari, Senator and President of the Commission, by the last of December, 1871. The extracts which the Italian journals have recently published from his works, show an almost prophetic sagacity as to the needs of Italy. One of the Florence journals severely criticised Macaulay's well-known essay on Macchiavelli, and accused him of palpable blunders in translation; but it appears that the blunders were made by the Italian translator of Macaulay's essay, translating the English version back into the original Italian.

#### ENGLAND.

In *Oriental literature* a kind of epoch is marked by the appearance of the first volume of Max Müller's translation of *The Sacred Hymns of the Brahmins as presented to us in the Oldest Collection of Religious Poetry, The Rig Veda Samhita*. Volume I. comprises *Hymns to the Maruts, or Storm Gods*, with ample illustrations by the learned editor. Professor M. concentrates in the Vedas the results of his life-long studies, and his edition of the original texts, executed at the expense of the East India Company, forms one of the most colossal monuments of learned labor that even Teutonic perseverance has produced. Equally strong in modern English and in ancient Sanscrit, he brings to the task of translation, advantages that it is impossible any earlier scholar could possess, and we may expect from his work a clearer intelligence of the

first recorded utterances of our race than has ever yet been obtained. The entire translation will form eight volumes in octavo. Other important books on Eastern history and antiquity, are the new volumes of Mr. Talbot Wheeler's *History of India from the Earliest Ages*. It includes a full analysis of the great Sanscrit Epic Poem *The Ramayana*, treating it in connection with the Brahminic period, as his first volume comprised the sister epic, *The Maha Bharata* and the Vedic Era. *The History of India*, as told by its own historians during the Mohammedan period, by Sir Henry Elliot and Prof. Dowson, has been continued by a second volume, and will be completed in a third. The first volume of a new edition of the *Works of Archbishop Leighton*, embracing his *Sermons and Charges*, and many pieces now first published, has been issued from the London press. So many errors have crept into the printed copies of Leighton's writings, that the work now appearing will be found "rather a new book than a new edition." The editor, who has been many years engaged in the work, is the Rev. Wm. West, one of the leaders of the Ritualistic party. The edition will comprise six volumes.

Mr. E. Deutsch, of the British Museum, author of that article on "The Talmud," in the *Quarterly Review*, which attracted great attention last year, was sent to examine the explorations in Jerusalem, and, the *Athenæum* says, "has returned to London from his Eastern journey, not only richer, generally, in knowledge of Semitic countries, but with curious additions to the special knowledge of scholars in Semitic antiquities. Mr. Deutsch has deciphered the inscriptions on the 'great stones' of the Temple platform, and finds them to be Phœnician masons' marks. Thus, we have an end of all doubts as to the original builders of that side of the Temple wall. They were of the age of Solomon, and probably the craftsmen of Hiram, King of Tyre. Mr. Deutsch has also recovered the lost letters of the Maccabean Hebrew alphabet. Two such 'finds' rarely fall to the lot of a single traveller.

#### UNITED STATES.

*The Life of Sir William Hamilton*, By Prof. VEITCH, just published in London, is a memoir that will be read with great interest in this country, where he was earlier appreciated than at home. The appendix contains an interesting paper from Prof. Noah Porter, of Yale College, on the influence of his writings in America. It appears that his studies were pursued under the pressure of narrow circumstances; that he was obliged to seek from the uncongenial profession of law the means that his own line of research failed to afford him; and when almost disabled by paralysis, he in vain applied for a pension from Government as a recognition of his services; all he could at last obtain was the pittance of £100 a year for his life. His common-place book was a folio of 1,200 pages, "made up and bound by his own hands." Another remarkable biographical work which has just made its appearance, (1,100 pp.) is John Forster's, *Walter Savage Landor*, embracing, besides a sketch of his life, an ample analysis and full specimens of his writings.

Thomas Carlyle. Messrs. Scribner, Welford & Co., are bringing out an entirely new edition of the whole of Mr. Carlyle's works, to be completed in 30 vols. It has been carefully revised by the author, and handsomely printed in 8vo., with portraits, maps, etc. The first four volumes are now ready, and one will appear regularly on the 15th of each month. The new works just received by Scribner & Welford include many of marked interest. In the department of "Philosophy, Theology, and Religion," there are Eadie's new *Commentary on Galatians*; *Five Years in a Protestant Sisterhood*, and *Ten Years in a Catholic Convent*; Jenkins's *Age of the Martyrs*; a new supply of Alfred's Greek New Testament, and Waddington's *Congregational History*. In History and Biography, there are John Forster's *Life of Walter Savage Landor*, and Veitch's *Memoir of Sir William Hamilton*. Poetry and Fiction are represented by William Morris's *Grettit Saga*, and by Thackeray's *Ballads and Tales*, the latest volume of this superb and uniform Library Edition which is now rapidly approaching its conclusion. All the other departments, of literature are fully sustained, as an inspection of Messrs. Scribner & Welford's amply stored shelves will show.

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